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This monograph is part of a series of books covering various aspects 
of the decade of Eastern European transition, with a focus on 
Ukraine. The book’s chapters, as presented by their authors, are in 
fact the result of a collective effort – research, brainstorming 
sessions, and open seminars – on the part of Ukrainian and foreign 
economists associated with the Harvard/CASE Ukraine Project 
(HCUP).  Several of the ideas in this volume have been presented 
before in the form of various analyses and recommendations to 
Ukrainian policymakers, and thus have already contributed, 
directly or indirectly, to Ukrainian policies and reforms.  
 
 
1. Market of ideas 
 
Due to financial constraints, Ukraine’s capacity for actively 
supporting both basic and applied research and publications 
remains low.  Professional books in economics and economic policy, 
including those on post-Soviet transition, remain in short supply.  
The importance of this research deserves attention and support 
from Ukrainian authorities and international donors.1 Reforms 
                                                          
1 In contrast to some other CEE countries, the number of books providing solid 
research on the Ukrainian transition is modest.  These are important publications. 
However, international donors, willing to finance costly reforms, are not providing 
sufficient support for the acquisition and diffusion of the knowledge required for 
implementing the reforms.  
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undertaken in Ukraine are complex and expensive and, to be 
successful, require much conceptual and analytical effort.2  
Comprehensive research publications, in addition to – but not 
instead of – detailed policy analysis papers and ad hoc policy notes, 
are needed to formulate and implement well designed reforms. Our 
books are published with the aim of making our contribution 
towards this end.   
 
In order to develop the competitive market of products (goods and 
services), a parallel development of many other “kinds” of 
competitive markets is necessary, such as the bonds and equities 
markets (stock exchange, sale of enterprises), currency and debt, 
real estate (land), labor (including a management skills market), 
technology, social and political activities (NGOs), institutions and 
policies, and ideas. A decade of experience with the post-Soviet 
transition demonstrated that all of these markets are indispensable 
for successful reforms. Moreover, they are closely interrelated and 
tightly interwoven, being both mutually competitive as well as 
mutually complementary.  They are mutually competitive, while 
for striving for the attention of policymakers and scarce resources; 
for example, major institutional reform efforts must often be 
undertaken at the expense of investments into new technologies in 
the public sector. To provide another example, comprehensive land 
(agrarian) reforms are likely to produce a short-run negative effect 
on agricultural produce market.  They are also mutually 
complementary, since they remain in strong symbiotic 
relationships and the development of each one of them requires the 
development of all of the others. Investments in new technologies 
require good institutional arrangements; good institutions are made 
possible by good policies, and good policies, in turn, are made 
possible by good institutions. Both good institutions and policies 
demand good ideas, while good ideas are generated by a strong 
research base, active and competent civil society (NGOs), and so on. 
 
Neglecting any of these markets impedes the development of the 
entire lot. A weak and malfunctioning land market, because of 
opposition to the private ownership of land; or equity market, as a 
result of a nontransparent stock exchange; enterprise market, 
because of corrupt sale procedures; management skills market, 
arising from distortions introduced by the closed stock status of 
many corporations; labor market, because of laws protecting 
unproductive work; foreign exchange market, as a result of the 
absence of an operational currency exchange; or a weak and poorly 
                                                          
2 Kyiv National Economic University professor Mykhailo Savluk argues that the 
notion that “U.S. universities are rich because the state is rich” is incorrect. 
Rather, “the country is rich because its universities are rich” (Gennadiy Neverov. 
Ukrayina Business (Ukrainian newspaper), December 21, 2000). 
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functioning ideas market, thwarted by the lack of reliable data and 
research capacities; etc. spill over to other markets, undermining 
each one of them and the entire transition process. 
In other words, if one market performs worse than the others, the 
whole process remains sub-optimal. In fact, we would be better off by 
allocating more reform effort to the development of this under-
performing, laggard market, and less effort to supporting those that 
are already more developed and performing better.  For example, the 
effectiveness of various privatization efforts could be restricted by the 
absence of a properly functioning stock and management markets.  
Likewise, technological improvements in the energy or agricultural 
sectors are of little use without fundamental institutional reforms.  
Similarly, it makes little sense to require the introduction of market 
prices (cost-based) for municipal utility services when the 
institutional and technical infrastructures are not in place.   
 
Great and wise efforts across the entire spectrum of these diverse 
markets are necessary in order to successfully replace the old, rigid, 
predominantly vertical structures with new, horizontal, competitive 
and flexible structures. Interestingly, the neoclassical concept of 
allocative efficiency applies here as well as in standard factor 
allocation problems.  Markets are institutions and institutions turn 
out to be very important production factors.  If there are differences in 
the “marginal productivities” of these markets (i.e., in the levels of their 
performance), then the basic requirement for allocative efficiency is not 
satisfied and the transition process becomes inefficient. 
There is also not much point in implementing a new law or policy if 
there is no “critical mass” of political leaders, economic experts, and 
population at large who understand the underlying rationale of the 
law or policy and support it.  For example, insisting on abolishing an 
export duty, if most local experts and political leaders believe that the 
duty is good for the country, is not the right strategy.  In other words, 
if proper efforts are not made to  collect data, do research, publish 
materials, provide explanations, and conduct information campaigns, 
formal legislative efforts will be unproductive. 
 
Perhaps the most important lesson we learned during the last 
decade has been that a narrow technocratic approach to reforms 
and the mechanical adoption of standard western market-oriented 
policies will not work unless broad changes are introduced in social 
and institutional environments in terms of both formal and, most 
importantly, informal institutions.  Information and knowledge, 
and their use in policymaking and investment decisions, turn out to 
be fundamental growth factors.  In transition economies, 
information and knowledge become the main driving force for 
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reforms and growth, rather than labor, capital and technology, 
although the latter, rather than the former, are used as standard 
explanatory variables in textbook economic growth models. 
An efficient market of ideas is a sine qua non for a successful 
transition.  The effective execution of transition-related policies, 
foreign aid initiatives, etc. require knowledge and reliable 
information. Moreover, we must know how to allocate both the efforts 
and the funds, and must be able to formulate useful, realistic and 
meaningful tasks, i.e., reasonable targets or benchmarks.  The 
reform process cannot be conducted in a void: it needs a variety of 
government data-collection and research units, diverse economic 
monitoring efforts, active academic institutions and NGOs, 
conferences, seminars, and publications all of which contribute to a 
competitive market of ideas.  This in turn creates an environment in 
which many questions are asked, and answers to these questions are 
sought; and in which policy and reform initiatives are formulated, 
and their implementation evaluated.  Thus, to do it right, a rich 
intellectual infrastructure is required. 
There must also be far reaching improvements in the availability of 
accurate information at both the microeconomic and 
macroeconomic level, without which it would be impossible to invest 
efficiently in the economy and implement effective policies.  Painful 
problems related to corruption, the black market, low fiscal 
discipline, weak contract enforcement, inadequate private property 
protection, low capital investment, and inefficient foreign aid cannot 
be solved without major improvements in the area of information 
and knowledge.   
 
 
2. Project closure 
Currently, as of May 2001, the Harvard/CASE Ukraine Project is 
in its closing stage.  It remains operational at a low level, with an 
extension under the auspices of CASE, Warsaw, which has been 
made possible by additional funding, provided by USAID.  Our 
main task now is to finalize various project activities and to 
publish a few monographs, including this volume, presenting the 
Project’s results. 
For some of us, this Project has meant a lot, and perhaps, in a way, 
has given our lives more meaning.  We did our best to help a 
country of some 50 million inhabitants establish and strengthen its 
links with developed western countries; to improve its knowledge of 
economics and policymaking; and to make the lives of its people a 
little bit better, or at least, a little less difficult.  
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3. Main project accomplishments 
To become a strong, independent, democratic, lawful, and 
prosperous European state, Ukraine must develop close economic 
and cultural ties with the international community of democratic 
states.  This task requires knowledge and human capital with the 
skills needed by a modern market economy, and a strong civil 
society with a broad base of support for reforms.  All of this can be 
accomplished with, among other things, a body of well-developed 
basic and applied research; mass education in economics, public 
policy and other modern social sciences; well-educated elite; strong 
democratic and market institutions; and last but not least good 
policies. 
The output of our project is very large.  While it is not possible to 
list everything, I will present those accomplishments I consider 
being the most important. 
Information.  As presented above, throughout the Project great 
importance was attached to good data, information, knowledge, and 
overall transparency.  A number of economic data libraries and 
monitoring systems were therefore initiated, and several direct data 
surveys were designed and implemented.  An important 
accomplishment was our assistance in initiating, designing and 
developing an “operational monitoring” system that is currently 
maintained and widely used by the Ministry of Economy.  This 
monitoring system includes data collection, presentation, analysis, 
and policy evaluation.  In addition, over the past year HCUP has 
begun designing another data system that goes beyond current 
standards.  We call it analytical monitoring because it includes 
specially designed indicators – including “institutional” and 
“structural” – that, we claim, better reflect the processes occurring 
in an incomplete market, or transitional economy, as in the case of 
Ukraine.  Most of these indicators reflect selected relationships, i.e., 
coefficients estimated by standard statistical techniques, like 
correlation and regression coefficients, structural ratios, etc.  
Unfortunately, efforts throughout former Soviet bloc countries to 
develop and use meaningful indicators for such economies are not 
very advanced.  Furthermore, the existing standard indicators in 
policy analysis and evaluation, which are used by domestic 
policymakers and international organizations, fail to provide truly 
useful information about these economies.  We have therefore tried 
to develop a new methodology that could be applied not only to the 
Ukrainian economy, but also to those of other transition countries.   
 
National accounts and economic modeling.  It is very difficult to 
understand what is happening in the economy and to evaluate 
policies without a solid, internally consistent accounting system 
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and strong econometric modeling capacities.  An important output 
of HCUP is an operational macroeconomic model, well tested and 
thoroughly documented, which enables checking the credibility of 
various official statistics, reconciling national accounts, estimating 
crucial structural and behavioral coefficients, explaining 
transformations of the economy, running diverse hypothetical 
simulations, and producing economic forecasts.  Due to significant 
problems with data, this model is still more a learning tool than a 
reliable forecasting utility.  It assists in detecting problems with 
official data and with idiosyncratic arbitrary policies.  More work is 
needed to account for the unofficial (shadow) economy and its 
effects on structural changes and growth.  
Struggling with virtuality.  Virtuality is a typical feature of a 
post-Soviet economy.  It consists of a large quantity of facts and 
figures that exist officially, but not in reality.  As virtuality is the 
main enemy of market reforms, HCUP directed its attention to “non-
standard” data that is not available from official libraries, and to 
non-standard methodologies for gathering, analyzing, and using 
this information in formulating policy recommendations.  Our focus 
was on bureaucracy, the shadow economy, corruption, budget-
sector expenditures not included in the official budget, barter, 
“mutual settlements,” arrears, nonpayments, etc.  A number of 
surveys were conducted – on the shadow economy, impediments to 
trade, international competitiveness of the Ukrainian economy, and 
others – and we presented many research reports that were used by 
Ukrainian policymakers and analysts.  
Education.  We viewed support for education as the most 
important task of the Project.  Thus, we held several series of 
seminars on economics, finance, and macroeconomic policies in 
which many members of the Verkhovna Rada (the Parliament) and 
senior staff members of the Ministry of Economy and National Bank 
participated.  We also offered a large number of open seminars 
covering a variety of economic policy issues, which were attended by 
hundreds of policymakers, analysts and advisors.  Other activities 
included seminars and internships for economics students.  A 
number of our interns and junior economists were trained with 
hands-on experience by participating in a variety of policy analysis 
projects, and we managed to sponsor several of them to attend 
educational programs at Harvard.  In fact, about twenty of our 
former consultants and interns are currently studying at Harvard 
and other top U.S. and Western European universities.   
Dissemination.  We sent our current economic reports and policy 
analysis studies to the several hundred people in the Ukrainian 
economic policy “community,” including the Government and its 
agencies, research and educational organizations, foreign assistance 
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organizations, and others.  The Ukrainian mass media – including 
TV, radio, newspapers, and professional journals – frequently 
interviewed members of our team, presented our educational 
programs, and featured our articles and policy research papers on a 
number of occasions. Our Internet site was visited daily by many 
people from every region of Ukraine and from abroad. 
 
Broad intellectual support.  HCUP has maintained close contact 
with many senior policymakers in Ukraine, as well as with Ukrainian 
and foreign policy analysts and advisors.  We have had numerous 
informal meetings and discussions on a variety of issues – both 
general transition-related problems and concrete reform initiatives – 
as well as large round-table conferences, workshops and seminars.  
The informal meetings in particular enabled us to develop cordial 
relationships with people involved in Ukrainian reforms, to build 
confidence in one another, and to exchange views on a wide range of 
topics.  It was truly a great learning experience for both sides. 
NGOs.  HCUP cooperated with a number of Ukrainian NGOs, and 
especially with educational and think-tank organizations.  Our 
cooperation resulted in many joint projects, seminars, presentations 
and publications.  On several occasions, we helped establish links 
between Ukrainian NGOs and the Ukrainian government, donors, 
and foreign NGOs.  This joint work contributed significantly to 
many reform concepts and initiatives.  
Lessons from the international experience.  Ukraine is not alone 
in its reform efforts.  Similar transformations and problems, 
although varying in degree, are occurring in neighboring countries.  
An important task of the Project was to bring the reform experience 
of other countries to Ukraine for the latter to learn from these 
accomplishments and failures.  We have also established close ties 
with several countries in the region, especially with Poland and 
Bulgaria.  Polish and Bulgarian experts participated in all of our 
endeavors, including education, conferences, direct policy support, 
and research (international comparative studies).  In this regard, we 
focused on issues like fiscal policy, taxes, rural development, 
agriculture, corporate governance, capital market development, and 
administrative reform (decentralization).  
Opening up.  HCUP helped develop Ukraine’s international 
contacts by: putting its leaders in touch with experts and 
policymakers in other countries, especially in the U.S.; assisting 
and/or supporting foreign trips of Ukrainian policymakers, 
researchers, and students; and sponsoring visits to Ukraine by 
internationally-known intellectuals, economists, and policymakers.  
We also brought to Ukraine many outstanding experts in economic 
policy, including a number of professors from Harvard, University of 
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Pennsylvania, Oxford, and other universities.  Finally, we assisted 
Ukrainian experts in establishing contacts with their counterparts 
in the CEE and several western countries. 
Policy advice.  HCUP helped Ukrainian policymakers with many 
day-to-day issues – like fiscal and monetary policy, and 
privatization – and produced hundreds of policy memoranda.  Direct 
assistance was also provided for the preparation of many official 
international and government presentations and documents, and 
many of the latter were based on our materials. An important 
aspect of this activity was the effort to help establish certain 
standards for cooperation between policy analysts, advisors, and 
political leaders. The problem is not only the nature of the advice, 
but also the capacity to apply it. In this regard, Ukraine needs to 
develop the professional advising culture that was absent in the 
Soviet Union.  Under the Soviet system, important economic 
decisions were of a political nature and were monopolized by a small 
group of leaders in Moscow.  As economic policy in the western 
meaning of the word was not practiced, policy advising was 
therefore not necessary.     
Struggling with “gaps.”  HCUP’s efforts were aimed at identifying 
important and harmful gaps in existing knowledge, and at filling 
these gaps with meaningful research.  A good example of such a gap 
was the “territory” between macroeconomic and microeconomic 
policies and reform initiatives.  While a number of experts worked 
on various macro and micro issues, almost none studied the mutual 
links, impact and feedback.  We therefore initiated an important 
project, Micro Foundations of Macro Policies, which encompassed 
both data collection and research.  This project was especially 
appreciated by many senior advisors to Ukrainian policymakers. 
Reforms.  We assisted in all major reform efforts in Ukraine, 
especially in developing the Pynzenyk comprehensive reform 
package in the fall of 1996, and the Yushchenko program Reforms 
for Prosperity in the spring of 2000.  In both cases our team worked 
closely with Ukrainian leaders to produce these milestone reform 
documents.  Over time, we have seen our reform recommendations 
gradually implemented.   
Almost always there occurred a significant time lag between a 
reform initiative and its implementation.  There are several 
examples: the abolishment of so-called mutual settlements in the 
budget sphere, abolishment of pension arrears, cuts in payroll tax, 
an increase in the proportion of fiscal income generated by excise 
taxes, low and flat tax rates for small business, a floating exchange 
rate, various privatization initiatives, liberalization of the internal 
registration of citizens (the propiska), liberalization of international 
trade and travel, etc.   
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Credit for these reforms should go, first of all, to Ukrainian 
policymakers, and also to local and foreign advisors, including the 
Harvard/CASE team.  Moreover, it appears the first positive results 
of these reforms are finally beginning to be noticed.  Over the past 
year, GDP, household incomes, consumption, output from 
consumer-oriented industries and from agriculture, foreign trade 
turnover, and banking sector activities increased significantly (some 
of them increased for the first time since independence), while 
barter, “mutual settlements,” arrears, and foreign debt declined.  
Consistency (reforms and policy integration).  A serious problem 
for Ukraine is the fact that policies are highly segmented, often with 
a lack of internal consistency between them.  HCUP attempted to 
assemble parts of various policies into one consistent framework, 
both institutionally (the structure of the policy process) and in 
substance.  There are several policymaking units in Ukraine, but 
communication between them is underdeveloped and coordination 
mechanisms are lacking. Likewise, there are a number of good 
policy documents – some of them officially approved by the Cabinet 
of Ministers and the Parliament – like the Reforms for Prosperity 
program and the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with the 
European Union.  However, the actual policies still tend to be 
narrowly defined, focusing on specific issues, and are not fully 
reconciled with these basic documents, nor with one another.  
HCUP has therefore been arguing for the establishment of a policy 
coordination unit.  While the unit has not yet been established, 
some coordination efforts have been partially successful.  We also 
argued for and assisted in designing a comprehensive system for 
monitoring policies and legislation.  Our initiative to formulate an 
economic constitution for Ukraine was well received by several 
policymakers but still awaits implementation.   
 
 
4. Acknowledgments 
According to many experts, the Harvard/Case Ukraine Project was 
one of the most important USAID projects in Ukraine.  Closing it 
down has not been easy.  We, as well as USAID and the U.S. 
Ambassador to Ukraine, received many phone calls and letters 
explaining the unique importance of the Project and arguing for its 
continuation.  We have met with a lot of appreciation from a very 
large number of persons, both in Kyiv and Washington, for which 
we are grateful. 
 
Soon, a new USAID project will begin and hopefully, after the usual 
difficult start-up time, some of our activities will resume.  The new 
project will be run not by Harvard but by a professional consulting 
firm. 
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It is difficult to overrate the importance of good systematic long-
term economic monitoring, solid economic research, academic 
education and policymaking capacity-building, good reform 
measures and sound policies.  Many foreign aid projects continue to 
be wasted until good economic policies are implemented, as was 
convincingly documented in a 1998 World Bank report Assessing 
Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why and several other 
publications.   
Ukraine needs considerable assistance in order to develop its own 
policymaking capacities.  While the country’s internal capacities have 
increased rapidly, Ukraine still needs considerable international help 
in its reform efforts.  If adequate assistance is not provided, then one 
should not expect Ukraine to implement reforms quickly and 
appropriately.  Moreover, if the necessary policy assistance is not 
made available, then one will have no moral right to criticize Ukraine 
for the “sluggishness” of its reforms.  We hope that western leaders 
will understand the crucial importance of aid to policymaking, 
namely, capacity building, assistance in economic policies, and in 
reforms.  We remain optimistic in hoping that, one way or another, 
useful economic policy assistance for Ukraine will be resumed. 
I must stress the great commitment of the entire Harvard/CASE 
team in Kyiv.  Many important activities were incorporated within 
this one single project.  Khwaja Sultan, David Snelbecker and all 
our Ukrainian and Polish (CASE) experts contributed greatly to it.  
Furthermore, the Project would not have begun without the active 
support of Jeffrey Sachs and Alexander Pivovarsky who were 
instrumental in the early reform initiatives that served as blueprints 
for all consecutive reform efforts in Ukraine over the past four years.  
Indeed, the list of individuals who greatly contributed to our project 
is very long.  
Our list of appreciation includes many international experts, especially 
professors Gerard Adams, Anders Aslund, Leszek Balcerowicz, Andrzej 
Bartnicki, Marek Dabrowski, Gerard Duchene, Yegor Gaidar, Rumen 
Gechev, Lester Gordon, Paul Gregory, Mirek Gronicki, Glenn Jenkins, 
Carol Leonard, Herbert Levine, Gregory Mankiw, Jerzy Osiatynski, 
Krzysztof Ostrowski, Thomas Reiner, Yochanan Shachmurove, Joseph 
Stern, Ann Strong, and the late Wladek Jermakowicz. We also enjoyed 
great support from several other individuals at Harvard and other U.S. 
and European universities.  
 
I must also emphasize our friendly and productive collaboration 
with, and significant contributions from, a large number of 
individuals in the Ukrainian Government and its agencies, 
especially the National Bank and State Property Fund, and many 
Ukrainian NGOs.   
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A crucial factor in HCUP activities was a close co-operation with many 
academic and research centers in Kyiv, in particular: Association of 
Ukrainian Banks, Center for Economic Development, Center for 
Market Reforms, Economics Education and Research Consortium 
(EERC), German Advisory Group, Institute of Reforms, KPMG-Barents, 
Ukrainian-European Policy and Legal Advice Center (UEPLAC), 
Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research, and others.   
 
Our appreciation goes, as well, to our colleagues in international 
organizations: EBRD, IFC, IMF, TACIS, UNDP, the World Bank, and 
officials in several embassies in Kyiv, in particular the Austrian, 
British, Canadian, Polish, and U.S. embassies.   
 
Of course, the whole project would not be possible without the 
sponsorship and helpful support of USAID. 
 
We express our sincere thanks to all those who supported and 
contributed in many ways to our project. 
 
 
BOOK OVERVIEW 
A principal difference between the centrally controlled Soviet 
economy and a competitive market economy is the role that money 
and financial activities play in the two systems.  In the latter, money 
is the fundamental category and its circulation connects all parts of 
the economy.  Money provides a “common denominator” for all 
transactions and enables the economy to establish horizontal links 
among producers and consumers, thus making that economy 
“competitive.”   
In the first chapter of this book, Finance and Growth, the 
relationship between financial development and economic growth is 
reconsidered in the context of post-Soviet transition.  The authors 
assert that successful transition is not possible without a strong 
revival of the financial sector, which, in a Marxian economy, was 
downgraded to a peripheral status and basically treated as a 
predominantly passive accounting system. Unlike the “real” sector, 
the financial sector was alleged to fail to produce any useful goods.  
As explained in the first chapter, this is an extremely important 
sector and one of the main tasks during transition is to elevate this 
sector from its laggard position to one where it actually leads the 
economy.  Moreover, the issue is not only the establishment of an 
appropriate financial system infrastructure, but – even more 
importantly – the need for a change in perceptions, in the ways of 
doing business, and even in terminology.  In this book, we avoid for 
“ideological” reasons the confusing distinctions between “real” and 
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“non-real,” “productive” and “non-productive,” etc.  Banking, 
insurance, and real estate are treated as “normal” – real and 
productive – industries, i.e., they are similar to other branches of 
the economy.  However, given that financial sector activities affect 
the operations of all industries and, for that matter, the entire 
economy, financial development possesses many features of public 
good.  This justifies and necessitates special attention and active 
support from government.  In this chapter, the authors examine the 
performance of this sector in Ukraine and conclude that its weak 
condition explains the current poor state of the Ukrainian economy 
and vice versa, and that its development would stimulate economic 
growth. 
This latter assertion leads to two important conclusions.  First, as 
pointed out in the second chapter, Institutional Development of 
the Banking System, the financial sector provides insightful 
benchmark indicators that can be used to monitor, analyze, and 
evaluate the overall progress of transition and economic 
development.  This progress is not adequately reflected by standard 
macroeconomic aggregates, such as GDP, inflation, consumption, 
investment, and income.  Transition requires institutional 
investment in the economy; in the short term, however, this type of 
investment often fails to deliver tangible economic outcomes.  In 
fact, more often than not, the immediate result of this investment is 
a worsening of these aggregates rather than their improvement.  
Thus, judgments formulated and policies evaluated on the basis of 
these aggregates tend to be misleading.  High inflation, high 
unemployment, shrinking GDP, etc. are not necessarily “bad” if they 
reflect the implementation of fundamental market reforms.  These 
reforms are expensive in many ways – economically, socially, and 
politically.  Moreover, they do not usually help political leaders win 
elections, and fail to produce tangible outcomes confirming the 
accomplishments of foreign aid providers.  Almost everyone – 
including political leaders, policy experts, and most importantly, the 
voters – view diminishing industrial output, declining foreign trade, 
and growing income inequality as policy failures.  In fact, these 
aggregates could indicate a true failure indeed, unless they are 
related to appropriate institutional transformations, the 
development of market mechanisms, and enterprise restructuring 
reforms, all of which are not taken into account by standard 
macroeconomic statistics.  If this is the case, the formulation and 
systematic monitoring of well-selected financial development 
indicators could provide the clue for evaluating policies and 
assisting in determining the degree to which economic decline and 
destabilization may be due to policy mismanagement or to long-
term, useful – although painful and unavoidable – reforms.   
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The second conclusion is the need to appreciate the importance of 
financial development.  “The current targeting of monetary policy 
tends to be too narrow and results in governments using diverse 
non-market, or even anti-market measures.  …[Central] banks in 
transition societies should make the development of the financial 
system a high priority, or a ‘parallel target’” (Financial Sector 
Development as a Central Bank Target in Transition 
Economies).  It seems that, in the past, financial development was 
not given the attention and care it deserved.  In particular, the 
accomplishments in macroeconomic stabilization were often made 
possible at the expense of this sector.  Policymakers tended to treat 
financial institutions instrumentally – as a means for making policy, 
and not the aim itself – by using them as tools in their efforts to 
control prices, collect taxes, bridge fiscal gaps, subsidize favored 
sectors and enterprises, protect the “national producer,” manage 
foreign currency exchange, etc.  This strategy often rewarded 
political leaders with short-term gains, like low inflation and a 
stable exchange rate, but punished the economy with delays in the 
establishment of a strong competitive banking industry and the 
entire financial sector.  Weak and mismanaged banks fell prey to 
powerful interests that took advantage of this weakness.  Tight 
controls – undertaken to accumulate money in the banking system 
and to prevent shadow transactions, corruption and capital flight – 
tended to paralyze commercial finance and produce outcomes 
opposite to those officially proclaimed.  The financial sector can 
hardly prosper and grow when abused by corrupted interests and 
micro-managed by authorities whose priorities are often not aimed 
at strengthening and further developing financial institutions. 
Examples of specific financial development tasks for a central bank 
in a transition economy are provided in the chapter Role of the 
Central Bank in the Development of Banking.  A basic problem 
is the pervasiveness of asymmetric information, which in a 
transition economy becomes a major obstacle to reforms and 
growth.  The experience of countries like Russia, the Czech 
Republic, Bulgaria, and Albania has demonstrated the harmful 
consequences that can be produced by mishandling this asymmetry 
in the banking industry.  Imposing strict informational 
requirements that foster greater transparency in banking, more 
consistent rules and less confusing administrative micro-
management, fewer market distortions (such as supporting an 
overvalued currency or providing loans ordered by the authorities), 
and strict contract enforcement become tasks of crucial importance 
for monetary policy leaders. 
All of these tasks are aimed at helping to monetize the economy, 
thus enabling money to fulfil its basic functions.  In the chapter 
Cyclical Dynamics of the Demonetized Sector, all transactions 
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conducted without money, or “non-monetary transactions” – like 
barter, payments with promissory notes, arrears, etc. – are 
aggregated into a “demonetized sector” that becomes a complex 
transaction system with its own peculiarities and patterns of 
behavior.  Studying these patterns helps one to understand the 
underlying processes and to detect important causalities. An 
interesting feature of the demonetized sector is its cyclical behavior.  
Description and analysis of the cycles improves our understanding 
of the demonetization phenomenon, assists in explanation and 
forecasting, and provides benchmarks for policy evaluation and 
economic performance.  The study of “demonetization cycles” 
confirms the existence of various fundamental problems in the 
Ukrainian economy, like the vicious circle of debt, and illustrates 
the specific economic effects of new institutional arrangements.  It 
turns out that enterprise arrears tend to “shuttle” between 
payments for labor and payments for other inputs.  Overdue inter-
enterprise liabilities are reduced at the expense of wage arrears, 
while the latter are diminished at the expense of the former.  
Arrears cycles are similar to those observed in centrally planned 
economies.  During transition, the system of fiscal and other 
financial regulations and penalties plays a similar role to that of 
centrally planned output quotas that require certain levels of 
performance by given dates. The one-year and five-year planning 
cycles, which had occurred in the Soviet economy, are now replaced 
by annual demonetization cycles and, perhaps, by longer transition 
cycles related to the subsequent stages of structural reforms.  The 
one-year cycles result in the seasonal increases and declines of 
various kinds of nonpayments, arrears and barter transactions. The 
long-run cycle manifested itself in the economic decline and 
increased demonetization of the 1990s, with a “peak” in 1997-99, 
and a “plateau,” or switch in the direction of change, in 1999-2000. 
 
Barter is an important pillar of the demonetized economy.  “The role 
of barter in a post-Soviet economy may be much greater than many 
economists would be willing to admit.  … [The] main problem with 
barter is not its alleged high transaction costs, but rather its 
nontransparent nature.  … [Barter] transactions break the market 
down into a huge number of separate little segments, each of them 
creating a small niche that provides appropriate ‘intimacy’ for a 
sale/purchase contract. … An obvious negative externality of barter 
is its promotion of an idiosyncratic clandestine business culture, 
where all pieces of the officially available information – prices, 
wages, interest rates, sale transactions, privatization contracts, tax 
payments, etc. – are ‘virtual’, not real, at best only partly true.  … Of 
course, this kind of duality – official and unofficial (further 
complicated by the multiplicity of many shades of ‘gray-area’ 
operations) – does not help successful reforms and dynamic 
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sustainable growth.” – according to the chapter on Transactions in 
Transition: To Barter or not to Barter?  In the literature, there 
exist a large number of hypotheses concerning the causes of barter.  
All of these hypotheses seem to be at least partly true; some of them 
become less important in time, while others become more 
important.  Learning by doing, businesses continue to refine their 
barter strategies in order to take advantage of the low level of 
transparency.  Barter becomes an important way for firms to stay in 
business and to generate monopolistic rents. 
According to a hypothesis presented by the author of The 
Fundamental Macroeconomic Cause of Barter and Arrears in 
Post-Soviet Economies, the main reason for barter is a 
combination of harsh price policy and soft budget constraint.  If 
market clearing-prices are lower than actual production and 
transaction costs incurred by producers, and selling products below 
cost is not allowed, then producers have to find a way to increase 
product prices and reduce input prices.  The former can be 
accomplished with barter deals between suppliers and purchasers 
in which official transaction prices are made much higher than 
market cash prices.  The latter can be accomplished with arrears, 
payments with various promissory notes, partial payments, virtual 
payments (through some mutual settlements), and simple 
nonpayments.  If this is so, then the main cause of barter, more 
than anything else, is confused price policy, and, unless this policy 
changes, barter will continue to prosper.   
The last two chapters, Industrial Production and Finance and 
The Economic Situation in Ukraine: 2000 provide an overview of 
Ukraine’s economic performance in 2000.  The bad news is that the 
economy remains in poor condition.  The good news is that it 
improved significantly in 2000.  GDP remained at a shamefully low 
level – UAH 2600 (USD 630) per capita in 1999, and UAH 3600 
(USD 660) per capita in 2000.  Raw materials and other low value-
added products (power, fuels, metals, and chemicals) accounted for 
two-thirds of gross industrial output and two-thirds of foreign trade.  
Inflation increased in 2000, reaching about 25 percent.  Net fixed 
capital formation (gross investment less capital depreciation) was 
negative.  Very little investment was done by privately owned 
enterprises: 92 percent was undertaken by state-owned and 
“collective” enterprises, while bank credits and equity investments 
played a marginal role, amounting to just a few percentage points.  
Total foreign investment in 2000 was USD 12 per capita, which was 
one of the lowest levels in the world.  If to subtract from this figure 
institutional investment (EBRD and others) and domestic 
reinvestment (Ukrainian capital repatriated through a foreign firm), 
then true foreign commercial investment was negligible.  The 
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financial sector remained in a rudimentary stage, and bank deposits 
and credits were very low.  In the last quarter of 2000, banking 
industry profitability sharply declined to negative values.  Average 
official daily income and household expenditures remained below 
the World Bank poverty benchmark of USD 1 per person per day. 
Only shadow transactions raised this figure above USD 1.  
Privatization provided less income than expected, for which 
nontransparent procedures and the low-level attractiveness of 
Ukrainian enterprises were blamed. Despite all of these gloomy 
figures, the year 2000 delivered several good figures.  Almost 
everything “bad” – wage and pension arrears, barter, fiscal deficit, 
foreign debt, etc. – was reduced; and almost everything “good” – 
GDP, real wages and incomes, foreign trade, industrial output, 
agricultural output, foreign currency reserves, bank deposits and 
credits, etc. – increased, although we lack sufficiently precise and 
detailed information for evaluating the time scale and sustainability 
of these improvements.  Asymmetric information, at both the 
aggregate (macro) and enterprise (micro) levels, remains a main 
factor that confuses everybody, including political leaders, experts, 
foreign aid providers, the mass media, investors, producers and 
consumers.  Improving the transparency of the entire economy, 
including tax collection, foreign trade, stock exchanges, banking, 
real estate operations, and so on, has become a major task for 
Ukraine for the next few years.   
At the end of the book, Harvard/CASE quarterly economic 
monitoring tables are provided.  They present selected indicators 
for the Ukrainian economy, annually, 1995-2000, and quarterly, 
1999-2000, covering output, foreign trade, balance of payments, 
public finance, prices, debt, exchange rates, monetary indicators, 
foreign currency reserves, privatization, and wages. Many figures 
used in the book are derived from these monitoring tables and other 
data collected in the Harvard/CASE database. 
This book is a result of the collective effort of the Harvard/CASE 
Ukraine Project team.  In particular, I wish to acknowledge the 
significant conceptual contributions of Vladimir Dubrovskiy, 
Charles Mohan, Alexander Paskhaver, Alexander Pivovarsky, and 
Thomas Reiner.  The consecutive translations (between the 
Ukrainian, Russian, and English languages) and several editions 
were a joint venture of the editor of this book and the authors of its 
chapters, assisted by many individuals: Yarema Bachynsky, Lilia 
Golodniuk, Zina Kravets, Kristina Krechevska, Anna Kolesnichenko, 
Anna Myslinska, Yuriy Oliynik, Mellisa Racey, Andrey Pivovarsky, 
Andrea Pyenson, Thomas Reiner, Olya Ruda, Peter Smilsky, and 
Lukasz Szyrmer.  Our special thanks to Liudmila Furta and Pavel 
Furta for their technical editing of the book. Kristina Krechevska 
skillfully and spiritedly coordinated the entire process. 
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CLOSING REMARKS 
 
A main argument of this book is the great need to improve the 
transparency of the entire economy.  Only with transparency can 
one expect to see good policies and wise investments, and hence, 
economic growth and prosperity. Moreover, not only must the 
economy be made more transparent, but also markets must become 
more open and more competitive, contracts better enforced and 
private property more effectively protected.  Yet, all of these changes 
will not be possible without a further monetization of the economy.  
Money and a well-developed financial sector are irreplaceable. In 
this regard, Mancur Olson (Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing 
Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships. New York: Basic Books, 
2000) expressed an interesting concept: economic and social 
development is made possible by advanced transactions, meaning 
transactions involving complex financial operations.  Countries that 
practice only simple direct transactions fail to build an institutional 
environment in which the efficient allocation of resources over space 
and time is possible, and which gradually enables both political 
“power” and social/economic “prosperity.”  No country thus far 
has enjoyed technological sophistication, high living standards, 
and a strong economy without these advanced financial 
transactions.   
If this is true, then the most successful transition economies will 
not be those that are the most stable with the most sophisticated 
technologies and the highest industrial output, but rather those 
that monetized their economic transactions, established a strong 
competitive financial sector, and overcame informational confusion 
by eradicating the infamous virtuality.  Such measures will enable 
the development of Olson’s advanced transactions, thereby fostering 
efficiency and prosperity. 
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Introduction 
Under the Soviet system, all financial resources were allocated by 
the state according to the priorities of the Gosplan.  These allocation 
decisions were made for ideological and political reasons rather 
than for reasons of economic efficiency.  Economic actors did not 
compete for financial resources according to who was prospectively 
the most efficient, so there was no need for a developed financial 
system.  Yet, according to Joseph Schumpeter, a well-functioning 
active financial system spurs technological innovation, mainly by 
identifying and supporting entrepreneurs with the best chances for 
success.  A growing body of findings from empirical analyses – 
including firm-level studies, individual country studies, and broad 
cross-country comparisons – demonstrates a strong positive 
relationship between functioning of the financial system and long-
term growth. In fact, as empirical evidence suggests, development of 
the financial system is a precursor and necessary condition for 
sustained growth and successful economic transformation in post-
Soviet transition economies.  Ross Levine argues that the current 
level of financial development (in year t) is a good predictor of future 
                                                          
1 Research under the supervision of professor Janusz Szyrmer.  This chapter was 
originally published in 1999 as an Harvard/CASE Working Paper; and was updated 
and revised in spring 2000. Unless otherwise specified, the sources of information 
and data used in this chapter were: Financial Week (1999), Business, Quarterly 
Monitoring, and Harvard/CASE database.  For another analysis of Ukrainian 
banking covering the year 2000, see “Institutional Development of the Banking 
System” in this volume. 
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rates of economic growth, capital accumulation, and technological 
change (in year t+n, n=1,2,…):2 
Economic growth t + n = f (Financial system t) 
This statement has serious implications for Ukraine.  If its financial 
sector is not strengthened soon, Ukraine could remain in the group 
of low-income countries for a long time.  
This chapter presents the results of a study undertaken with the goal of 
improving our understanding of the role of the financial system in 
promoting growth and recovery in transition countries.  Its focus is 
on Ukraine.  
In Section 1, we present a cross-country analysis of banking 
activities to examine the relationship between the size of the 
financial system and growth.  We also discuss the important 
functions that banking performs in a market economy, and argue 
that if these functions are not fulfilled, the transition to market 
economy will become a difficult and prolonged process.  In Section 
2, we highlight some characteristics of Ukraine’s banking, especially 
those related to asset structure and credit portfolio, with the goal of 
identifying the main problems in this industry.  In Section 3, we 
explore some specific constraints which, we argue, drive away 
consumers of banking services, as a result of which, there is little 
financial intermediation in Ukraine.  Finally, in Section 4, we 
suggest an agenda for policymakers which would allow banking to 
develop, thus, promoting economic growth. 
 
 
1. Banking and the economy 
Cross-country analysis 
The banking industry is critical for capital accumulation, 
technological change, and growth.  Some transition countries, 
through consistent institutional changes, have created conditions 
for banking to grow rapidly.  Ukrainian banking has remained small 
and underdeveloped.  To assess the level of banking system 
development, implementation of its basic functions (see below) and 
quality, the ratio of domestic credits provided by banking system 
was used for a number of countries (Figure 1).  As can be seen this 
indicator remains very low for Ukraine even compared with the 
average for Central European countries, leave alone the average for 
developed ones.  
                                                          
2 Levine, Ross. 1997. “Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and 
Agenda.” Journal of Economic Literature 35. 
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Levine, while comparing bank credits to private enterprises as a 
percentage of GDP noted that, on average, “very rich” countries have 
this indicator equivalent to 53 percent of their GDP; “rich” countries, 31 
percent; “poor” countries, 20 percent; and “very poor” countries, 13 
percent.  In terms of its GDP, Ukraine is classified as a poor country, yet 
its credits to private sector, as of the end of 1999, are 8.6 percent of 
GDP (Bulletin, 2000/4); i.e., they are lower than the average for very 
poor countries.  
Evidence from selected transition countries (Figures 2 and 3) shows 
that growth in banking activity (measured in terms of aggregate 
deposits and aggregate lending to the private sector) goes hand in 
hand with economic growth.  Countries with a sizeable expansion in 
banking show a significant increase in GDP.  As a result, increased 
banking activity becomes a good proxy for future economic growth.  
In Poland, deposits per capita have risen from USD 742 in 1994 to 
USD 1,318 in 1998.  During this period, Poland’s growth rate has 
averaged 6 percent.  Other countries – like the Czech Republic, 
Croatia and Estonia – have experienced a similar growth in deposits 
coupled with growth in real GDP.  In Ukraine, deposits per capita 
have remained stable at about USD 50 over the same period.  This 
coincides with the decline in GDP throughout the 1990s.  
 
Figure 1 
Ratio of domestic credits provided by banking system, 
developed countries* and Central European countries,** 
average, and Ukraine, end of 1999  
 
 
 
 
* France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and the USA. 
** The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. 
Source: Report (2000/2001) 
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An analysis of banking in twenty countries in CEE and Latin 
America, in 1995-97, demonstrates that GDP growth and bank 
lending to the private sector are positively interrelated (Figure 3). 
The volume of private lending reflects several factors: 
• Policy:  with increased private lending, fewer “directed loans” 
are requested/ordered by the government (these usually are 
provided to state-owned enterprises). 
• Economy: private sector lending is related to the level of 
emancipation of the economy from state interference. 
• Banking: large private lending is likely to reflect a competitive 
banking industry. 
 
Figure 2 
Annual GDP growth, percent; and bank deposits, USD per 
capita, end of year; averages for both variables (GDP and 
deposits) over period, 1996–1998 
Source: International Financial (1998) 
 
In Ukraine, credits to private borrowers, expressed as percent of 
GDP, are among the smallest for emerging markets (Figure 3, and 
Appendix Figures A1, A2, and A3). 
While credits to the private sector are positively related to GDP 
growth, credits to the public sector adversely affect growth (Figure 
4).  There are several possible reasons for this.  First, governments 
often borrow to finance current consumption rather than 
investment.  Thus, no new income-generating capacity is created.  
Second, even when governments do invest in social infrastructure, 
the effect on income growth is slow.  Third, the three groups of 
factors related to lending to private borrowers apply, but in reverse.  
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Large public sector credits tend to reflect a low emancipation from 
state interference in banking and the whole economy, and less 
market competition.  
Figure 3 
Annual GDP growth, percent; and bank loans to private 
borrowers, percent of GDP, end of year; averages for both 
variables (GDP and loans) over period, 1995-1997 
Source: Emerging Markets (1998) 
 
Importance of banking  
Banks provide an important link between savers and entrepreneurs 
in an uncertain environment by performing the following functions: 
(1) they allocate resources from savers to the most promising 
entrepreneurs, (2) monitor the managers of borrowing enterprises, 
(3) trade risks, (4) mobilize savings, and (5) facilitate the exchange of 
goods and services.3  These functions are especially important for 
transition economies, which need to bolster private financial 
resources for investment in new businesses. 
It would be costly for individual savers to attempt evaluating 
various firms and the activities of their managers.  Most households 
do not have time, capacity nor expertise to judge market conditions 
accurately.  Savers would be reluctant to invest their money without 
reliable information about borrowers or the market.  Banks provide 
this expertise on behalf of all savers who deposit their money in 
banks, and thus economize on the acquisition of information.  By 
carefully selecting enterprises, banks allocate financial resources to 
earn the highest profit for the given level of risk.  
                                                          
3 Levine, op. cit.  
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Figure 4 
Annual GDP growth, percent; and change in bank loans to 
public sector, percent, end of year; averages for both variables 
(GDP and loans) over period, 1995-1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Emerging Markets (1998) 
 
It would be inefficient for individual savers to monitor borrower 
enterprises.  For one, this would impede investment and business 
decisions.  Individual monitoring by individual lenders would also 
be very expensive.  Finally, individual savers would not have the 
capacity to enforce financial discipline or to exert control over 
enterprises.  Thus, banks undertake delegated monitoring on behalf 
of borrowers.  This makes possible the economizing of saver costs 
and is also preferred by firms because it allows them to deal with 
only a few specialized monitors.  
Banks provide the pooling, trading, and hedging of risks.  Most 
projects require a long-term commitment against liquidity risks by 
using a suitable mix of liquid and illiquid investments. 
It would be costly for firms to mobilize savings from individual 
savers who may not know enough about them.  If banks are 
efficient in performing their role – allocating resources, monitoring 
managers, and trading risks – then savers will feel comfortable with 
entrusting their money to the banks. 
Banks help mobilize saving and thereby facilitate specialization, 
technological innovation, and growth through lowering transaction 
costs.  Greater specialization promotes the exchange of goods and 
services and, thus, encourages gains in productivity. 
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By overcoming information asymmetries and economizing costs, 
banks efficiently channel investments, and play a key role in 
technological upgrade and innovation. 
 
 
2. Features of Ukrainian banking  
We have analyzed several binding constraints on the development of 
banks in Ukraine, and have looked at the structure of the credit 
portfolio, the nature of bank deposits, capital structure, and cash 
flows.  Data from the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) and the 
Association of Ukrainian Banks, which were added to the 
Harvard/CASE database,  were of great assistance in our analysis. 
Credit portfolio  
In 1999, the value of total credit portfolio of Ukrainian banks was equal 
to 11 percent of annual GDP, which was one of the lowest ratios in 
Central Europe.  From Q4’97 to Q4’99, the credit portfolio grew, in 
nominal terms, by 44 percent.  However, in dollar terms, the credit 
portfolio declined by 46 percent over the same period (Figure 5). 
Figure 5 
Credit portfolio, UAH and USD, billion, Q4’97-Q4’99 
 
Source: Harvard/CASE database 
As of the end of 1999, 27 percent of this portfolio consisted of 
problem credits (Figure 7).  With such a high level of problem loans, 
commercial banks have to mobilize a large part of their funds for 
credit risk reserves.  As lending remains very risky, this also 
significantly increases the cost of lending money.  
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Figure 6 
Problem loans, percent of banks’ portfolio, Q4’97-Q4’99  
Source: Harvard/CASE database 
 
The level of problem loans in the total credit portfolio increased 
rapidly from 21 to 32 percent from Q4’97 through Q1’99, but 
declined to 27 percent by Q4’99 (Figure 6).  Problem loans hinder 
the functioning of credit operations and reduce bank profits.  
Another drawback is the high proportion of short-term credits 
(Figure 7).  Of the total credits, 56 percent are short term and only 
17 percent are long term.4  Moreover, some of the good credits (both 
short term and long term) are hidden bad credits.  The practice of 
rolling over credits with irregular servicing (i.e., issuing a new credit 
to finance an old one) allows bankers not to document all bad 
credits and thereby avoid a corresponding (required) augmentation 
of risk-related reserves.   
There is little lending to households: only about 5 percent of total 
credits.  With weak property rights, households usually do not have 
sufficient collateral to secure loans.  Also, with continued economic 
uncertainties, most households are not in a position to predict their 
future incomes, and are therefore not ready for investment decisions.  
The ratio of credits in hard (foreign) currency to total credits as 
growing.  This was mainly due to the depreciation of the hryvnia in 
the autumn of 1998 and throughout 1999.  From Q1’98 through 
Q4’99, credits in foreign currency grew, in nominal terms, from 37 
percent to 54 percent of total credits (Figure 8).  
                                                          
4 Short-term credits are for one year or less; long-term credits are for more than 
one year. 
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Figure 7 
Structure of bank credit portfolio, percent, end of year, 1999 
Source: Harvard/CASE database 
 
Figure 8 
Credits in foreign currency, in hryvnia terms, and credits in 
domestic currency, UAH, billion, end of quarter, Q4’97-Q4’99 
Note: Problem credits are not included. 
Source: Harvard/CASE database 
 
 
The shift from government securities to deposits in foreign banks 
In December 1999, the T-bill portfolio of commercial banks was at 
UAH 633 million, compared to UAH 2.4 billion in June 1998.  In a 
risky lending environment, government securities used to be one of 
the few sources of profit for banks.  However, the government failure 
to repay T-bills in the second half of 1998, and the forced 
restructuring that followed, made this instrument a risky investment.  
As a result, banks almost stopped buying new government securities 
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(Figure 9).  The existing portfolio consisted mainly of restructured 
securities that the banks could not get rid of.  The banks therefore 
reorganized their portfolios, switching to deposits in foreign banks  
 
Figure 9 
Government securities (T-bills) held by commercial banks, UAH, 
billion, end of quarter, Q4’97-Q4’99  
Source: Harvard/CASE database 
While the level of interbank credits to local banks declined from UAH 
1.2 billion in Q4’97 to UAH 0.9 billion in Q4’99 (UAH 0.6 billion in 
Q3’98), interbank credits to foreign banks increased from UAH 0.3 
billion in Q4’97 to UAH 1-1.4 billion in 1999 (Figure 10).  Some of 
these changes are due to the depreciation of the hryvnia, but to a large 
extent, they resulted from the loss of confidence in local banks. 
Figure 10 
Interbank credits to local and foreign banks, UAH, billion, end 
of quarter, Q4’97-Q4’99  
Source: Harvard/CASE database 
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Bank capital structure 
The depreciation of the hryvnia further weakened the already feeble 
capital structure of Ukrainian banks.  Although in hryvnia terms, 
bank capital grew from UAH 3.9 billion (Q4’97) to UAH 6 billion 
(Q4’99), in dollar terms, capital shrank by almost a half over the 
two-year period 1998–99, from USD 2.0 billion to USD 1.1 billion 
(Figure 11).  The increase of capital in hryvnia terms was stipulated, 
above all, by an increase in reserve requirements.  However, bank 
compliance with reserve requirements was rather weak: instead of 
the required UAH 1.7 billion, they held less than UAH 1 billion as of 
June 1, 1999. 
 
Figure 11 
Bank capital, UAH, billion, and USD, billion, end of quarter, 
Q4’97-Q4’99 
Source: Harvard/CASE database 
Also, part of the expansion of the capital base resulted from capital 
swap operations – the exchange of new stock issues of one bank for 
the new stock issues of another.  An alternative is to issue credit to, 
and to purchase additional stocks from the same bank (with the 
same funds).  While this allows bankers to extend the level of 
capital, it is, we believe, a risky operation.  It leads to increased risk 
in the entire banking sector and, in case of a bank panic, could 
result in a chain of bank failures, as happened in Bulgaria in 1996. 
Effect of hryvnia depreciation on bank deposits 
Figure 12 shows how the depreciation of the hryvnia in fall 1998 
adversely affected the dollar value of deposits of both households 
and businesses (total reduction of USD 887 million).  This recession 
continued throughout 1999. 
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Liquidity 
Cash and correspondent accounts (in NBU and commercial banks) 
increased in 1998, and also in the first two quarters of 1999.  This 
increase was due to changes in the level of obligatory reserves for 
credit risk requirements from 15 to 17 percent, and to the 
expansion of the minimum level of capital requirements from ECU 
0.75 million to ECU 1 million (April 1, 1999).  Correspondent 
accounts are treated as liquid assets.  Theoretically, bank liquidity 
increased, but the cash in banks remained almost at the same level 
as in 1997 in nominal terms (Figure 13).  
 
Figure 12 
Total deposits, USD, billion, end of quarter, Q4’97-Q4’99  
 
 
Source: Harvard/CASE database 
 
By the end of Q4’99, cash in Ukrainian banks amounted to UAH 
755 million, or 1.4 percent of total bank assets.  At the same 
time, cash as a percentage of liquid assets dropped from 26 
percent for Q1’98 to 14 percent for Q1’99.  The increase of total 
liquid assets in hryvnia terms was due to the expansion of 
correspondent accounts in accordance with the restrictive NBU 
policy.  For 1998 and 1999, cash as a percentage of total assets 
and of liquid assets declined (Figure 14). 
 
 
3. Why Ukrainian banking sector is not growing 
Several external factors hinder the normal functioning of the 
banking system in Ukraine.  These factors together discourage 
both borrowers and lenders from using banking services, and most 
of these factors are a direct or indirect result of government 
policies. 
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Figure 13 
Cash and correspondent accounts, UAH, billion, end of quarter, 
Q4’97-Q4’99 
 
Source: Harvard/CASE database 
 
 
Figure 14 
Liquidity ratios, percent, end of quarter, Q4’97-Q4’99  
 
 
Source: Harvard/CASE database 
Tax collection and Kartoteka #2 
Banks in Ukraine act as tax collectors.  Under the “Kartoteka #2” 
system, money coming into the bank accounts of firms with tax 
arrears is automatically deducted for payment of those arrears.  As 
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a result, firms avoid transactions through banks.  It is not so much 
the Kartoteka #2 system itself, as the intensity with which it is 
implemented by the tax administration that is driving firms away 
from the banking system.  As of March 1, 1999, Kartoteka #2 
charges on the banks were UAH 52 billion, which was higher than 
the total assets of the banking system (UAH 37 billion).  This 
imposed a high cost on the banks.  Kartoteka #2 was actually 
abolished by presidential decree in June 1999, but this decree has 
not been implemented. 
Directed lending and government-guaranteed loans 
According to the banks, the volume of credits they provided at the 
“request” of the government was UAH 1.6 billion.  Although such 
lending is guaranteed by the state, these obligations are not always 
met.  The loans are often directed to loss-making enterprises.  This 
adversely affects the development of financial markets in Ukraine: it 
imposes an additional cost on banks and depresses profitability. 
Weak implementation of banking regulations 
Implementation of banking regulations is weak in Ukraine, and the 
status of the National Bank as the regulator of the banking system 
is still ambiguous.  As of March 1, 1999, 24 banks (out of 214) had 
statutory funds lower than the required EURO 1 million; 49 banks, 
including all the largest, did not meet the reserve requirement ratio.  
Many small banks continue to operate, even though they fail to 
achieve economies of scale and are not economically viable. 
Problems with credibility 
The unclear valuation of firm assets and the weakness of the land 
market leave banks with little collateral on which to hedge their 
lending.  Weak contract enforcement also makes it difficult for 
banks to lend at reasonable rates.  Inadequate bankruptcy 
procedures mean that banks are rarely able to recover their funds 
through the liquidation of enterprises.  These risks make lending to 
firms unattractive and expensive for banks.  Many banks made 
most of their profits from the T-bill market, but the inability of the 
Government to redeem T-bills in the autumn of 1998 and 
throughout 1999 left the banks with little opportunity for profitable 
activity.  Many of them increased their deposits in foreign banks, 
rather than lend to the non-financial sector in Ukraine. 
 
The land market in Ukraine remains underdeveloped.  Because the 
procedures for privatizing and purchasing land are very 
complicated, a large part of the land remains in state or collective 
ownership (as of December 1999, only 3.5 million hectares, or about 
5.5 percent of all land, was privately owned).  Under Ukrainian law, 
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foreign citizens and businesses with foreign capital are not allowed 
to own land.  This creates additional obstacles for many new 
companies to receive credits from Ukrainian commercial banks.  
Although the legislation gives firms and individuals the right to use 
their privately-owned land as collateral, most firms and individuals 
lack formal title to the land they own or use.   
 
Exchange risks and barter 
The exchange rate regime relied on currency corridors which the 
Government was unable to support.  As a result, exchange rate risk 
was high.  This increased the cost of lending and stimulated 
demonetization of the Ukrainian economy. 
Figure 15 shows how the above-mentioned factors make banking 
unaffordable in Ukraine.  Under normal market conditions, the 
supply for banking, S, and its demand, D, would have resulted in a 
quantity, q, of banking services at a price (rate of interest), r.  
However, in Ukraine, there is a large shadow economy sector 
which avoids the official banking system.  This brings the demand 
curve down to D’.  At the same time, the high costs due to the 
factors mentioned above push the supply curve up to S'.  At this 
level, only the T-bill market is able to make use of banking at a 
very high rate, rTB.  At this rate, however, credits are not affordable 
for the rest of the economy.  The demand for banking (D') does not 
meet the supply (S') at any positive level of banking.  This 
illustrates why there is not much banking in Ukraine.  At the end 
of 1999, long-term lending of commercial banks to the private 
sector amounted to UAH 420 million, or equivalent to only USD 
1.6 per capita.  
A weak banking system was vulnerable to external shocks.  The 
financial crisis of 1998 resulted in an overall loss to the Ukrainian 
banking system of about UAH 153 million.  Depositors lost an 
equivalent of USD 1 billion due to the sharp hryvnia depreciation, 
while bank capital fell by USD 700 million.  At the same time, 
bank holdings of problem loans  (officially recognized) almost 
doubled.  
 
 
4. Agenda for policymakers 
In order for the banking system to develop, it is necessary to remove 
the impediments to its growth.  This would help reduce the high 
transaction costs incurred by banks, and in turn pull the supply 
curve down to meet the demand curve at a positive level of banking.  
It is also important for the government to ensure that the removal of 
Kartoteka #2 is implemented.  There is an urgent need to develop 
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the system of collateral and the land market, and to establish 
effective bankruptcy procedures.5  
 
Figure 15 
Banking, supply and demand analysis 
 
 
The forced restructuring of T-bills and frequent abandoning of the 
commitment created by the currency corridor undermined the 
Government’s credibility.  Contract enforcement should start with the 
Government.  We welcomed the decision to establish a managed float 
currency regime at the beginning of 2000.6  The false sense of security 
created by a currency corridor was detrimental to investment 
decisions.   
To build credibility in banking, renowned foreign banks should be 
encouraged to operate in Ukraine.  Simultaneously, foreign exchange 
operations should be further liberalized. 
Political and legal impediments to financial development are usually 
difficult to overcome.  However, even under conditions of 
macroeconomic stability, insufficient institutional development in the 
banking system creates a poverty trap.  Only a well-regulated 
banking system, free of detrimental constraints, can perform the 
role of financial intermediation which is essential for growth.  
                                                          
5 In 2000-2001, a significant progress was made. A new bankruptcy law was 
implemented and Kartoteka #2 was gradually abolished. 
6 A managed float can help prevent temporary monetary shocks. It will enable the 
exchange rate to adjvet smoothly in case of real shocks. 
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APPENDIX  
Figure A1 
Bank loans to private sector, percent of GDP, Ukraine and East 
Asian countries, end of year, 1994-1998 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Emerging Markets (1998) 
 
 
Figure A2 
Bank loans to private sector, percent of GDP, Ukraine and Latin 
American countries, end of year, 1994-1998 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Emerging Markets (1998)   
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Figure A3 
Bank loans to private sector, percent of GDP, Central Europe, 
end of the year, 1994-1998 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Emerging Markets (1998) 
 
Figure A4  
Structure of assets of Ukrainian commercial banks, percent of 
total bank assets, end of quarter, Q4'99  
 
 
Source: Harvard/CASE database 
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Introduction  
A mature and efficient banking system plays a critical role in economic 
development. Schumpeter (1934) argues that well-functioning banks 
spur technological innovation by selecting and supporting those 
entrepreneurs who possess the best chances for success in their 
investment activities.  A growing body of empirical evidence suggests a 
strong positive relationship between financial development and 
economic growth (Levine, 1997). As it turns out, progress in financial 
development is useful for predicting future rates of growth, capital 
accumulation, and technological change. By reducing information 
asymmetries and diminishing transaction costs, financial 
intermediaries increase factor productivity and stimulate growth.2 
According to the Marxian doctrine, financial intermediation is a 
parasite-type activity that absorbs much income while failing to 
deliver useful output.  Unlike the “real” sector, the financial sector 
does not produce any new utility, but only redistributes goods 
created elsewhere in the economy.  This ideology led to an almost 
complete annihilation of the financial sector in the FSU countries.  
This in turn caused a systematic misallocation of resources and 
undermined the long-term efficiency of the Soviet economy.3  The 
                                                          
1 The authors acknowledge the contributions of Anatoliy Drobiazko, Volodymyr 
Domrachev, and Olga Pogarska to this chapter.  
2 See also “Role of the Central Bank in the Development of Banking” in this volume. 
3 Ludwig von Mises: “The problem of economic calculation is … essentially a matter 
for the capitalists, who buy and sell stocks, make loans and recover them, 
speculate in all kinds of commodities.  These operations of speculators … create 
the data to which managers have to adjust their business and which therefore give 
direction to their trading operations” (Szyrmer, 2000).  
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weakness or absence of the financial sector was a significant factor 
which contributed to the political, economic, and social collapse of 
the Soviet state.  
Financial development has been slow during the post-Soviet 
transition. Moreover, it has lacked strong support from policymakers, 
for which there are many reasons, such as: 
• lack of understanding: in the early stages of transition, the 
focus was on (macroeconomic) stabilization and 
(microeconomic) liberalization, with less attention paid to 
financial institutions;  
• problems with measurement: the development of the 
financial sector does not produce tangible results, like an 
increase in industrial output or a reduced level of inflation; 
• long-run nature: financial development does not have 
immediate effects on economic growth; instead, it creates an 
“environment” which stimulates savings, investment, and 
growth over a longer period of time, and is therefore not 
treated as a high priority by political leaders who tend to 
focus on short-term issues; 
• economic transparency: a strong financial sector improves 
the overall transparency of economic activities and makes 
governmental interference, bureaucratic micro-management, 
and shadow transactions (corruption, tax evasion, etc.) more 
difficult; thus, powerful interests block the institutional 
development of this sector. 
The strategy used during the 1998 financial crisis illustrates these 
problems.  Preference was given to supporting stability - to keep 
currency depreciation and price inflation at relatively low levels - at 
the expense of the banking industry and its clients.  In political 
terms, low inflation was perceived as a greater achievement than 
effective protection of financial markets, banking activities, and 
people’s saving accounts. Thus, Ukraine successfully escaped a 
major macroeconomic destabilization, but banks suffered 
substantial losses and their deposit holders lost about half of their 
savings in the process.  Thus, those who kept dollars under their 
mattresses were again the winners.  In the wake of the crisis, high 
interest rates had to be offered to lure savings back to bank 
accounts and credits therefore remained very expensive.  The 
eventual effect on the “real” sector was painful.4 
In this chapter we will focus on Ukrainian banking, although our 
analysis is indirectly relevant to the entire financial sector, given 
that the banking system is its main “representative.” 
                                                          
4 See “Financial Sector Development as a Central Bank Target in Transition 
Economies” in this volume. 
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Our objective is to monitor institutional transformations.  We identify 
the relevant indicators, which are used as proxies for these 
transformations, much in the same way that GDP and real average 
wage rates are used to evaluate current performance of the directly 
“observable” economy.  Monitoring institutional progress in banking 
and elsewhere, along with the changes in output, income, and prices, 
enables us to evaluate the overall performance of a given economy 
and to assess the success of particular policies and strategies.  
Otherwise, if institutional development was not explicitly monitored 
and evaluated, the analysis would remain shallow and “technocratic” 
in the sense that it would be confined to only short-term “external 
manifestations” of the economy and would neglect its institutional 
fundamentals.  The development of these fundamentals is of crucial 
importance to any country, but especially to all FSU countries 
struggling with “incomplete market” impediments. 
We are looking for those proxies that reflect the performance of 
Ukrainian banks with respect to their major functions – reducing 
the costs of resource allocation and the efficient channeling of 
capital between savers and investors.  These proxies should also 
reflect the direction of institutional changes in the financial sector 
and enable us to monitor the performance of policymakers by 
examining the impact of their policies on banking.   
We consider the main functions of a bank (a financial intermediary), 
select indicators for monitoring the fulfillment of each of these 
functions, and use these indicators to analyze Ukraine’s financial 
development over the past several years. 
While diminishing the transaction and information costs, a financial 
sector fulfills one primary task: it facilitates the allocation of 
resources across space and time in an uncertain environment 
(Merton and Bodie, 1995).  This task may be broken down into five 
basic functions (Levine, 1997):  
1. Mobilizing savings and stimulating investment 
2. Allocating resources 
3. Monitoring managers and exerting financial control 
4. Hedging, diversifying, and pooling risks 
5. Facilitating transactions 
 
 
1. Mobilizing savings and stimulating investment 
This function involves the accumulation of savings, which are 
channeled to direct investments in the economy.  By abating 
information asymmetries and reducing risks involved in investment 
decisions, the banking industry motivates economic actors to save 
more and consume less.   
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The ratio of total bank deposits to annual GDP can be used to 
measure the success of the banks in attracting household and 
business savings.  This ratio, calculated for time deposits, reflects 
the overall capacity of banks to support enterprise investment 
activities.  Time deposits are defined as those bank accounts that 
have a fixed maturity length ranging from several months to several 
years, and often involve penalties for early withdrawal.   
In Ukraine the ratio of household and business time deposits to 
GDP has remained at a low level when compared with other 
transitional economies (Figure 1).  Banking systems in countries 
like the Czech Republic, Slovakia, or Hungary, which were more 
successful in implementing institutional reforms and well-grounded 
policies, are stronger and have a significantly higher capacity to 
pool and channel large amounts of savings.   
Nonetheless, the overall trend in Ukraine has been positive.  Over 
the past several years, household and business time deposits have 
been growing steadily (Figure 2).  The rate of growth was the 
greatest in 2000, 1.2 percentage points, which reflected an overall 
improvement in bank services and the terms of deposit contracts, 
such as higher real interest rates on deposits, the introduction of 
personal pension accounts, and the increased speed of 
transactions.  The lessons taught by the financial crisis of 1998, 
when most depositors lost a large portion of their savings, forced 
commercial banks to offer more favorable terms in their deposit 
contracts.  Thus, higher real interest rates and diverse forms of 
hedging exchange rate and inflation risks were introduced.  Many 
banks now guarantee their depositors the dollar-equivalent return 
on their principal.  
 
 
2. Allocating resources 
 
Efficient resource allocation is another important function of banks.  
Individual savers may not be able to collect and process information 
on a variety of possible investments. Consequently, the high cost of 
acquiring information could prevent capital from flowing to its most 
productive uses.  For individual savers, it may be very expensive, if 
at all possible, to acquire the necessary investment evaluation skills 
to collect relevant information and to monitor the performance of a 
large number of investments.  Taking advantage of specialization 
and significant economies of scale, banks are able to perform these 
tasks as a service to their clients.  As a result, capital goes to those 
investors which are expected to give the best returns. To assess the 
performance of domestic banking in allocating resources the 
following indicators are selected: 
• ratio of long-term loans to total loans 
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• ratio of long-term loans to total investments 
• ratio of private sector bank credits to GDP  
• variation in interest rates on deposits   
 
Figure 1 
The ratio of time deposits in 
banks to GDP, percent, selected 
transition countries, end of 
year, 1999 
Figure 2 
The ratio of time deposits in 
banks to GDP, percent, end of 
year, Ukraine, 1995-2000  
 
 
Sources: Web pages of the central 
banks 
 
 
Source: Harvard/CASE database  
 
In the macroeconomic sense, long-term loans support total 
investments, while short-term loans support (short-term) borrower 
liquidity.  The term “investment” involves, among other things, the 
formation of new fixed capital (buildings and equipment); this is 
usually a lengthy process and requires a long-term commitment of 
capital and effort. Long-term loans are assumed to support this 
process.  The ratio of long-term loans to total loans may be used 
as an indicator of the overall contribution of banks in allocating 
resources to total investments and growth.  
The behavior of Ukrainian banks (Figure 3) does not show any 
significant changes in the crediting pattern.  Although it is true that 
the year 2000 saw quite a substantial growth in the volume of loans 
provided by domestic banks,5 most of the funds were used for short-
                                                          
5 In 2000 the credit portfolio of domestic commercial banks (stock) grew by about 
64 percent (from UAH 14 billion to UAH 23 billion), which is a significant increase 
given that year-on-year inflation rate was about 25 percent. 
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term needs. Since 1998, the proportion of long-term loans in bank 
portfolios has been fluctuating in the 10–17 percent range.  In 2000 
the share of long-term loans remained at about 14 percent of the 
total credit portfolio. Thus, Ukrainian banks help enterprises with 
their liquidity needs, rather than with large investment projects.   
Figure 3 
Long-term loans and short-term loans, percent of total credit 
portfolio, Q4’97-Q4’00 
Source: Harvard/CASE database 
 
At the same time, according to another important indicator – the 
ratio of long-term loans to total investments6 – the role of banks 
in supporting the country’s investment activities has strengthened 
over the past several years (Figure 4).7   
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Here, the term “investment” is used in the macroeconomic sense: GDP minus 
total consumption minus net exports.  
7 However, this ratio should not be interpreted as a percentage of total investment 
financed by bank loans.  Long-term loans, according to the classification used in 
Ukraine, are those maturing in more than one year.  Whereas total investments 
cover only a one year period. 
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Figure 4 
The ratio of long-term loans to total investments, percent, 
1991-2000 
Source: Harvard/CASE database 
The industrial structure of long-term loans was the following: about 
32 percent were lent to Trade, 9 percent to Food, 6 percent to 
Agriculture, 8 percent to Machinery, 6 percent to Transportation, 
and 5 percent to Ferrous Metals.  The remainder (about 34 percent) 
were dispersed in small amounts among all the other industries 
(Bulletin, 2001/2).  In some industries - for example, in Food 
Processing - long-term loans seem to be used relatively efficiently.  
Investment in Food Processing is done on a competitive basis: there 
is a low level of government intervention, and the banks allocate 
credit according to economic rather than political criteria.  On the 
other hand, the Machinery and Metals factories are, as a rule, state-
run and inefficient in the use of their capital.  
There is empirical evidence suggesting the existence of a positive 
relationship between lending to the private sector and economic 
growth: countries in which private lending is high and expanding 
have higher levels of growth.8  This finding appears to be quite 
logical given that lending to the private sector is usually driven by 
economic rather than administrative levers.  Moreover, private 
enterprises – rather than consuming borrowed funds - usually 
invest in projects, which generate economic returns.  Thus, a high 
volume of credits directed to the private sector can be viewed as an 
indication of the significant contribution of banks to allocating 
resources that support economic growth.  In Ukraine, the ratio of 
                                                          
8 See “Finance and Growth” in this volume. 
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private sector bank credits to GDP has remained low, although 
its level increased quite substantially, from 3 percent in 1995-96 to 
11 percent at the end of 2000 (Figure 5).  In countries like Poland, 
Hungary, and Slovenia this number approaches 30-40 percent.  
 
Figure 5 
The ratio of bank credits to the private sector to GDP, percent, 
1995-1997, annually, end of year, and 1998-2000, quarterly, 
end of quarter 
Source: Harvard/CASE database 
The interest rate is the price of borrowed funds. In accordance with 
economic theory, a large discrepancy in the price of similar 
(homogeneous) goods or services indicates an allocative inefficiency.  
Hence, a large variation in interest rates on deposits suggests 
the inefficient allocation of financial resources.  Poor accounting 
and auditing standards, high market segmentation, and frequent 
nontransparent transactions between lenders and borrowers are 
important factors contributing to these differences.  Some banks 
only “specialize” in servicing a limited number of specific 
enterprises, and behave as book-keepers for their clients, rather 
than as commercial banks operating in a competitive market.  
Moreover, the banking industry is subject to various pressures from 
the central and local authorities.  While all these market distortions 
were present in the Ukrainian banking industry in 1998-2000, the 
rapid convergence in interest rates (Figure 6) suggested that the 
situation was improving and resource allocation was becoming more 
efficient. 
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Figure 6 
Variation in interest rates on deposits, percent, Q1’98-Q4’00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The variation in interest rates is the spread of the interest rates, offered by 
various banks, around the average rate for the banking system.  It can be 
measured by the variance defined as  
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where iav – average interest rate, in – interest rate offered by bank n, and N - number 
of banks analyzed.  The variance was calculated for interest rates on term deposits of 
individuals for 6-12 months.  As these services are available in all commercial banks, 
they can be viewed as homogeneous goods and their prices can be compared. 
Source: Harvard/CASE database 
 
 
3. Monitoring managers and exerting financial control 
After providing funds to an enterprise, a lender should be able to 
actively monitor the enterprise’s performance (to make sure that the 
money is used well) to prevent any income losses.  For obvious 
reasons, collecting the necessary information and influencing 
management decision-making cannot be done by small individual 
investors.  Given the scale of their operations, large banks are able 
to establish effective controls over an enterprise in order to protect 
the interests of outside creditors.   
The following indicators may be used to assess the capacity of 
banks in exerting corporate control: bank credits as a percentage of 
enterprise liabilities and the size of Kartoteka #2.  The latter is an 
important indicator for Ukraine but, obviously, this would not apply 
to countries without Kartoteka #2 or some similar system. 
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The larger the proportion of bank credits in enterprise liabilities, 
the more the enterprise is dependent on the arrangements with its 
bank(s) while conducting its business.  This implies an increased 
capability on the part of the bank to collect information and influence 
the operation of the enterprise.  
In most industrialized countries, bank loans are the primary source of 
external funds for non-financial businesses.9  In the US, for example, 
bank credits provide about 60 percent of total external funding to non-
financial businesses (Mishkin, 1997, pp. 195-97), whereas in Ukraine 
the corresponding number approaches only 7 percent.   
The situation in Ukraine is explained mainly by the high interest 
rates on loans.  The banks must charge higher rates for the money 
they lend in order to cover the high risks involved.  In turn, this 
makes loans very expensive and raises the likelihood of default and 
so on.  Moreover, banks continue to carry out a number of 
controlling activities, such as the monitoring of tax payments.  A 
combination of these factors forces enterprises to seek funds 
outside the banking system.  A typical funding source is the inter-
enterprise credit that firms provide to their clients (purchasers of 
their output) to be able to sell (and stay in business).  Thus, it is not 
a healthy situation when most financial credits are provided by non-
bank enterprises.  
Liabilities to the banking system constitute only about 1 percent of 
total consolidated liabilities of all Ukrainian enterprises (financial 
and non-financial), from which it may be inferred that the banks are 
hardly able to exert corporate control.  Since 1997 the proportion of 
liabilities to banks in total enterprise liabilities has been growing, 
but still remains at a low level (Figure 7).   
The Kartoteka mechanism transfers control to the tax administration 
which imposes financial measures on enterprises, placing its own 
claims above those of banks and investors.  Cash entering the bank 
accounts of firms with tax arrears is automatically confiscated by the 
tax authorities and other institutional creditors (Antczak and 
Ivashchenko, 1997; and Dubrovskiy, 1999).  As a result, bank control 
over corporate finances is limited.  The size of Kartoteka #2 is 
therefore inversely related to the degree of financial control banks have 
over enterprises.  Moreover, servicing Kartoteka #2 imposes large 
additional costs on a bank, leading to higher transaction costs and 
lower intermediation efficiency.  Despite the significant reform efforts 
of Ukrainian policymakers, Kartoteka #2 continued to grow in 1997-
2000 (Figure 8).  Since the beginning of 1999, the size of Kartoteka #2 
has even exceeded the total assets of the banking system.  
                                                          
9 The “external funds” denote all funds obtained from outside the business itself.  
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Figure 7 
Enterprise liabilities to banks, percent of total enterprise 
liabilities, 1994-2000 
 
Source: Harvard/CASE database 
 
 
Figure 8 
The ratio of Kartoteka #2 to total assets, percent, Q4’97-Q4’00 
 
 
Source: Harvard/CASE database 
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4. Hedging, diversifying, and pooling risks 
High-return projects usually require the long-term commitment of 
large amounts of capital.  As a rule, however, savers do not want to 
relinquish control of their savings for long periods.  They also prefer 
to invest their capital into several, as opposed to one project in 
order to diversify the risk.  Banks address this problem by pooling 
out resources from a large number of savers, and lending them to a 
large number of borrowers.  This portfolio diversification helps 
savers to manage their risks.  In addition, banks maintain a certain 
amount of reserves to insure against risky assets in their portfolios.  
As discussed above, a bank should possess the skills necessary to 
evaluate whether a given investment is worthwhile.  By lending to 
financially insecure borrowers, a bank misdirects its resources – in 
many cases these resources would be kept away from more 
successful enterprises – and fails to properly perform its function of 
facilitating risk management.  The share of problem loans in the 
portfolio of a bank is a good indicator for evaluating its performance.  
In this respect, a high share of problem loans (bad, prolonged, and 
overdue loans)10 suggests poor performance on the part of a bank.  
Judging from the dynamics of problem loans in their portfolios (Figure 
9), Ukrainian banks significantly improved their risk management in 
2000: in the course of the year, this share dropped from 27 to 17 
percent.  A large part of the risk seems to be “bank-specific” rather 
than “system-specific.”  In other words, the magnitude of the risk 
depends on the capacities of banks to manage risks (and perhaps their 
capacities to withstand external pressures from both the authorities 
and powerful interests).  In fact, some Ukrainian banks consistently 
maintained a relatively low share of problem loans in their portfolios, 
while the share for others has always been much higher.  This 
confirms a perception that the quality of risk management significantly 
varies among Ukrainian banks (Table 1).   
Banks with 100 percent foreign capital usually applied better 
management techniques and were more successful in resisting 
external pressures and avoiding high risks.  As a result, problem 
loans were rare in these banks.  The majority of large Ukrainian 
banks, however, had a high share of problem loans in their 
portfolios, and in most cases this was higher than the average for all 
banks.  Nevertheless, the fact that the average share of problem 
loans decreased indicated that domestic banks had improved their 
risk management.   
                                                          
10 To ensure solvency, the NBU requires commercial banks to maintain reserves 
equal to 100 percent of the bad loans in their portfolios.  It could be that banks 
reschedule their bad loans and show them as extended loans.  For this reason, we 
use for the purpose of our analysis the total amount of extended, overdue, and bad 
loans in bank portfolios.   
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Figure 9 
The share of problem loans in bank credit portfolios, percent, 
Q4’97-Q4’00 
Source: Harvard/CASE database 
Table 1 
Problem loans as a share of bank credit portfolio 
 
 Problem loans, percent of credit portfolio 
 As of January 1, 2000 As of January 1, 2001 
Large banks 34.2 24.8 
Prominvestbank 29.6 15.1 
Ukrsotsbank 29.3 21.8 
Ukraina 72.1 71.7 
Privatbank 15.7 22.6 
Oshchadbank 45.2 29.0 
Aval 15.7 8.3 
   
Banks with 100% 
foreign capital 
5.4 2.8 
Medium and small-sized 
banks  
17.6 15.2 
All  26.7 17.2 
Source: Harvard/CASE database 
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5. Facilitating transactions 
The banking system reduces transaction costs and thus stimulates 
specialization, which, in turn, helps productivity and growth.  We 
have selected the following indicators to evaluate the performance of 
the banking system in facilitating transactions: percentage of money 
outside the banking system and interest rate spread.  The higher 
these indicators are, the worse the performance. 
Money outside the banking system as a percentage of money 
supply is an indicator that helps us evaluate the overall health of 
the banking system.  If a substantial portion of the money supply 
circulates outside the system, economic agents avoid conducting 
their transactions through banks because of the problems inherent 
in this system - high risks and/or high transaction costs.  In 
addition, a poorly performing banking system stimulates the 
expansion of the shadow economy, which has a negative effect on 
the former.  Thus, a powerful relationship of negative feedback 
develops. 
This point is consistent with the pattern of money supply allocation 
in transition economies.  Those economies that are considered to be 
more successful in their transitions, and which have better 
functioning banking systems, tend to have a lower portion of money 
outside their banking systems, compared to other CEE countries 
(Figure 10).  Although Ukraine belongs to the latter group, one can 
observe a steady tendency for money to flow into banks (Figure 11), 
including an inflow of deposit savings, as discussed above.  
Interest rate spread is calculated as the ratio of (1) difference 
between interest rate on credits and interest rate on deposits, to (2) 
interest rate on credits. This indicator can be used as a proxy for 
the degree of inefficiency of a bank in acting as an intermediary 
between savers and borrowers.  It measures the proportion of funds 
raised from crediting which is absorbed by the banking system, 
rather than acquired by the investor (the owner of a deposit). 
Currently approximately 70 percent of the money that Ukrainian 
banks earn from loans remains within the banking system, and 30 
percent is returned to depositors, which is significantly less than in 
many other countries of the region (Figures 12 and 13).  
Transaction costs have remained high for the last three years, 
mainly due to the huge Kartoteka #2, high taxes, and the inability of 
banks to effectively manage their operational expenses.   
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Figure 10 
Money outside banks, percent of 
M3, transition countries, Q4’99 
Figure 11 
Money outside banks, percent 
of M3, Ukraine, Q4’95–Q3’00 
Sources: Web pages of central banks Source: Harvard/CASE database 
 
 
Figure 12 
Interest rate spread, percent, 
transition countries, 1999 
Figure 13 
Interest rate spread, percent, 
Ukraine, Q1’98–Q4’00 
 
Sources: Web pages of central banks Source: Harvard/CASE database 
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Conclusion 
 
We believe that Ukraine can serve as an excellent case study for the 
role of the financial system in an economy.  What we observed in 
Ukraine during the last decade provided us with a good illustration 
of, and yet another piece of evidence to support, the hypothesis 
presented above by Schumpeter, and systematically tested by 
Levine: the performance of the financial system and its banking 
industry is a good proxy for the current level of economic 
development and for future growth.  A strong and growing banking 
system today means a strong and growing economy tomorrow.  A 
weak banking system reflects a weak economy and weak prospects 
for future growth.   
 
The transition period in Ukraine may be divided into several stages: 
Stage 1. Early 1990s.  The economy is still operating under the old 
Soviet institutions and is dominated by large state-owned factories - 
predominantly 19th century-type heavy industries with a focus on 
the military sector. Nominal GDP is relatively high.  The whole 
consumer-oriented sector is weak, living standards are low, and the 
natural environment is devastated.  Heavy distortions in prices and 
resource allocation prevent sustainable (and reasonable) economic 
growth.  In this context, the banking industry is nominally large but 
fails to play any active role in the economy.  Of the five banking 
system functions analyzed in this paper, only the facilitation of 
transactions is being performed (in a way).  The passive and heavily 
distorted banking system reflects an economy in a state of imminent 
collapse. 
Stage 2. Mid-1990s.  The anticipated collapse of the economy is 
taking place.  The banking sector is heavily affected, and its assets 
and activities are diminished by several times.  The banking system, 
barely operating, supports a pessimistic forecast for the economy 
which is reflected in the gradual decline of GDP and a very low level 
of foreign direct investment in Ukraine. 
Stage 3. Late 1990s.  Sluggish reforms in 1995-97 fail to stop the 
decline, although the rate of decline decelerates.  The financial 
sector operates at a very low level, several times lower than in many 
other countries of the region.  The fall crisis of 1998 brings more 
decline to the economy and subjects Ukrainian banks to another 
painful shock.  However, the effects of the crisis are encouraging.  
The very significant devaluation of the hryvnia helps both foreign 
trade and the domestic economy.  Reform efforts are increased.  We 
observe a gradual hardening of budget constraints on the budget 
sector itself, as well as on commercial enterprises.  Banking 
rebounds. 
Figure 14 
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Real GDP and loans to GDP ratio, percent, 1993-2000 
 
Source: Harvard/CASE database 
 
Stage 4. 2000 to present.11  Ukraine’s economy remains at a very 
low level.  Its GDP per capita, wages, etc. are comparable to the 
least developed economies.  The current level of financial system 
development, including banking, is also very low.  Yet, the economy 
is growing, and the banking indicators analyzed in this chapter 
appear to solidly support this growth.  Three observations can be 
made.  First, while remaining at a low level, most of the institutional 
indicators for banking show a significant improvement.  The gap 
between Ukraine and more advanced countries in the region is 
narrowing.  Second, as shown in Figure 14, most of these indicators 
already began to improve some time ago and preceded, rather than 
followed, the growth of GDP (household incomes, investment, and 
foreign trade).  Third, while some of the indicators have not 
improved, there are well-founded expectations that the recent 
legislative efforts will bring significant improvements in the near 
future.  Some reforms have already been implemented and some are 
forthcoming - in particular, in the areas of tax reform (including the 
abolishment of the disastrous Kartoteka #2 system), land 
ownership, and bankruptcy procedures, to name a few. 
 
Our final comment concerns an issue addressed at the beginning of 
this chapter, namely, investment.  It can be argued that, despite 
much attention to institutional development during the last decade, 
                                                          
11 See “The Economic Situation in Ukraine: 2000” in this volume. 
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this development is still under-estimated.  We keep learning (and 
admitting) that institutional investment provides very high returns, 
yet the entire system of official statistics continues servicing 
physical investment.  In other words, economists are still more 
concerned with physical capital allocations than with institutional 
efforts.  It appears that in Ukraine this substitution – “institutional” 
for “physical” – has been occurring for several years now, but was 
not reflected in the standard economic statistics.  Our analysis of 
the banking system seems to confirm the existence of this 
substitution. In 1996-99 there was increasingly less physical 
investment, but more institutional investment, although the latter 
was certainly less visible and less measurable than the former.  
Reform efforts are now beginning to bring more tangible fruits.   
The financial sector is expanding and solidifying.  In-depth analysis of 
this sector provides important insights, not available from the study of 
standard macroeconomic indicators.  Our modest attempt to examine 
Ukraine’s banking system seems to confirm the optimistic evaluations 
and forecasts.  The economy is growing and, if reform efforts continue, 
better and stronger institutions will further ensure a more rapid 
development of the financial sector and the entire Ukrainian economy. 
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Financial Sector Development 
as a Central Bank Target 
in Transition Economies1 
 
  
Ihor Eremenko 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter the financial system in transition economies is 
analyzed, the main impediments preventing the development of this 
system are considered, and a policy recommendation for central 
banks in transition economies is formulated.  The current targeting 
of monetary policy tends to be too narrow and results in 
governments using diverse non-market, or even anti-market 
measures.  It is argued that central banks in transition societies 
should make the development of the financial system a high 
priority, or a “parallel target.”  The analysis here involves the CEE 
countries, with particular emphasis on Ukraine. 
For a decade now, respectable international organizations and 
internationally reputable economists have been advising 
governments of transition countries and proposing – and even 
actively promoting – policies they believed would lead to a faster and 
less painful transformation.  The set of recommended basic reform 
measures is often referred to as the “Washington Consensus” 
(Szyrmer, 2000; Dubrovskiy, 2000).  In many cases these polices 
succeeded; in some, they were heavily criticized by insiders of 
transition countries and by a number of Western economists, for 
their superficiality and for their attempt to apply the same standard 
measures, regardless of the circumstances. Stiglitz (1999) wrote, 
“…at least part of the problem was an excessive reliance on 
                                                          
1 Research under the supervision of Janusz Szyrmer. Inna Golodniuk and Khwaja 
Sultan made significant contributions to this chapter. 
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textbook models of economics. Textbook economics may be fine for 
teaching students, but not for advising governments trying to 
establish a new market economy...” 
In all CEE countries, the financial sector is in a poor state due to 
unfavorable initial conditions, bureaucratic “financial repression,” 
inadequate legislation, and inconsistent policies.  In many cases, 
the current responsibilities of a central bank are confined to price 
stability as the only explicit target of monetary policy.  
Unfortunately, such a narrow scope of responsibilities does not 
create an environment conducive to the development of the financial 
sector.  Setting money stability as the only or main target of the 
central bank is certainly the right thing to do in the case of 
hyperinflation.  There is no evidence, however, that this stability 
should be the main or only target in an environment of moderate 
inflation.  Moreover, such a narrow targeting enables the authorities 
to intervene more easily in the financial sector in order to finance 
budget deficits or to siphon off funds to selected enterprises and 
individuals.  An alternative solution – making financial sector 
development a top priority, or a parallel policy target – should 
enable and motivate central banks to consider policy trade-offs, and 
to be equally concerned about short-term price stability and the 
long-term development of the financial system, thereby accelerating 
market reforms and economic growth. 
The main motivation behind this idea was the situation in Ukraine.  
The Ukrainian banking system is one of the weakest in CEE 
countries.2  Past policies and international assistance projects have 
failed to raise financial intermediaries above a rudimentary level.  The 
financial system is not able to provide the necessary services to the 
economy.  In many cases, financial development was neglected in 
order to meet short-term government priorities or as a result of 
inappropriate recommendations of Western experts.  Many of the latter 
are not willing to accept the idea of parallel targets because it appears 
to run counter to existing conventions.  Transitional economies, 
however, experience dramatic changes which are quite unconventional 
per se.  Thus, policymakers seeking to promote development in 
transitional economies must look beyond traditional ideas. 
This chapter is organized as follows.  In Section 1, the arguments 
supporting the importance of a well-developed financial system for 
the economy as a whole are presented, with an emphasis on 
transitional countries.  The current state of the Ukrainian financial 
sector is described in this context.  Section 2 contains a brief 
overview of traditional central bank targeting.  It is argued that 
current institutional priorities tend to suppress, rather than promote 
                                                          
2 See “Institutional Development of the Banking System,” and “Role of the Central  
Bank in the Development of Banking” in this volume. 
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growth.  The logic behind promoting development of the financial 
sector is presented in Section 3.  The main points of the chapter are 
summarized in the last section. 
 
1. Economic growth and the financial system3 
A well-functioning financial system, by helping to lower transaction 
and information costs, is indispensable for sustainable economic 
growth.  In advanced economies with well-developed financial 
intermediaries, the benefits of such a system are often taken for 
granted.  In transition economies, on the other hand, where 
financial markets are underdeveloped, the role of the financial 
system in economic growth becomes painfully evident. 
Some economists argue that there is no need for active state 
support for the financial sector.  According to Robinson (1952), this 
sector does not play a special role and automatically adjusts to the 
needs of the economy.  Lucas (1988) argues that economists tend to 
overestimate the role of finance.  Moreover, many development 
economists – Stern (1989), Chandavarkar (1992) and others – do 
not appear to appreciate the importance of the financial sector and  
neglect it in their research. 
Nevertheless, many economists agree that the financial sector does 
play a particularly important role in economic development.  
Bagehot (1873) and Hicks (1969) argue that the financial system 
was a crucial factor in England’s industrial revolution.  According to 
Schumpeter (1934), banks identify the best enterprises with the 
most innovative products and thus promote technological 
improvements. Levine (1997) analyzes existing theories and 
develops a framework that demonstrates the strong relationship 
between financial development and economic growth.  An analysis 
of the effectiveness of monetary policy and the financial system in 
eleven CEE countries demonstrated that economies with better 
developed financial sectors were growing faster.4 
The Ukrainian financial sector includes banks, pension funds, 
trusts, insurance companies, real estate agencies, and other 
financial intermediaries, most of which are characterized by high 
costs, inefficiency, poor management, and an inability to resist 
pressure from the authorities. 
Of all financial intermediaries, the banks developed most quickly 
over the past decade and now dominate all the others: they are the 
largest intermediaries and provide the most services. At the end of 
                                                          
3 The discussion of economic literature in this section is based on Levine (1997). 
4 Eremenko (2000) applied a policy index based on 15 indicators that reflected the 
soundness of banks, the depth and structure of the financial system, and the 
importance of non-bank and offshore funding. 
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2000, there were in Ukraine 195 registered banks, including 31 
banks with foreign capital (7 of them being owned in 100 percent by 
foreigners), 2 state-owned banks; of these, 153 were considered 
“operational” and 38 were in the state of liquidation.5  The entire 
Ukrainian banking sector is about as large as a medium-sized 
Western bank. 
The volume of total credits provided by the Ukrainian banking 
system is very low, at 17.2 percent of GDP in 1998 – the lowest 
among CEE countries (Figure 1).  Given that a significant portion of 
credits in Ukraine is problem ones, the situation becomes even 
more dramatic.6   
 
Figure 1 
Depth of financial sector: total credits to GDP, percent, 19987 
Source: International Financial (1999) 
 
A no less important issue is the operational efficiency of banks.  A 
low interest-rate spread (difference between average bank credit rate 
and average bank deposit rate) will be favorable to the economy 
because it makes money and investment less costly.  As Figure 2 
demonstrates, the interest-rate spread in Ukraine was the largest 
among CEE countries, amounting to 34 percent (1999).  This large 
spread can only be partially explained by the high inflation in Ukraine 
                                                          
5 Harvard/CASE database. 
6 Problem credits comprise overdue, extended and bad credits. At the end of 2000 
they amounted to 18 percent of total credits. 
7 Includes all credit to various sectors on a gross basis, with the exception of credit 
to the central government, which is net (credits to government less government 
deposits in the banking system). The banking sector includes monetary authorities, 
deposit money banks, and other banking institutions, such as savings and loan 
institutions and building and loan associations. 
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in 1999.  Among the countries included in Figure 2, only Ukraine, the 
Czech Republic, and Bulgaria had their spreads exceeding annual 
inflation rates (These rates were: 22.7 percent, 2.1 percent, and 0.3 
percent, respectively).  In fact, these three countries are believed to 
possess relatively weak banking systems, and during the 1990s, at 
one moment or another, suffered from severe financial crises.   
 
Figure 2 
 Interest rate spread,8 percent, 1999 
 
Source: International Financial (February 2001) 
 
The most important causes of the poor performance of Ukrainian 
banks are: 
 
1) The poor financial state of households and the non-financial 
sector 
• the decline in output in 1989-99 – more than 60 percent 
• the decline in bank deposits in 1989-99 – almost 90 percent 
• hyperinflation in the mid-1990s 
• the payments crisis involving barter and arrears 
• the shadow economy – from 50 to 70 percent of GDP 
2) Weak management of banks 
• “pocket” banks, created to meet the needs of particular 
enterprises 
                                                          
8 Annual interest rate charged by banks on loans to prime customers, minus the 
annual interest rate paid by commercial banks for demand, time, or saving 
deposits. 
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• insider lending 
• poor diversification of assets 
• lack of knowledge and experience 
3) Inadequate legislation 
• weak banking regulations  
• ineffective bankruptcy procedures 
• a low level of contract enforcement 
• inadequate protection of financial transaction 
confidentiality  
4) Excessive government intervention 
• nontransparent “arrangements” and direct influence of 
the authorities on bank activities 
• credits directed to selected enterprises 
• rent seeking 
• corruption 
• banks being forced to act as agents of the Tax 
Administration through Kartoteka #29 
 
Groups of causes 2, 3, and 4 can significantly be affected by bank 
activities.  The central bank can promote the creation of healthy 
competition and other incentives to make banks improve their 
organization.  The central bank has also significant power with 
which it can initiate and implement legislation.  And finally, by 
diminishing its interference in current financial sector activities, the 
central bank could help solve several other management-related 
problems.  Thus, by adopting and implementing the appropriate 
policy, it could in many ways promote the development of the 
financial sector. 
 
To summarize this section: 
– A fully developed financial system is crucial for economic growth. 
– The degree of financial system development is particularly 
important in transition economies. 
– Ukraine has one of the weakest financial systems among CEE 
transitional countries. 
– A significant part of the Ukrainian banking system’s problems 
could be improved by changing the policies of the central bank. 
 
                                                          
9 See “Institutional Development of the Banking System” in this volume. 
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2. Central bank targeting 
The question is: What should monetary policy do and not do?  
Should the central bank set specific economic outcomes as its 
targets, e.g., production, employment and trade?  Or should it 
concentrate only on monetary/financial objectives, such as prices, 
the exchange rate and financial sector performance? 
Most economists agree that monetary policy cannot achieve economic 
outcomes directly, and that setting such targets may even worsen a 
country’s economic performance (Tobin, 1983).  The point is that 
aggregate output is primarily determined by the supply and 
productivity of labor and capital, which are not under the direct 
control of the central bank.  Moreover, the transmission of monetary 
policy is uncertain.  Shocks from both the demand and supply sides 
will affect it.  The effects of monetary measures could take a few 
months – or 1-2 years, or even longer – to manifest themselves.  
Finally, since various economic factors and the actions of other 
authorities obscure the effects of central bank measures on aggregate 
output, the central bank itself has both little incentive and little 
capacity to establish and pursue an output target. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that central banks tend to select price 
stability as the sole objective of their policy.  This can be seen from 
Table 1, which presents central bank objectives in several transition 
countries. 
Table 1 
Objectives of central bank policy in selected transition countries 
Country Legislated prime objectives 
Bulgaria 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Latvia 
 
Lithuania 
 
Poland 
Russia 
Slovenia 
Slovak Republic 
Ukraine 
Currency stability 
Currency stability 
Internal and external currency stability 
Price stability, and facilitation of the circulation 
and allocation of financial assets 
Currency stability, and support for government 
policy 
Price stability and banking sector stability 
Currency stability 
Currency stability 
Currency stability 
Currency stability 
Sources: Web sites of countries’ central banks 
Ihor Eremenko 62
A possibly even more powerful factor that influenced the selection of 
target choices has been the insistence of the IMF, in line with the 
Washington Consensus, to single out monetary stabilization as a 
top priority.  Thus, governments of countries that cooperated with 
the IMF were strongly advised to set this as the main target of their 
monetary policy.  Such a policy, however, could be costly for an 
economy, especially for one in transition (Kamin, Turner, and 
Van’tdack, 1998).  Price stability as the sole target of monetary 
policy reduces economic flexibility without producing important 
growth benefits (Stiglitz, 1998).  Moreover, there is no evidence that 
this approach helps economic growth (Alesina and Summers, 1993). 
In politically unstable countries with a high level of corruption, and 
particularly in ex-USSR countries, price stability as the sole target 
of monetary policy provides the authorities with greater freedom to 
achieve short-term objectives and pursue personal interests.  It also 
enables a government to justify financial repression and to 
subsidize enterprises favored by particular officials.  Moreover, there 
is no evidence of gains from very low inflation, especially in 
transition economies. In fact, the opposite seems to be the case.  A 
policy enforcing “artificial” stability, not supported by economic and 
institutional fundamentals, could result in missed opportunities to 
pursue other goals, while gaining little from stable prices.  After all, 
in transition economies, price stability is not the main factor in 
investment decision-making: there are other, much more serious 
problems related to the tax system, contract enforcement, 
corruption, etc. 
A question naturally arising is, why some countries are unable, or 
unwilling to develop their financial systems.  The existence of 
inequalities in the initial conditions is not a sufficient explanation.  
The point is that the authorities in some countries, especially where 
the political situation is unstable, use the financial sector for their 
short-term purposes, intervene excessively, and obtain cheap 
money to finance current needs.  As a result, banks are hampered 
by high reserve requirements, interest rate ceilings, credit controls, 
foreign exchange market regulations, heavy taxation, and 
government-directed credits.  Governments that apply financially 
repressive measures justify them by stressing that their financial 
controls help avert market failures, lower the cost of credit, and 
improve the quality of loans by excluding risky projects (Denizer, 
Desai, and Gueorguiev, 1998).  Moreover, financially repressive 
governments may support output and exports in some areas of the 
economy and encourage the flow of capital to those sectors (Stiglitz, 
1989 and 1998). 
Most economists agree that financial repression is used to finance a 
budget deficit where the financial sector is characterized by an 
oligopolistic market structure, directed credit schemes, the 
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obligatory holding of government bonds, and suppressed security 
markets.  The weak markets enable the transfer of funds to public 
borrowers.  In addition, the development of a sound and competitive 
financial sector is not supported in politically unstable countries 
where policymakers frequently pursue their own financial goals. 
The costs of excessive intervention can be demonstrated by 
examining directed credit schemes in Ukraine.  The central and 
local authorities have the power to influence Ukrainian financial 
institutions and direct credits to selected enterprises.  The 
government guarantees some loans, and in many cases they are not 
paid back.  In this way, financial intermediaries transfer to loss-
making state companies and corrupt officials funds that could have 
been lent to productive enterprises.  Directed credits are considered 
to be one of the main reasons for the poor structure of assets in 
Ukraine.  According to official statistics, approximately 18 percent 
of all credits are problem credits (December, 2000). 
Excessive government intervention results in low saving account 
balances, low bank profitability, low resource-allocation efficiency, 
and low direct investment.  Moreover, if the financial sector is 
repressed, undeveloped and riddled with obstacles, the central 
bank’s monetary policy could be both inefficient and ineffective, 
producing unpredictable results because the necessary policy 
transmission mechanism is lacking.  All these factors constitute 
obstacles to growth and lead to losses in the economy. 
There is no doubt that high inflation distorts market signals and 
prevents the economy from developing. Indeed, if there is a threat of 
high inflation, the government must develop special policies to keep 
prices from skyrocketing.  However, if inflation is not very high, is 
price stability still so crucial a factor, and if it is, does it make sense 
to make it the sole target of monetary policy?  There is no evidence 
in support of this hypothesis.  Bruno and Easterly (1996) estimated 
that no significant costs are incurred if inflation is less than 40 
percent. Stiglitz (1997) confirms this and argues that only with a 
very high inflation rate does the economy fall into a high-inflation-
low-growth trap.  Fischer (1993) and Barro (1997) also state that 
there is no evidence supporting the assertion that moderately high 
inflation is costly. 
Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that control of inflation, 
under any circumstances, should remain a very important policy 
objective.  The point is that it should not be the sole target of 
central bank policy. 
A major problem is that too much weight attached to price stability 
could stimulate efforts to achieve it, not by means of reforms and the 
strengthening economic fundamentals, but through administrative 
Ihor Eremenko 64
measures – price controls, subsidies, etc.  As Stiglitz (1998) wrote: 
“The single-minded focus on inflation may not only distort economic 
policies – preventing the economy from living up to its full growth and 
output potentials – but also lead to institutional arrangements that 
reduce economic flexibility without gaining important growth 
benefits.” 
This thesis can be illustrated by the 1998 financial crisis in 
Ukraine.  By 1998, after several years of hyperinflation, Ukraine 
had achieved relative price stability. Inflation was only 10 percent in 
1997, and the exchange rate was stable.  This currency stability, 
however, was achieved mainly through T-bill operations, and not 
through structural reforms.  The government started to issue T-bills 
in late 1995, which by 1997 became the main method for financing 
the budget deficit and for maintaining currency stability.  Monthly 
T-bill issues rose constantly, leading to a rapid increase in public 
debt while nominal and real yields skyrocketed.  At the same time, 
GDP kept declining, the fiscal deficit remained large, and financial 
intermediaries remained undeveloped.  In the second half of 1998, 
after the Russian financial crisis, the Ukrainian government 
announced that it was not able to service its debt, which had to be 
restructured.  As the result of the crisis, the economy in general, 
and the financial system in particular, experienced severe shocks: 
• The NBU spent most of its foreign reserves attempting to 
protect the national currency and repay the debt. 
• The hryvnia lost approximately half of its value by the end of 
the year. 
• Government credibility declined further, as was made evident 
in, among other things, the collapse of the T-bill market. 
• The banks had serious problems – in particular, a loss of 
liquidity, followed by excessive liquidity – and foreign 
exchange risks became a major issue. 
• Bank deposits fell abruptly if expressed in dollar terms (while 
remained almost stable when expressed in hryvnia terms). 
 
To summarize: 
– Current monetary policy and maintaining price stability as the 
central bank’s sole target enables the government to manipulate 
the financial system and finance the fiscal deficit. 
– Directed credits permit corrupt officials to siphon off funds to 
selected enterprises and to their own pockets. 
– There is no evidence that maintaining currency stability fosters 
economic growth when the inflation rate is less than 40 percent. 
– Focusing on currency stability could cause the policymakers to 
lose the flexibility to pursue other economic goals. 
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– If the authorities are obliged to achieve currency stability, they 
could attempt to do so, not through real reforms, but by 
administrative measures, often at the expense of other sectors, 
especially the financial sector. 
 
 
3. The financial system as a central bank target 
 
The central bank can and should promote an environment conducive 
to the creation of a sound and competitive financial market.  Making 
the development of the financial system a parallel target of monetary 
policy would help relax the constraints of single-minded price 
stability targeting.  If this target becomes enshrined in legislation, the 
central bank would then be enabled and obliged to pursue it. 
A parallel target should have three important features: (1) it should 
remain under the direct control of the central bank; (2) its 
performance should be measurable and subject to systematic 
monitoring; (3) it should be closely related to the ultimate goal, i.e., 
to economic growth (Mishkin, 1998). 
Undoubtedly, the central bank can influence the financial sector.  
With economic measures, administrative constraints and legislation, 
it can either promote or retard the development of the financial 
system, highlight key directions for development, determine top-
priority financial institutions, and so forth. 
The second feature of a parallel target – measurability – is somewhat 
more complicated.  Targeting price stability uses a well-defined 
indicator – the inflation rate, and targeting external stability – the 
foreign exchange rate.  These indicators make it possible to formulate 
target values, to achieve these values by means of diverse monetary 
policy measures, and to monitor them using statistical data.  Unlike 
currency stability, no single figure permits one to trace the 
development of the financial system.  To get an effective indicator for 
this purpose, several factors must be considered. 
The last criterion – the relationship between the parallel target and 
economic growth – was illustrated in Section 2.  Basing our argument 
on both theory and empirical research, we showed that a sound 
financial sector is critical for the development of the whole economy. 
There is yet another important issue concerning the measures the 
central bank should implement to achieve its targets.  The 
development of the financial sector as an objective of central bank 
policy means neither a return to the old command system and 
central planning, nor the micro-managing of financial intermediaries.  
To the contrary, what is needed here is the creation of a competitive 
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environment, the removal of excessive restrictions, and the drawing 
of regulations that promote a sound financial system. 
Finally, one more issue should be addressed.  A traditionally-minded 
economist views targeting the development of the financial system, 
as a departure from “conventional” economics.  Making this 
development an object of central bank policy is not like inflation or 
exchange-rate targeting, or keeping interest rates under control. 
Yet, one should be reminded of an important historical event: the 
creation of the Federal Reserve System of the United States in 1913, 
to promote financial stability in response to the frequent and 
lengthy bank panics which had occurred throughout the 19th and 
early 20th centuries. The financial crisis of 1907 was so severe that 
it convinced the American public of the need to establish an 
institution for developing and supporting a sound financial system 
(Mishkin, 1998). In time, the Federal Reserve Bank helped create an 
orderly financial sector and the need for explicit direct measures for 
promoting financial development diminished.  As a result, a short 
and medium-term measure – like changing the interest rate – 
becomes usually sufficient to keep financial intermediaries in good 
shape. 
The point is that the financial systems of Ukraine and a number of 
other transition countries resemble that of the United States at the 
beginning of the century.  In Ukraine, the establishment of a sound 
financial system is a difficult task which cannot be accomplished by 
the financial sector alone, but which requires central bank support.  
An important aspect of this shift in policy priorities would be to 
start paying more attention to long-term objectives – like financial 
sector development – and less to short-term objective – like currency 
and price-level management. 
 
To summarize this section: 
– To promote sound financial intermediaries and foster economic 
growth, the central bank must adopt the development of the 
financial sector as a parallel target. 
– While this target meets the formal criteria of a central bank 
objective, further research in this area is neccessary. 
– The development of the financial sector is not such an 
unconventional target as it might seem: the Federal Reserve 
System of the US was created for similar purposes. 
– Adopting the development of the financial system as a parallel 
target would effectively change the priorities of the central bank: 
it would have to pay attention not only to short-term needs but 
also to the long-term growth of financial intermediaries. 
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Conclusions 
This chapter has dealt with the development of the financial sector 
in a transition economy, the role of this sector in economic growth, 
and the policies of a central bank that significantly influence the 
development of the financial market and the entire economy in 
general. 
Sound financial intermediaries are crucial for economic 
development, especially in transition countries with rudimentary 
banking, equity market, insurance, and pension fund systems.  In 
this chapter we focused on one such country, Ukraine, which has 
one of the weakest financial systems in CEE. 
An efficient central bank policy should concentrate on the most 
important problems of the monetary sector, and in transition 
countries, on promoting the development of the financial markets.  
Present monetary policy, which sets currency stability as the main 
target, cannot promote development because it is too narrow, allows 
authorities to implement non-market measures, and leads to the 
suppression, and sometimes oppression, of the financial sector, 
thereby retarding economic growth.  We therefore propose that the 
central bank be further empowered by permitting it to adopt and 
implement a broader monetary policy that favors the financial 
sector and which truly facilitates long-term economic growth.  This 
broader monetary policy can be achieved by adopting the 
development of the financial system as a parallel target of the 
central bank.  
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Development of Banking1 
 
 
Inna Golodniuk 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Many central banks all over the world, in addition to conducting 
monetary policy, play an important role in elaborating and 
implementing regulations governing financial markets and economic 
actors.  The central banks in many countries, including Ukraine, also 
oversee their respective banking systems.  Prudential supervision 
and efficient regulation is very important for the development and 
growth of the banking system, and as a result, for economic growth 
in general.   
The question that may arise is: Why should the government 
intervene at all?  The standard explanation or justification for 
government regulation is the so-called market failure: if left to itself, 
the market might not be able to operate efficiently, so the 
government must help out.  A typical problem of the financial 
market is its poor performance in dealing with asymmetric 
information inherent in all financial transactions, in which the 
transacting parties lack accurate information about one another for 
making the right decisions.  For example, bank managers always 
have better information about the quality of the credit portfolio than 
bank creditors and depositors.   
Asymmetric information is inevitable in every transaction, be it the 
purchase of a computer or getting a haircut. Services are usually 
associated with higher information asymmetries than goods.  
                                                          
1 Research under supervision of Janusz Szyrmer. The author acknowledges the 
contributions of Volodymyr Domrachev and Anatoliy Drobiazko to this chapter. 
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Moreover, services requiring highly specialized and sophisticated 
skills and expertise, like healthcare or financial intermediation, 
probably have the highest level of asymmetric information.  For this 
reason, the services market often fails to produce desirable 
outcomes – like the efficient channeling of financial resources, in 
the case of financial transactions – and is believed to require more 
regulation than other product markets.   
Many economists have also argued that strong financial 
infrastructure is a necessary prerequisite for economic development 
in general (Levine, 1997).  Thus, an efficient financial system is 
beneficial to all market participants and thereby generates an 
important externality, or public good.  This is another rationale why 
authorities should put effort into facilitating and prompting the 
development of the financial sector, and in particular, the 
development of the banking system,2 which is the largest financial 
intermediary in transition economies.  Regulation is the main tool 
through which a central bank in a non-command economy can 
influence the process of financial sector development.   
The banking system is regulated primarily to promote the provision 
of accurate and complete information to clients and to ensure the 
soundness of banks as financial intermediaries.  These objectives 
are achieved by setting the “rules of the game” that are meant to 
reduce asymmetric information – in particular, adverse selection 
and moral hazard. 
Adverse selection occurs before the transaction takes place.  For 
example, banks that are big risk-takers will be the ones that most 
actively seek deposits.  If they are fortunate enough to succeed in 
their risky investments, the rewards will be high.  However, 
depositors wishing to protect their savings might not be interested 
in being exposed to high risks.  Thus, in order to prevent excessively 
risky investments, relevant information asymmetry must be reduced 
by securing for depositors and creditors access to information on a 
bank’s portfolio and risk management. 
Moral hazard often arises after the transaction has occurred.  For 
instance, after receiving the deposit, bank managers might engage 
in excessively risky activities, which they would avoid if managing 
their own assets.  This type of behavior might not find favor with 
bank clients.  Thus, creditors should be provided with the capacity 
to exercise their right to monitor how banks manage their deposits.  
Availability of information to depositors and forcing the banks to 
efficiently use attracted funds is favorable to many economic actors.  
On a microeconomic level, this ensures the allocation of capital to the 
most viable and competitive banks that are able to provide an 
                                                          
2 For further discussion see “Financial Sector Development as a Central Bank 
Target in Transition Economies” in this volume. 
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adequate rate of return to their depositors, which in turn stimulates 
the latter to save rather than to spend on current consumption.  On a 
macroeconomic level, this secures the inflow into the economy of 
investment funds that are allocated efficiently by the financial system.   
Governments should therefore support the implementation of 
regulations that promote the development and growth of competitive 
and efficient banks and which protect depositors, directly and 
indirectly, from the misuse of their savings by the banks.  In 
Ukraine the regulation and supervision of the banking system is the 
responsibility of the National Bank of Ukraine.  Since the Ukrainian 
financial market is still underdeveloped, the NBU should put 
substantial effort into supporting it, and especially into supporting 
the banking system, which, so far, is the most important financial 
institution in the domestic economy.  In other words, while setting 
the regulatory framework and pursuing monetary policy, the NBU 
should take into account the impact of this activity on the 
development of the banking system and include the development of 
this system among its highest priorities. 
In this chapter I consider the major problems faced by the central 
bank in a transition country while it is developing an adequate 
regulatory framework.  I then discuss the regulatory activities of the 
NBU in the context of institutions prevailing in the Ukrainian 
economy, and examine the major problems and possible ways of 
approaching them. 
 
 
1. Regulation of Ukrainian banking 
 
As discussed above, the financial sector, and the banking system in 
particular, should be appropriately regulated to prevent a potential 
market failure resulting from large information asymmetries.  
Developed countries have accumulated solid experience in reducing 
asymmetric information through the regulating of their banks.  This 
experience provided the basis of the principles adopted for effective 
bank supervision by the Bank for International Settlements in Basel.   
The formulation of satisfactory banking regulation for transition 
economies is a far more challenging task than it is for developed 
countries.  The former often have incomplete markets and lack 
market institutions in many areas relevant to the operations of 
commercial banks – weak stock and real estate markets, poorly 
defined and enforced property rights, low transparency and 
availability of information, absence of uniform and consistent 
accounting standards, lack of credit histories, etc.  Thus, central 
banks in transition economies have to struggle with complex 
fundamental problems that manifest themselves much more 
sharply in Ukraine than in the other countries of the region. 
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Absence of uniform and transparent accounting principles.  
Ukraine’s accounting standards are slowly evolving towards 
international standards.  Since January 1, 1998 banks have been 
required to report according to International Accounting Standards 
(IAS).  To accommodate this requirement and to enable monitoring 
the implementation of bank regulations, the NBU introduced a new 
chart of accounts that seemed to be broadly consistent with IAS.  
The major drawbacks, however, were: lack of complete and 
internally consistent reporting between bank branches, low capacity 
for the verification of journal entries (e.g., for detecting possible 
fraud in credit and securities transactions, and in the registering of 
collateral and guarantees), and weak internal control.  Another 
drawback was the pervasive notion that the reporting of information 
is for the use of regulators and not for internal management 
purposes.  
 
Poorly defined and enforced property rights. The Ukrainian 
government has yet to develop the legal framework for regulating 
property rights, especially corporate property rights, and an 
appropriate mechanism that allows shareholders to exercise their 
rights over corporate managers.  It is also very difficult, and almost 
impossible, for outsiders to obtain information about the owners of 
an enterprise because there is no single registry of corporate 
ownership.  Thus, an important part of the regulation of commercial 
banks is ineffective.  For example, the NBU sets requirement 
regarding the maximum size of credits to bank insiders.  However, if 
information on corporate ownership is not available, then it 
becomes impossible to determine the identity of insiders.  By the 
same token, a barely operational system of bankruptcy procedures 
hampers the development of the domestic banking system because 
banks are unable to properly protect themselves against defaults.  
 
Absence of credit history. Ukraine lacks a mechanism for 
monitoring credit histories as in developed economies.  The NBU 
should assist in the development of an institution that would 
collect, organize, and maintain information on a wide range of 
borrowers.  Together with strict disclosure requirements, such an 
institution would further reduce information asymmetries, which 
would make it possible to lower interest rates on loans, thereby 
generating a larger inflow of investments into the economy. 
 
Inefficient mortgage mechanism. The mortgage mechanism in 
Ukraine does not function as efficiently as in developed market 
economies because of the incomplete and fragmented real estate, 
land and stock markets. Land reform began only two years ago and 
property rights in land are only partially regulated.  Banks cannot 
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accept land as collateral for loans.  Moreover, the domestic real 
estate market is weak and fragmented.  Banks bear high costs in 
realizing their collateral, which indicates lower efficiency from the 
economic standpoint.   
 
Low trust in banks.  The Ukrainian banking system suffers from a 
low level of public confidence.  The credibility of domestic banks 
was greatly undermined by their failure to protect depositors from 
the rapid devaluation that followed the Russian financial crisis in 
1998.  As a result of this devaluation, hryvnia-denominated 
deposits lost one half of their original value.  This precipitated a 
large outflow of household savings from the domestic economy.   
At present, the situation has improved to a good extent: the deposits 
of households in the domestic banks increased in 2000 by almost 
70 percent. Inflation for the same period was 25-30 percent, and the 
dollar exchange rate remained relatively stable.  This improvement 
was most likely related to better risk management on the part of 
banks and to the introduction of several packages that peg deposit 
value to, for example, a corresponding dollar amount.   
The situation, however, has been exacerbated by the practices of the 
tax administration that can – without the authorization of a court or 
public prosecutor – demand that a commercial bank disclose 
information regarding any contract or depositor.  This fact, and the 
general imbalance between the rights of the taxpayer and tax 
inspector, leads many would-be bank depositors to avoid the banking 
system altogether, even if their savings are completely legal. 
 
Weak management.  In Ukraine, most bankers are from the Soviet 
Gosbank period. Placed in a new and rapidly changing environment, 
these bankers are unable to monitor and manage diversified 
portfolios and complex bank transactions.  Likewise, the boards of 
these banks do not practice good standards of internal oversight 
and are incapable of doing proper internal audits.  With these 
limitations, it is difficult for Ukrainian banks to implement the 
regulations imposed by the central bank. 
 
Absence of bank performance ratings/rankings.  While most 
agencies rate the quality of Ukrainian government bonds and other 
securities, as well as the overall quality of the country’s debt, most 
major international rating agencies – like Moody’s, Standard & 
Poor’s, and Thomson BankWatch – only become active on the 
Ukrainian market in 1997.  In fact, the first rating of a Ukrainian 
commercial bank did not take place until 2000 when Thomson 
BankWatch rated the performance of Nadra Bank.  
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Weak infrastructure.  There was some progress in Ukraine in the 
privatization and modernization of the telecommunications market.  
Cellular and Internet communications are becoming increasingly 
available and banks are gradually introducing new services like 
Internet banking and banking by cellular phone, which could 
significantly reduce transaction costs should such services be provided 
on a large-scale basis.  The latter will depend on further progress in 
telecommunications development.  However, while Ukraine develops 
its cellular communications, the major telecommunications monopoly, 
“Ukrtelecom,” is totally state-owned and a competitive market in this 
area cannot be expected in the near future.   
 
 
2. Banking regulation in Ukraine: standard approaches and 
recommendations 
 
To stimulate the development of the Ukrainian banking system, the 
NBU must develop and implement “standard” regulations similar to 
those in developed economies.  It must address the transition-
specific problems identified above, or at least assist other 
government agencies in doing so.  Some of these problems – for 
example, poorly defined and enforced property rights – do not lie 
within the area of central bank authority, while others – like credit 
history – could and should be dealt with by the central bank. 
In market economies, the authorities should keep their direct 
involvement in business activities to a minimum, and intervene only 
indirectly by determining and enforcing the rules of the game.  
Similarly, central banks set regulatory requirements and control the 
implementation thereof through prudential supervision.  All 
banking regulations usually cover six areas: the government safety 
net; restrictions on bank asset holdings and capital requirements; 
prudential supervision; disclosure requirements; consumer 
protection; and competition (Mishkin, 1997).  By regulating these 
areas the NBU could reduce asymmetric information associated 
with banking transactions and address the problems listed above. 
The government safety net aims at reducing the adverse 
consequences of a bank failure that occur when a bank is unable to 
meet its payment obligations to depositors and other creditors, and 
goes out of business.  In order to receive their deposits, bank 
customers must wait until the bank is liquidated, at which time 
they could be paid only a fraction of the value of their deposits.  
Because banks operate on a “first-come-first-served” basis, a bank 
“run” often occurs.  Uncertainty and lack of information can lead to 
runs on both good and bad banks alike, and the failure of one bank 
can precipitate the failure of others and spark an outflow of money 
from the banking system.  
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Thus, governments often provide a safety net to reduce the possibility 
of bank panic.  One form of protection is deposit insurance.  In the 
US, for example, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
guarantees that depositors will be paid in full on the first USD 
100,000  deposited in a bank, regardless of what happens to the 
bank.  Although economists agree that this insurance can increase 
the “moral hazard” for depositors – they have less incentive to 
monitor their banks – many countries continue to provide a 
government safety net. 
The safety net in Ukraine operates on a principle similar to that 
used in the U.S.  In 1998 the President issued a decree pursuant to 
which a fund for insuring the bank deposits of individuals was 
established in February 1999.  This fund is financed by the 
Government and commercial banks.  Of the 164 banks operating in 
Ukraine, 133 contributed to the fund, which accumulated UAH 65 
million (about USD 12 million) by mid-2000.  The fund guarantees 
compensation for the loss of private deposits with banks.  The 
maximum compensation, however, was set at UAH 500 per 
depositor, regardless of the amount lost.   
This provision is not very useful, however; in fact, a true safety net 
has yet to be created.  First of all, paying back a small amount of 
money fails to reduce the possibilities of a bank run.  Second, this 
compensation does not decrease the risks associated with 
depositing savings in a bank.  Third, this “safety” – while bringing 
no explicit benefit – does involve additional costs: it keeps USD 12 
million idle.  Given the small size of the Ukrainian banking system, 
this is not a small amount of money and could have been used for 
other purposes.  More important, it increases the banking system’s 
transaction costs, namely, additional compliance costs for the 
commercial banks, and monitoring costs for the NBU. 
The recent example of Slov’yansky Bank’s collapse, which was the 
first time the fund had to compensate depositors, proves this point.  
The fund allocated UAH 4 million – sufficient to compensate for 
about 6 percent of deposits (principal only) at Slov’yansky. 
The NBU should fully use its authority, strengthened by the 
recently adopted Law on Banks and Banking,3 to handle the 
rehabilitation and/or liquidation of insolvent banks.  Moreover, it 
should either abandon the existing system all together or develop a 
more credible mechanism for deposit insurance.  The latter should 
substantially increase the security for money deposited in banks, 
                                                          
3 The Law was adopted in December 2000, and governs the structure of the 
banking system, economic, legal, and institutional bases for banks’ functioning, 
including establishing, management, reorganization and liquidation of a bank. 
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thereby contributing to the strengthening of confidence in domestic 
banks on the part of businesses, and stimulating an inflow of 
savings into the banking system.  
 
Restrictions on bank asset holdings and capital requirements 
are often used by governments to minimize moral hazard.  
Regulations that restrict banks from holding risky assets, such as 
certain common stocks, are a direct means of making banks avoid 
excessive risks.  Bank regulations also promote diversification, 
which reduces risk by limiting the amount of loans in particular 
categories or to individual borrowers.  
The requirement that banks have sufficient capital provides them 
with another incentive to assume fewer risks.  When a bank is 
forced to hold a large amount of equity capital, it has more to lose if 
it fails and is thus more likely to pursue less risky activities.  Bank 
capital requirements can take three forms.  The first type requires 
banks to maintain a certain leverage ratio, that is, the amount of 
capital divided by the bank’s total assets.  While calculating 
leverage ratio, assets are usually weighted according to their relative 
risk.  The second type of risk-based capital requirement sets 
minimum capital standards linked to off-balance-sheet activities, 
like interest-rate swaps and trading positions in futures and 
options.  The third type can be illustrated by the example of the US 
Federal Reserve’s approach to covering risk in the trading activities 
of the largest banks: the latter are required to estimate their 
possible losses over a ten-day period, and to set aside additional 
capital equal to three times that amount. 
Restricting asset holdings and capital requirements is employed by 
the NBU according to the patterns described above.  The NBU sets 
standards – for the capital requirement, maximum degree of risk 
per credit, etc. – which the banks must maintain.  Most of these 
requirements were developed under various foreign technical 
assistance programs related to bank supervision (Landy, 1997) and 
are broadly consistent with the recommendations of the Bank for 
International Settlements.4  In addition, the NBU sets the rate of 
required bank reserves and in such a way affects bank assets’ 
allocation.  The reserves are established as an additional safety,  in 
a case a bank experiences liquidity difficulties. 
 
Thus, the NBU should work to enforce its requirements by closely 
monitoring banks and taking appropriate measures against non-
compliance.  The principle it has yet to learn, however, is equal 
                                                          
4 These recommendations were introduced in 1998 and have been updated several 
times since; for example, capital charges for market risks were added to those for 
credit risks.  The latest revision has been sent out for final consultation, and is due 
to come in force in 2004. 
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treatment for all banks with the same problem.  Selectivity, or 
preferential treatment, in the long run works to the disadvantage of 
the “favorites” themselves, as illustrated by the example of Ukrayina 
Bank.5  The rewards of such efforts should be quite significant as 
they could enhance trust on the part of bank customers in both 
banks and bank management. 
 
Prudential supervision, i.e., overseeing who operates banks and 
how they are operated, is also an effective method for reducing 
adverse selection and moral hazard on the part of banks.  On-site 
examination gives regulators the opportunity to monitor how banks 
implement minimum capital requirements and their restrictions on 
asset holdings.  Banks are usually given a CAMEL ranking. (The 
acronym is based on the five areas assessed: capital adequacy, asset 
quality, management, earnings, and liquidity.)  If a bank receives a 
low ranking in any of the five areas, then the central bank can take 
disciplinary action.  However, the most recent trend in bank 
supervision is to put greater emphasis on evaluating the soundness 
of bank management with regard to controlling risks, rather than on 
assessing a bank’s position at a certain point in time.  
Since late 1996 the NBU has had a more systematic schedule of 
inspections and has been using methods borrowed from the U.S. 
system, but significantly adapted to reflect the circumstances under 
which domestic banks operate.   
In 1998, for example, an attempt was made to introduce the CAMEL 
ranking system, with the expectation that ranking would take place 
regularly and the results published.  The system was also supposed 
to function similarly to how it does in the U.S., helping to evaluate 
and quantify (i.e., assign ranking) a bank’s compliance with 
prudential requirements and legislation in general.  In particular, 
this would have included a bank’s standing with respect to capital 
adequacy, quality and structure of assets, and evaluation of skills 
for risk management. However, the NBU’s efforts were not effective 
and CAMEL ranking – even if functioning – was not very helpful 
because the results were not publicly available. 
As world experience illustrates, the availability of reliable and timely 
independent opinion about the performance of a bank is vital for 
developing investor trust and a willingness to do business with it. 
For this reason, many agencies exist for the purposes of providing 
information regarding their evaluation and analysis of the 
performance of various financial institutions.  There is currently an 
                                                          
5 During the past few years Ukrayina Bank financed different government programs 
like crediting of the domestic agriculture, which operated with losses.  As a result the 
bank became insolvent – as of January 1, 2001, about 70 percent of the bank’s credit 
portfolio were problem loans.  
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acute need for this type of information service in Ukraine and the 
NBU should be promoting its development.  The information, if 
publicly available and disseminated on a regular basis, would: 
• provide individual and institutional investors with relevant 
information on the creditworthiness of a commercial bank, 
thus facilitating the inflow of savings into the economy and 
the development of the banking system; 
• strengthen the capitalization of commercial banks through 
modern market mechanisms, particularly through open and 
transparent initial public offerings; and 
• stimulate better risk management in banks. 
 
In developed economies, disclosure requirements, which enable 
the market to assess the quality of a bank’s portfolio and its risk 
exposure, is one of the major instruments ensuring that a bank acts 
in the best interest of its depositors.  Regulators require banks to 
adhere to certain standard accounting principles and to disclose a 
wide range of information to the public.  This information enables 
shareholders, depositors, and creditors to monitor banks and 
thereby acts as a deterrent to excessive risk taking.  The NBU 
should therefore study the experience in other countries in order to 
take full advantage of disclosure requirements.   
Ukrainian banks are currently required to publish balance sheets 
and income statements quarterly, and the same together with other 
financial statements annually.  According to the Law on Banks and 
Banking, this information is to be published in either Uriadoviy 
Kur’yer [The Government Messenger] or Holos Ukrayiny [The Voice 
of Ukraine], both of which are not very easily available.  For 
example, Uriadoviy Kur’yer has a circulation of 115,000 or 
approximately one copy per 500 people.  Before the law was 
adopted, banks published their financial statements in Visnyk NBU 
[The Herald of the NBU], which is even more scarce than the above 
mentioned periodicals.   
In addition to the difficulties in finding this information, the 
potential bank client faces another serious problem: the published 
reports are so aggregated that they are of little value in making 
decisions.  For instance, banks present “total amount of loans 
issued,” but information regarding the status of these loans – for 
example, the share of bad debts – is absent.   
The NBU could contribute significantly to the development of the 
banking system by expanding and strictly enforcing disclosure 
requirements.  The first and most obvious step would be to require 
banks to supply comprehensive quarterly financial statements 
providing, among other things, information on the status of bank 
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assets, their lending activities, interest rates, and profits/losses.  
These statements should be audited by the NBU at least semiannually 
and made public by at least posting them in all bank branches.  
Consumer protection is enhanced by providing important 
information to bank customers, like information on the cost of 
borrowing, including standardized interest rates; on how finance 
charges are determined; on the handling of billing complaints; and 
on non-discrimination in credit markets, etc.  The current Law of 
Ukraine on Banks and Banking specifies the type of information 
that clients have the right to obtain from a bank:  
• data on financial indicators and activities which must be made 
public  
• list of the bank’s managers and the managers of its branches  
• list of legal entities and individuals who own more than  
10 percent of the bank’s equity capital and  
• list of the services provided by the bank and their prices  
 
However, these provisions alone do not reflect the philosophy of 
consumer protection as it is understood in Western economies.   
So-called truth in lending implies, first of all, that the consumer has 
the right to know about benchmark interest rates and the range of 
interest rates charged by other banks.  
The other important component missed is the procedure for 
handling customer complaints, which is quite typical of the 
prevailing declarative nature of Ukrainian regulations, including 
those governing banking.  It is often declared, for example, that a 
bank, its manager, or the client must adhere to certain rules; 
however, the enforcement and remedial mechanisms are not 
specified.  This means that, if a violation of the rules occurs, the 
nature of the response is totally at the discretion of the bureaucrat 
or manager who will handle it.  This contributes to the system’s 
nontransparency and provides opportunities for abuse of power. 
The NBU should therefore take measures to ensure that the recently 
adopted Law on Banks and Banking is made operational, especially 
those parts dealing with the management of banks, requirements 
regarding bank activities, customer relations, and confidentiality of 
customer and banking-transaction information. 
Restricting competition through appropriate regulation is practiced 
by some governments to help protect bank profits. However, in 
recent years most industrialized countries have abandoned such 
practices because of their serious disadvantages. Fortunately, the 
NBU does not have any regulations that restrict competition. 
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Ukraine is now in the process of giving its banking system an 
effective and efficient regulatory and supervisory capacity.  Several 
positive results have been achieved to date, in particular, the 
adoption of the Law on Banks and Banking and the Law on the 
National Bank of Ukraine.6  Moreover, the NBU was successful in 
introducing regulations that bring its prudential norms closer to 
international standards, which make financial information more 
meaningful and reliable and improve the organizational structure of 
bank supervision.  Nevertheless, as discussed above, there is still 
much room for improvements that would accelerate the 
development of the Ukrainian banking system.   
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“Is there some action a government of India could 
take that would lead the Indian economy to grow like 
Indonesia’s or Egypt’s?  If so, what, exactly?  If not, what 
is it about the ‘nature of India’ that makes it so?  The 
consequences for human welfare involved in questions 
like these are simply staggering: Once one starts to think 
about them, it is hard not to think about them, it is hard 
to think about anything else.”   
 
Robert E. Lucas (Mankiw, 2000, p. 104) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Studies of the Ukrainian transition to a market economy frequently 
present changes as chaotic and random.  Kolodko (2000), for 
example, claims that one of the main driving forces of the economic 
downturn of the 1990s was the accumulation of mistakes made in 
economic reform strategy that were precipitated, to some extent, by 
inaccurate forecasts of the country’s economic development. 
Sundakov (1998) and Nanivska (1999) stress the political causes of 
slow reforms and blame the government for lack of foresight in 
reform conduct.  Kornai (2000) emphasizes the fragility and 
idiosyncrasies of transition: after old institutions and structures are 
dismantled, new ones are formed by trial and error, and the length 
of this process varies significantly, depending on the depth of 
transformation.  
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The main message of Ukrainian transition studies is that it is 
difficult to determine the general pattern of this process.  As chaotic 
as it might appear, there is, nevertheless, a kind of order in the 
process.  In particular, important regularly occurring phenomena 
can be detected; however, they only become visible when one 
thoroughly analyzes the dynamics of a transition economy. 
In Ukraine, the most interesting regularly occurring phenomena, in 
our view, are those in the demonetized sector.  Revealing these 
phenomena is a prerequisite for reliable forecasts and policymaking.  
Yet, in spite of the considerable number of publications on non-
monetary transactions and the payment crises, there is still an 
insufficient amount of research in this area.  Continuous statistical 
updates and revisions, together with theoretical and methodological 
advances, have rendered the earlier studies dated and incomplete in 
their coverage.  Moreover, as soon as Ukraine’s economy stabilizes, 
the diverse methods of standard economics, which were not useful 
just a few years ago, will become applicable. 
Recently, the idea of a durable transition has become increasingly 
popular.  Economics has witnessed the emergence of new conceptual 
developments, such as transition economics, economic reform 
theory, and institutional trap theory.2  These new theories have made 
us realize that it is impossible to switch to a new, more desirable and 
efficient economic regime in a single “leap.”  Consequently, the period 
required for interim reforms turns out to be much longer than 
originally anticipated. 
Accelerated development of a complex system of non-monetary 
transactions has been a distinctive feature of Ukraine’s economy in 
recent years.  A system based on non-monetary means of payment 
distorts economic relations, increases transaction costs, creates 
additional market barriers, and dramatically changes the incentives 
and behavior of economic agents, thereby hindering economic growth.  
 
 
1. Subjective and objective factors 
 
Many political leaders and mass media commentators believed that 
non-monetary transactions in the Ukrainian economy would 
disappear as soon as economic growth was revived by market reforms 
and stabilization.  The avoidance of taxes was seen as the primary 
reason behind these transactions.  Hence, the simple panacea was to 
increase pressure on those attempting to evade taxes.  
                                                          
2 According to the trap theory, new inefficient stable institutions, or “the institutional 
traps,” emerge during times of transition. Barter, nonpayment, corruption, and tax 
evasion are examples of these institutions (Polterovich, 2001). 
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The “subjective” nature of non-monetary transactions tended to be 
emphasized, while certain “objective” (systemic or institutional) 
regularities of the demonetized sector were generally ignored.  The 
pervasiveness of these transactions was interpreted to be the 
predominant social and mental legacy of the socialist era: “Social 
physiology views contemporary barter as past experience, rooted in 
the mentality of the administrators” (Kulytsky, 1999, p. 5).  The 
phenomenon of demonetization was personified in the stereotype of 
the corrupt director.  Directors who sought to avoid paying taxes 
were viewed as the principle obstacle to economic development.  The 
main emphasis was on their “immoral activities.”  
These subjective factors, however, cannot provide a full explanation 
for the phenomenon of demonetization.  To be able to understand 
what has happened, it also becomes necessary to examine the 
objective causes of the current economic situation and to analyze 
the distinctive regularities of non-monetary transactions. 
We will begin this analysis by looking at the subjective factors, and 
this will be followed by a discussion about the objective factors.    
Various features of economic development in transition countries are 
often explained by referring to the “wicked” behavior of individuals 
involved in sinister interactions between business, mafia, and 
government.  The most popular concepts include: rent seeking 
(Aslund, 1996); the virtual economy (Gaddy and Ickes, 1998); and 
the economy of individuals (Kleiner, 1999; and Levine, 2000). 
 
Rent seeking.  The rent-seeking hypothesis is frequently used to 
explain the failures of post-socialist economies (Aslund, 1996; 
Tollinson, 1997; and Zaostrovtsev, 2000).  Rent in this case is “a 
payment to a factor in excess of what is necessary to keep it to its 
present employment.”  Rent seeking is “the use of real resources in an 
attempt to appropriate a surplus in the form of rent. … Consumers 
suffer two losses from rent seeking: the loss of consumers’ surplus 
from the higher price and the loss of output from the resources 
devoted to rent seeking” (Pearce, 1997, pp. 121 and 372-373).  Rent-
seeking behavior may take various forms:  
• (political) pressure 
• bribery and lobbying 
• the misuse of resources by influencing the behavior of 
politicians (through voting, campaign contributions, etc.) 
Non-productivity is a distinctive feature of rent seeking.  Instead of 
producing useful output, economic agents – in order to extract 
additional profits (rent) – devote their time, efforts, and resources to 
redistributing already-created products.  As a result, society incurs 
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losses instead of deriving gains from an alternative (productive) use 
of the resources.  Thus, rent seeking could be defined as value 
redistribution without creating any new utility for society.  The 
resources allocated to rent seeking by corporations were estimated 
at 13 percent of GDP for the U.S. in 1963-66 (Tollinson, 1997), and 
at 7 percent of GDP for the U.K. in 1968-69.  The losses due to rent 
seeking in Russia were estimated at 80 percent of GDP in 1992 
(Aslund, 1996).  This figure accounts for the differences between 
world and domestic prices for raw materials, for import subsidies 
and for diverse credits and fees to racketeers. 
 
Economy of individuals.  Kleiner (1996, 1999) argues that in post-
Soviet Russia the main economic actors are not legal entities – 
enterprises and other organizations of all ownership forms 
(including administrative bodies) – but individuals.  The following 
features characterize this economy:  
 a wide gap between the personal interests of managers and 
what is best for their enterprises in terms of realizing market 
potential 
 very large and growing differences between the remuneration 
to enterprise managers and that paid to other employees 
 priority given to the short-term interests of economic agents 
(related to the instability of the institutional environment) 
 weak market competition 
 corruption and criminal market relations 
 resort to non-judicial means of conflict resolution 
 low factor productivity  
 
Virtual economy. Gaddy and Ickes (1998) claim that the reforms in 
Russia resulted in a “virtual economy” in which – unlike in a market 
system – rules of behavior and the criteria for success and failure 
create an illusion, systematically distorting the economic indicators 
of the true situation.  This illusion allows the government to inflate 
the actual number of administrative staff and to make excessive 
expenditure claims on the budget.  For this reason, Russia has not 
been able to overcome its fiscal crises and pervasive nonpayment 
problems.  Gaddy and Ickes reject a widespread belief that, in a 
transition economy, “innocent” enterprises are forced to become 
inefficient and insolvent: to the contrary, enterprises are active 
participants in transition, and not its passive victims.  Together 
with the government and other agents, enterprises support the 
virtual economy which itself matures into a well-established system.  
The arguments described above provide only partial explanations to 
the observed phenomena.  In order to understand exactly what has 
occurred, it is necessary to analyze both the short-term and 
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medium-term dynamics of the main parameters of transitional 
economies.  Ukraine is a good case for this analysis.  The slow pace 
of reforms has caused Ukraine’s economy to operate without any 
drastic changes in the main trends of basic parameters.  This 
relative stability, especially during the last several years, enables a 
systematic analysis of the features of an economy adrift – one which 
remains under a kind of long-lasting (“sleepy”) crisis. 
 
 
2. Economic indicators for Ukraine’s demonetized sector 
 
All transactions in a country’s economy can be classified into two 
broad categories: monetary and non-monetary.  In monetary 
transactions, money (national currency) is used as a means of 
payment.  Non-monetary transactions involve a variety of money 
“substitutes” (Zhylayev, 2000a), including: 
• arrears 
• barter 
• mutual settlements (primarily, tax settlements) 
• promissory bank notes and treasury securities 
• corporate, firm, and municipal promissory notes (widely used 
as money substitutes in debt-clearing operations) 
• other money substitutes 
 
For the needs of this study, we divide the economy into two sectors: 
the monetized sector and the demonetized sector.  The latter 
includes all economic activities involving non-monetary transactions. 
Arrears are pervasive in the demonetized sector, occurring in both 
payables and receivables.  Payables (or accounts payable) are 
payments due to all suppliers of goods and services purchased by an 
entity (an enterprise or another organization).  Receivables (or 
accounts receivable) are payments due to the entity for all products it 
has sold to its clients.  Arrears, i.e., overdue payables and overdue 
receivables, occur when the payments are not made by a certain 
date.3  They may arise for the following (Pinto, Drebentsov, and 
Morozov, 1999):  
• payments among domestic enterprises  
• liabilities to banks 
                                                          
2 In the literature, arrears are often defined broadly as total payables or total 
receivables, including both non-overdue and overdue financial obligations.  A narrow 
definition of arrears is used here: they are understood as overdue obligations only.  
In Ukraine, these arrears, (overdue payables, domestic and foreign combined) 
amounted 67 percent of GDP on January 1, 2001.  This ratio was 93 percent in 
January 2000, 86 percent in January 1999, and 82 percent in January 1998 
(source: Statistical Bulletin).   
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• wages 
• taxes and other payments owing to the budget and to extra-
budgetary funds 
• government liabilities, including wages for budget sphere 
employees, pensions and various social transfers  
• liabilities to foreign governments, enterprises, and individuals  
  
Gross arrears are the total arrears of all entities.  Given that the 
amount owed by one entity (its overdue payables) equals the amount 
claimed by another (its overdue receivables), logically, total domestic 
arrears payable should equal total domestic arrears receivable.  
The net arrears of an economic unit (enterprise, industry, sector, 
city, region, etc.) represent the difference between its overdue 
payables and overdue receivables.  Typically, an economic unit’s 
payables do not equal its receivables; the higher the level of 
aggregation, the lower the difference.  For example, net arrears 
calculated at the level of the enterprise must be greater than, or at 
least equal to the net arrears of the entire industry.   
In a similar way, one defines gross payables and gross receivables, 
as well as net payables and net receivables.  These include both 
current and overdue financial obligations of enterprises. 
An analysis of the payment crisis problem demonstrates two 
principal regularly occurring phenomena:  
1. As soon as mutual arrears emerge somewhere in the 
economy, they tend to grow rapidly - like an epidemic - 
propagating themselves through the chain of receivable-
payable obligations (Pinto, Drebentsov, and Morozov, 1999). 
2. In Ukraine, the total of accounts payable has consistently 
been greater than total accounts receivable. 
 
The second phenomenon above can be explained by, among other 
things, the following factors.  First, payables are calculated in sales 
prices, whereas receivables are calculated in operational costs (the 
difference between payables and receivables is the profit).  Second, 
payables include such items as enterprise arrears to the budget and 
social funds, and wage arrears; these items are absent in 
receivables.  Third, accumulating receivables takes longer than 
payables.  Due to price inflation, enterprises most often sell their 
products for much higher prices than what they actually paid for 
the inputs (raw materials, labor, etc.) used to produce these 
products.  Inflation causes a faster growth of accounts payable than 
of accounts receivable. Moreover, since current inflation raises 
expectations for further inflation, enterprises, in anticipation of 
future inflation, tend to set their product prices at levels much 
higher than those justified by the actual cost of inputs. 
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Data on selected kinds of non-monetary transactions in Ukraine 
during the last four years are presented in Table 1.  The size of the 
overall demonetized sector can be measured by the ratio of  non-
monetary transactions to total sales in the economy during a one-
year period.  For several years, the demonetized sector in Ukraine 
has been very large:3 in 1997, non-monetary payments were 55 
percent of total sales; in 1998, this ratio increased to 58 percent; in 
1999, it decreased to 51 percent; and in 2000 it further decreased 
to 29 percent (source: Statistical Bulletin).4 
 
Table 1 
Non-monetary transactions in Ukraine, 1997-2000* 
 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 
Share of barter in total sales, percent     
− industry  42.4 42.5 32.7 17.1 
− agriculture 23.4 26.2 27.1 18.6 
− exports 10.5 7.5 3.8 1.5 
− imports 10.0 7.1 3.0 1.4 
Share of non-monetary settlements 
with the budget in total budget 
revenues, percent** 
    
− state budget 24.3 16.9 10.2 0.1 
− local budgets 28.3 23.1 28.0 1.7 
Ratio of overdue arrears to gross 
industrial output, percent 
    
− overdue accounts receivable 77.1 75.9 76.2 55.6 
− overdue accounts payable 110.1 108.5 106.5 71.4 
Overdue enterprise obligations 
(including industrial, agricultural, 
and service enterprises), domestic 
transactions, billion UAH*** 
    
− overdue accounts receivable 51.4 56.3 75.5 80.2 
− overdue accounts payable 70.0 82.1 105.5 103.0 
Overdue enterprise obligations 
(including industrial, agricultural, 
and service enterprises), foreign 
transactions, million USD*** 
    
− overdue accounts receivable 835 824 292 253 
− overdue accounts payable 1450 1852 2622 2676 
                                                          
3 For additional discussion, see Zhylayev (1999), and Szyrmer and Kolesnichenko 
(2000). 
4 Because of changes in accounting methods, it is difficult to compare the share of 
monetary transactions in total sales for different years.  While non-monetary 
transactions have declined over the past few years, this decline was probably less 
dramatic than official figures suggest.  
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Overdue enterprise obligations 
(including industrial, agricultural, 
and service enterprises), foreign 
transactions to gross industrial 
output, percent**** 
    
− overdue accounts receivable 0.5 1.3 1.1 0.6 
− overdue accounts payable 0.7 1.8 1.9 1.1 
* Ukrainian government statistics authorities have collected data on accounts 
payable and accounts receivable (enterprise obligations) since January 1, 1993; the 
share of overdue enterprise obligations, including foreign economic transactions, 
since January 1, 1997; and payables and receivables in industrial enterprises by 
sectors since October 1, 1997. 
** Data for 1999 and 2000 is according to the Ukrainian government’s estimates (Report, 
2001).  According to other estimates, the volume of non-monetary settlements with the 
budget is much higher.  For instance, Vakhnenko (2000) estimates these settlements at 
UAH 10.1 billion, or 36 percent of total revenues of the 1999 consolidated budget.   
*** End of year; current prices; small businesses and organizations financed from 
the budget excluded. 
**** End of year; transactions secured by promissory notes. 
Sources: About Social (January 1998, January 1999, January 2000, and 
January 2001), Bulletin (1999/4 and 2001/1), Bulletin of NBU (1998/12, 
1999/12, and 2000/12), Sales (1997,1998, 1999, and 2000), Statistical 
Bulletin (January 1998, January 1999, January 2000, and January 2001), 
and authors’ calculations 
 
 
3. Consequences of demonetization 
A microeconomic approach must be used in order to understand 
the process of demonetization observed at the macroeconomic 
(aggregate) level. 
As enterprises adjust to a transition economy, they form “new 
entrepreneurial organizations” – informal clusters of businesses, 
vertically or horizontally integrated, containing a number of 
financial and production enterprises, each of which operates 
officially as a separate legal entity.5  This leads to the development 
of a whole network of market intermediaries, specializing in 
distribution and sale of products.  These intermediaries shoulder 
the high commercial risks while demanding the appropriate 
compensation (Sladkevich, 2001). 
The demonetized sector operates similarly to a multi-currency system 
in which various money substitutes are used.  These substitutes 
sustain market segmentation, enabling economic agents to 
manipulate the system in order to generate rents.  Government 
interference, in the form of arbitrary fiscal and price decisions, 
further exacerbates segmentation.  When inputs are expensive and 
tax authorities prohibit selling products at prices lower than officially 
declared costs, the use of money substitutes often becomes the only 
                                                          
5 See “Transactions in Transition: To Barter or Not to Barter?” in this volume. 
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viable option for an enterprise if it wants to stay in business.6  Local 
price equilibria emerge separately in each market segment.   
By means of non-monetary transactions, enterprises adapt their 
business strategies to the conditions prevailing in a transitional 
economy.  In Ukraine, the system of non-monetary operations has 
gradually developed into a primitive kind of highly segmented and 
nontransparent market.  This market makes it possible for many 
enterprises to survive, and to continue employing labor and 
contributing to Ukraine’s GDP.  Thanks to this market, some of 
them are also able to earn extraordinarily high profits. 
The market segmentation results in different prices for the same 
product.  For example, the barter price of gasoline in exchange for grain 
exceeds its monetary price three to five times; and the barter price of 
metal is 50-70 percent higher than its monetary price (Zhylayev, 1999). 
In 1996 the average production cost of one ton of grain was UAH 99.  
At the same time, grain was also delivered at the following average 
prices: to procurement organizations (government), at UAH 220; to 
private individuals as in-kind wages, at UAH 97; to purchasers at 
farmer markets and stores, at UAH 164; and in barter transactions 
and other non-monetary operations, at UAH 174 (Zhylayev, 1999). 
Barter prices of agricultural products tend to be lower than official 
procurement prices.  In 1998, average agricultural barter prices 
were 25 to 50 percent lower than the corresponding procurement 
prices (Zhylayev, 1999). 
Barter prices of industrial products in mutual settlements with the 
budget tend to be higher than equivalent monetary market prices.  In 
1995, mutual settlement prices in manufacturing exceeded monetary 
prices by 20-30 percent.  At the beginning of 1996, this difference 
rose to 50–70 percent (Malakhov,1996).  In 1998–99, it rose again to 
100–150 percent.  “A product will cost 20-50 percent more in a barter 
transaction than in a cash deal.  This is evident in the price 
differences for homogeneous goods auctioned for cash.  Thus prices 
at gas and grain auctions are significantly below ‘normal’, i.e., below 
barter prices” (The Next 1000 Days, 1999, p. 19). 
Losses incurred by coal mines due to the barter scheme “coal–coke–
metal” amounted to 40 percent (Region, 1998).  
 
 
4. Socioeconomic cycles  
The demonetized sector is characterized by a certain intrinsic logic 
that brings about time-related fluctuations, which follow certain 
specific patterns.  These patterns may be explained by the physical 
laws of wave dynamics. 
                                                          
6 See “The Fundamental Macroeconomic Cause of Barter and Arrears in Post-Soviet 
Economies” in this volume. 
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At the beginning of the twentieth century, social scientists 
discovered that fluctuations in socioeconomic developments occur 
according to the principle of perpetual and periodic fluctuations, 
which are either in harmony or in conflict with one another.  At the 
beginning of the last century, it was also noticed by philosophers 
that various socioeconomic indicators are prone to a rhythmic 
undulation or cycling, which is regularly manifested in periods of 
either increased or decreased intensity.  
A cycle7 begins with the structural collapse of a socioeconomic 
system, which occurs during the declining phase of the previous 
cycle.  When the minimum (the trough) is reached, a structural 
change within the system begins to take place.  This change can be 
broken down into three “stages”:  
(1) the “calm before the storm” – a slowdown in the process of 
structural transformations; 
(2) the “apogee” – an outbreak in the intensity of the structural 
change during the ascending phase in the cycle; and 
(3) the “outcome,” after which  a new downturn begins. 
 
In the so-called Juglar’s cycle,8 the shift in one parameter brings 
about shifts in others, and these changes continue to occur in a 
cyclical pattern.  The beginning of a new cycle takes place when an 
extensive crisis, and eventually a system-wide transformation, takes 
place.  Structural crises arise from the disparity between the 
economy’s structure and its functions. Thus, some of the current 
economic processes are cyclical in character.  
The economic cycle is often defined as a regular changeover to a 
new stage of development of the economic system.  This process is 
characterized by a partial repetition, manifested by the re-
occurrence of similar phases with similar characteristics.  Economic 
cycles can be divided into: 
• functional cycles – when the economy changes some of its 
parameters, without changing the overall path of its 
development; and 
• development cycles – when the economy undergoes a 
profound qualitative change in its structure and functioning, 
eventually resulting in a shift to a new development path.   
Gregory Mankiw argues that economists paid insufficient attention 
to the cyclical dynamics of economic development.  He begins his  
                                                          
7 Cycle – (Greek Kyklos - wheel, circle, ring, disk) denotes a round of years or a 
recurring period of time, especially one in which certain events or phenomena 
repeat themselves in the same order and at the same interval.  See: Random House 
Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary. 1997. – 2nd ed., New York: Random House. 
8 Juglar’s cycles are related to the reproduction of capital. They are long-term cycles (8-
12 years), with distinctive phases embracing the whole process of capital formation.  
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chapter on economic fluctuations by quoting John B. Clark:  “The 
modern world regards business cycles much as the ancient 
Egyptians regarded the overflowing of the Nile.  The phenomenon 
recurs at intervals, is of great importance to everyone, and natural 
causes of it are not in sight” (Mankiw, 2000, p. 236). 
Over the past decade, both functional cycles (short-term seasonal 
fluctuations) and development cycles (long-term structural 
transformations) can be observed in the economic processes taking 
place in Ukraine.  In this analysis, the focus is on the seasonal 
fluctuations.  Long-term trends are also noticed, but since Ukraine 
still remains in the initial stages of transition, more research (and 
time) is necessary to identify robust long-term cycles.  
 
 
5. Cycles in the demonetized sector 
An initial analysis of the monthly arrears of Russian enterprises in 
1993 generated the following findings (Volkonsky, Hurvich, and 
Kantorovich, 1995): 
1. A number of simultaneous cycles occur, each one lasting 
approximately three months. 
2. The upward trend is slow until June, but the rate 
increases significantly in the second half of the year. 
3. The industries can be divided into two distinct groups, each 
with a different cyclical pattern.  The first group includes 
Power, Fuels, and Machinery; and the second – Metals and 
Chemicals. 
4. The increase in output is accompanied by an increase in 
accounts payable; accounts receivable, however, are not 
affected.  
 
A study of the 1994-97 period in Ukraine confirmed a clear cyclical 
pattern in the changes of the ratio of accounts payable to gross 
industrial output  (TACIS BISTRO Facility, 1997).  This research also 
revealed an intense cyclical flow of arrears (the “payables-receivables” 
chain feedback) throughout the economy.  When a large number of 
enterprises accumulate mutual arrears, it becomes impossible to 
identify the “original” debtors and the “original” creditors.  
 
 
6. Ukraine’s demonetized sector  
Figure 1 shows that considerable changes in Ukraine’s demonetized 
sector occurred between the fall of 1997 and spring of 2000.  As of 
October 1, 1997, the share of the combined obligations of three 
industries – Power, Fuels, and Ferrous Metals – in the total volume 
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of Ukrainian enterprise obligations amounted to 53.5 percent of 
both accounts receivable and accounts payable.  As of April 1, 
2000, the figures were 64.0 and 60.1 percent respectively.  The 
share of these industries in the gross industrial output increased 
from 48.6 to 52.0 percent.  
 
Figure 1 
 
Structure of financial obligations in manufacturing,  
by industry, percent of total obligations (the sum of all 
obligations in manufacturing = 100 percent), October 1, 1997, 
and April 1, 2000 
 
             Accounts receivable  Accounts payable 
 
 
 
Sources: About Social (January 1998, January 1999, January 2000, and 
January 2001), Bulletin (1999/4 and 2001/1), Bulletin of NBU (1998/12, 
1999/12, and 2000/12), Sales (1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000), Statistical 
Bulletin (January 1998, January 1999, January 2000, and January 2001), 
and authors’ calculations 
 
Differences in the magnitudes of obligations in various industries 
could be explained by the type of goods each industry produced – 
intermediate versus final-consumption goods – and by the specific 
payment procedures followed. 
Investigating regularly occurring phenomena in the cyclical dynamics 
of Ukraine’s demonetized sector requires the separating of industries 
into three groups according to their distinctive features and 
development trends:  
 Power and Fuels (Figures 2a and 2b) 
 Ferrous Metals and Construction Materials (Figures 2c and 2d)  
 Machinery and Food (Figures 2e and 2f)  
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Similar to the studies mentioned above, the focus of this analysis is 
on the changes in flows of non-monetary transactions.  Price 
inflation and shifts in exchange rates complicate and distort the 
relationship between flows and stocks.  Due to significant price 
changes, the flows (i.e., current transactions) are not directly 
compatible with the stocks (i.e., liabilities generated by previous 
transactions).  Thus, for the sake of analyzing the dynamics of non-
monetary transactions, it becomes convenient to use flow-to-flow 
measures (rather than flow-to-stock measures), such as the ratio of 
non-monetary transactions to total sales.  The use of flow-to-flow 
measures secures price compatibility and allows one to take into 
account the impact of changes in business activity.  
Figures 2a through 2f demonstrate changes in accounts payable, 
both total (current and overdue) and arrears (overdue payables 
only), for selected industries during the period October 1997 – 
December 2000. 
 
Figure 2 
 
Ratio between changes in accounts payable in industrial 
enterprises and gross industrial output, selected industries, 
percent, monthly, October 1997 – December 2000 
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Sources: About Social (January 1998, January 1999, January 2000, and 
January 2001), Bulletin (1999/4 and 2001/1), Bulletin of NBU (1998/12, 
1999/12, and 2000/12), Sales (1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000), Statistical 
Bulletin (January 1998, January 1999, January 2000, and January 2001), 
and authors’ calculations 
 
Findings: 
1. Discernible seasonal fluctuations can be identified for the entire 
period. 
2. In December 1998, all industries demonstrated a drastic decrease 
in their overdue payables, while their total payables remained 
almost unchanged.  It seems that this decrease was a result of a 
combination of several factors, including accounting standard 
changes, such as a redefinition of arrears (overdue payables).    
3. Interestingly, a sharp decline in overdue payables resulted, after a 
few months, in a strong increase in both total payables and 
overdue payables.  Among possible causes of this increase were 
such factors as:  
- a soft-budget-constraint-type behavior: a softness in treating 
enterprise debt sparks further softness expectations and 
produces more debt; 
- maturing of previously postponed payables: the overdue 
arrears, re-classified as “current” liabilities, if not paid, sooner 
or later become “overdue” again; 
- low liquidity of both financial and non-financial enterprises 
due to the 1998 fall crisis; and 
- the government’s anti-crisis measures that further stiffened an 
already rigid economy.  
Regular annual cycles continued during the entire period 1997-2000 
period (Figure 3).  The annual cycle of total payables consisted of 
three waves that peaked in March, June, and September.  Each wave 
had a different length: four months (January-May), two months 
(May-July), and six months (July-January).  
Wage arrears amount to only a small percentage of total arrears; 
however, their social significance makes their analysis especially 
important.  Arrears in wages and social security payments have 
proved to be the main factor precipitating a decrease in household 
income during a time of rapid disinflation.  In 1996, wage arrears 
increased 6.5 times, from UAH 575 million at the beginning of the 
year to UAH 3.7 billion at the end of the year.  In 1998, employees  
(total economy) were paid 78 percent of their wages on time.  In 1999 
this rose to 83 percent, but agricultural employees were paid only 47 
percent of their annual wages.  Generally, 1998-99 wage arrears 
stayed within the range of 20-50 percent, compared to total wages.9   
                                                          
9 Unpaid wages in January 2000 amounted  to UAH 672 million or 32 percent  of 
accrued (total) wages (Zhylyaev, 2000b).  
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Figure 3 
Enterprise payables* and wage arrears,** percent, monthly 
averages, 1997-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Ratio between (1) changes in total enterprise payables (including industrial, 
agricultural and service enterprises), domestic transactions; and (2) gross industrial 
output. 
** Ratio between changes in wage arrears and wages paid. 
Sources: About Social (January 1998, January 1999, January 2000, and 
January 2001), Bulletin (1999/4 and 2001/1), Bulletin of NBU (1998/12, 
1999/12, and 2000/12), Sales (1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000), Statistical 
Bulletin (January 1998, January 1999, January 2000, and January 2001), 
Trends (2000 and January 2001), and authors’ calculations 
 
During the 1997–2000 period, a significant seasonal pattern is 
noticed in the ratio between wage arrears and paid wages (Figure 
3).10 The curve peaked at the beginning of the quarter in January, 
April/May, July, and October/November; and dipped at the end of 
the quarter in March, June, August/September, and December.   
The relationship between total enterprise payables and wage arrears 
is strongly negative.11  This strong seasonal pattern is mostly a 
result of the institutional environment in which the enterprises 
operate.  An interesting path-dependence phenomenon occurs.  In 
the Soviet economy the cyclicality was produced by the plan 
fulfillment process: the enterprises had to meet specified output 
quota by the end of each quarter and, more importantly, by the end 
of the year.  The current tax collection system, involving different 
quarterly and annual tax and wage payment deadlines and penalties 
for non-compliance, results in a new strong cyclical pattern.  Some 
payments – especially taxes and wages – are crowded at the end of 
                                                          
10 Paid wages include the payment of those for the current month, plus the clearing 
of arrears for the preceding periods listed for the current month.  
11 Pearson correlation coefficient for first differences for the two time series is negative 
61 percent [-0.61]. 
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the quarter, and some – like inter-enterprise debts – at the beginning 
of the quarter (inter-enterprise liabilities).  Wage arrears increase 
drastically at the beginning of the year, especially in January, and 
are paid back at the end of the year, especially in December.12  Total 
enterprise payables decline drastically in January but increase 
rapidly at the end of first quarter in March.  This increase may be 
related to the massive write-offs of enterprise debts to the 
government that often occur at the end of the year. 
Another important phenomenon is the strong positive relationship 
between enterprise gross receivables, gross payables, and net 
arrears (Figure 4).  The maximums and minimums in the stock 
changes of accounts payable, accounts receivable, and net arrears 
tend to coincide in time.  Payables display the greatest cycle 
amplitude, indicated by the steepest slopes of their “waves.” Three 
clearly defined periods, or waves, were observed: January-April, 
April-July, and July-December.  The cyclical pattern does not show 
any significant changes over the four years, although some cycle 
“flattening” trend is noticed.  The amplitude of cycles in 1999, and 
especially in 2000, tends to be lower than that in 1997 and 1998. It 
is possible that a new pattern is about to begin: the shapes of 
curves for August-December 2000 are distinctly different from the 
corresponding curves for the three previous years. 
Figure 4c demonstrates the economic essence of changes in the 
flows of arrears.  There are two ways an enterprise can reduce its 
arrears: by incurring fewer debts of its own, thus reducing its 
accounts payable; or by reducing the debts of its customers, thus 
reducing its accounts receivable.  Positive segments of the curve 
show periods of a worsening in the debt position of enterprises, 
while negative segments show an improvement in this position.  The 
deterioration occurs at the end of each quarter, and the 
improvement occurs at the middle of each quarter. 
 
Figure 5 displays a clear trend, possibly a component of a long-
term development cycle related to the post-Soviet transition.  It 
shows that the demonetized sector in Ukraine has been shrinking: 
enterprise payables, enterprise receivables, wage arrears, and barter 
transactions have been declining.  Figure 5 also reveals the short-
term (annual) cycle pattern. Quarterly changes in enterprise 
obligations, 1993-2000, have their maximums in the first quarter 
and minimums in the last quarter (Figure 5a). Wage arrears the 
most often grow at the beginning of the year and decline at the end 
(Figure 5b).  Barter transactions decline at the beginning of the year 
and stay stable during the year (Figure 5c). 
 
                                                          
12 To a significant extent, the December lows could be explained by the payment of 
annual bonuses, combined with increased working hours.   
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Figure 4 
Ratio between (1) changes in enterprise obligations, domestic 
transactions; and (2) gross industrial output; percent, monthly 
averages, 1997-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: About Social (January 1998, January 1999, January 2000, and 
January 2001), Bulletin (1999/4 and 2001/1), Bulletin of NBU (1998/12, 
1999/12, and 2000/12), Sales (1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000), Statistical 
Bulletin (January 1998, January 1999, January 2000, and January 2001), 
Trends (2000 and January 2001), and authors’ calculations 
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A sporadic component in the dynamics of non-monetary settlements is 
related primarily to economic crises and the government’s 
administrative measures.  Thus, Figure 5a shows alterations in the 
cycling pattern caused by: (a) high inflation in 1993-1994, and (b) the 
economic crises of 1997 and 1998.  Similarly, Figure 5b shows that 
increases in the amount of wages paid (area below the trend line) 
usually coincided with election campaigns, both parliamentary and 
presidential, and national referenda (Mau, 1997a, 1997b; and Zhylayev, 
1999).  Figure 5c shows rapid decreases in the share of barter in total 
sales of industrial products, which were related to the imposition of 
restrictions and bans on barter transactions, introduced usually at the 
beginning of the year.  In some cases, the changes in statistical 
accounting methods also caused changes at the beginning of the year.  
 
Conclusions 
Non-monetary transactions in Ukraine are a proverbial double-edged 
sword.  The positive side is that they temporarily facilitate employment 
and raise family incomes, as well as provide support for current 
economic activity.  Ukrainian living standards would have been even 
lower if it were not for non-monetary transactions.  The negative side 
is that the demonetized sector is inefficient.  By increasing transaction 
costs, it drains resources away from productive activities.  Further 
expansion of this sector would be dangerous for Ukrainian society.  
Measures aimed exclusively at enhancing controls, in order to abolish 
the non-monetary transactions, could result in short-term declines in 
output and a worsening of living standards.  Policy efforts should be 
directed at assisting those who are forced to resort to non-monetary 
transactions. They should be helped to rejoin the monetized sector.  
This is not an easy task, given that the demonetized sector operates 
within a vicious circle.  The government, faced with a shortfall of 
monetary tax revenues, applies administrative measures, typically at 
the beginning of the year, to combat and ban non-monetary 
transactions.  This leads enterprises to either curtail their economic 
activities or to continue accumulating arrears, as a result of which tax 
revenues fall.  The government is then forced to ease the pressure on 
the demonetized sector.  Idiosyncratic and inconsistent measures, the 
use of punitive sanctions in the absence of positive incentives, as well as 
asymmetry in the responsibilities of the government, entrepreneurs, 
and employees,13 characterize the government’s policy on non-monetary 
transactions and stimulate further demonetization (and corruption).  
                                                          
13 This asymmetry is a fundamental feature of the fiscal and financial system in 
Ukraine.  All institutions are tailored toward bureaucratic authorities and provide little 
chance for an individual or for an enterprise (especially a small business, which lacks 
political power) to defend themselves from the abuses.  The authorities have rights, 
individual economic actors have responsibilities.  The latter pay penalties whenever 
they are behind schedule with their payments.  The authorities view arrears as a 
cost-free “open credit line.”  They may delay the payments at their discretion.  
There is no effective legal system that would defend taxpayers against bureaucratic 
harassment by the authorities.   
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Figure 5 
Demonetization trends 
(5a) Ratio between changes in enterprise obligations, domestic 
transactions only; and GDP; percent, quarterly, 1993-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(5b) Ratio between changes in wage arrears and wages paid, 
percent, monthly, 1997-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(5c) Share of barter transactions in the sales of industrial 
products, percent, monthly, July 1997 - December 2000 
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Sources: About Social (January 1998, January 1999, January 2000, and 
January 2001), Bulletin (1999/4 and 2001/1), Bulletin of NBU (1998/12, 
1999/12, and 2000/12), Sales (1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000), Statistical 
Bulletin (January 1998, January 1999, January 2000, and January 2001), 
Trends (2000 and January 2001), and authors’ calculations  
 
It is unfair to say that non-monetary transactions are a uniquely 
Ukrainian invention, and that the demonetized sector developed 
purely as a consequence of market reform.  Its existence goes back 
to Soviet times, and it can also be found in the economies of many 
developed countries.  However, the slow pace of Ukraine’s market 
reforms has stimulated a rapid expansion of this sector, creating a 
radically new business environment.  Those who design Ukraine’s 
reform programs cannot afford to ignore the breadth and strength of 
the demonetized sector, and must find ways to reduce it. 
The analytical approach used in this chapter may serve as the 
starting point for more detailed investigations.  It should be further 
extended and improved upon, as additional research reveals the 
specifics of regions, their industries and  internal structures.  As 
detailed time series are assembled, specific cycles and the most 
significant relationships will be identified, and this in turn will 
make our explications, forecasting, and policy evaluations more 
precise.  
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About Social and Economic Situation of Ukraine. January 1998, 
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Introduction and Case Study 
A simple standard neoclassical production function (such as Cobb-
Douglas, CES, etc.) transforms some factors of production (say labor 
and capital), by means of a particular technology, into a specific 
product.  Within such a framework, in a relatively open competitive 
market, two factories, of similar size, which use similar technologies, 
are expected to produce a similar output and perform similarly.  
Therefore, it has been very insightful to study two almost identical 
cement factories, one in a Central European country and one in an 
FSU country, both being owned by same Western European 
company, that differ significantly in their economic performance.2  
For reasons explained below we will call the former factory the “Cash 
Factory” and will refer to the latter as the “Barter Factory.”  The Cash 
Factory paid wages to its workers, covered its liabilities and taxes 
due, and remained profitable.  At the same time, the Barter Factory 
had large arrears for both wages and taxes, and generated losses to 
its owner.  Interestingly, in 1998 the average wage of Cash Factory’s 
workers was five times higher than the average wage of Barter 
                                                          
1 The authors acknowledge conceptual contributions of Vladimir Dubrovskiy and 
Aleksander Pivovarsky to this chapter. 
2 CASE STUDY: Research undertaken by Harvard/CASE Ukraine Project in 1999, 
sponsored by USAID.  Several persons participated in this project: Janusz Szyrmer, 
Alexander Pivovarsky, Khwaja Sultan, Elena Besedina, Charles Mohan, and others. 
In this chapter, we use selected results of this research, as presented by Alexander 
Pivovarsky and Janusz Szyrmer at the Harvard/CASE Ukraine Project HIID 
Economic Policy Seminar, Kyiv, September 8, 1999 (seminar handout, Pivovarsky, 
1999).    
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Factory’s workers3 and taxes paid by the Cash Factory exceeded 
those paid by the Barter Factory.  This case study made obvious that 
neoclassical microeconomic theory is not well equipped to handle the 
difference in performance between these two factories.   
A thorough comparative analysis identified the following main 
differences: 
1. The total number of workers in the Cash Factory was lower 
than in the Barter Factory.  Labor productivity in the former 
was significantly higher than in the latter (890 tons versus 
490 tons of cement per worker, respectively).  
2. Income and living standards of Cash Factory’s workers were 
much higher than those of Barter Factory’s workers. 
3. Income and living standards of Barter Factory’s managers 
were much higher than those of Cash Factory’s managers 
(luxury housing, fashionable cars, etc.). 
4. Cash Factory was not supported by local authorities while 
the Barter Factory “enjoyed” a lot of attention from and 
support by local authorities. 
5. The Cash Factory used cash in its transactions – for both 
purchases and sales – while the Barter Factory used barter 
(about 90 percent of all transactions); in particular, it 
exchanged cement for gas, the latter used as an input in the 
production of the former.  The share of energy in total costs 
in the Cash Factory was 40 percent; it was 70 percent in the 
Barter Factory. 
After having interviewed several individuals working in, or affiliated 
with, the two factories we have decided that barter must be the 
number one suspect to be responsible for these differences.  
Actually, the exact calculation of costs and revenues of the Barter 
Factory was a difficult task.  The lack of transparency in this 
factory’s accounts was striking.   
A large proportion of all transactions in Ukraine (and several other 
FSU countries) are variants of barter-type operations, including 
mutual cancellations, payments with promissory notes, arrears and 
simple nonpayments, equity for debt swaps, obscure debt 
restructuring deals, conditional debt write-offs, etc.  It is therefore 
hard to expect this kind of economy to grow and prosper (Szyrmer, 
2000a; Besedina, 2000; Zhylayev and Orlova, 2000; and Thirsk, 
2000).  The costs of inputs acquired by barter transactions are often 
                                                          
3 CASE STUDY: In 1999, due to a significant change in exchange rates, Cash Factory’s 
workers, in dollar terms, earned ten times more than Barter Factory’s workers (average 
wages of USD $400 and USD $40, respectively). 
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from two to four times higher than in the case of cash transactions;4 
many otherwise profitable activities become unprofitable, at least 
officially; corruption and the shadow economy become rampant; 
income inequality is growing; and decapitalization, in terms of both 
physical and human capitals, is progressing. At the macroeconomic 
level, all this results in a sick, depressed economy. 
The role of barter in a post-Soviet economy may be much greater 
than many economists would be willing to admit.  We argue in this 
chapter that the main problem with barter is not its alleged high 
transaction costs, but rather its nontransparent nature.  The lack of 
transparency creates opportunity for so-called tunneling, or 
leakages of money and goods outside of the official economy.  
Moreover, barter transactions break the market down into a huge 
number of separate little segments, each of them creating a small 
niche that provides appropriate “intimacy” for a sale/purchase 
contract.  It is protected from the rest of the world by an invisible 
wall of informal connections between persons involved in barter 
deals usually concluded behind closed doors.  An obvious negative 
externality of barter is its promotion of an idiosyncratic clandestine 
business culture, where all pieces of the officially available 
information – prices, wages, interest rates, sale transactions, 
privatization contracts, tax payments, etc. – are “virtual,” not real, 
at best only partly true.  The practice of multiple bookkeeping, or  
maintaining several kinds of accounts – official, unofficial for 
internal use, strictly confidential, etc. – becomes a business 
standard.  People view any information with a jaundiced eye, even if 
it happens to be accurate.  The reliability of any published data is 
discounted. Every official activity and every official transaction is 
under suspicion of corruption, and likely to be accompanied by 
some undisclosed hidden “attachment.”  Investing and doing 
business in such an economy turns into a major challenge that only 
few people are able and willing to face.  Of course, this kind of 
duality – official and unofficial (further complicated by the 
multiplicity of many shades of “gray-area” operations) – does not 
help successful reforms and dynamic sustainable growth. 
This chapter presents an effort to examine a number of hypotheses 
as to the causes and nature of barter, collected from the literature 
published over the last several years.  Our objective is to improve 
understanding of this peculiar and obscure phenomenon and 
formulate some policy recommendations.   
In the first section of this chapter, we present basic facts about 
barter in Ukraine.  A literature overview and discussion of 
alternative hypotheses as to causes of barter is provided in the 
second section.  This is followed by an empirical analysis of barter 
                                                          
4 CASE STUDY: The Barter Factory purchased gas through barter for USD $60-100 
dollars per one thousand of cubic meters, while the cash price was as low as USD 
$20-30 dollars.  
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in Ukraine, 1991-2000, with a focus on the time dimension; we look at 
the evolution of a “barter economy.”  Next, we discuss two important 
aspects of barter: barter’s relationship to the neoclassical perfect 
competition model in the context of globalization, as this is supported 
by rapid Internet development; and the issues of barter and money in 
terms of their relative liquidity.  The final section is a Conclusion 
explaining why barter occurs, and ending with a strong argument for 
implementation of further institutional reform in Ukraine. 
 
 
1. Barter in Ukraine 
In Ukraine, barter statistics for manufacturing began to be 
systematically collected in April 1997.  Barter trade is recorded with 
shipment of an enterprise’s output.  According to these statistics 
barter remained at about 40 percent level of total industrial 
shipments throughout 1997 and 1998; it declined to about 30 
percent in 1999, and to about 17 percent in 2000 (Figure 1). 
Figure 1  
Structure of sale transactions in manufacturing, percent, 
 1997-2000  
Sources: Statistics Yearbooks (1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000) and 
Monitoring (February 2001) 
The share of barter varies significantly across different manufacturing 
industries. At the end of 2000 the largest barter volumes (as a 
proportion of total sales among manufacturing industries) are 
observed in Construction Materials, Machinery, and Fuels, while the 
smallest are in Metals and Food (Figure 2). 
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Barter has also been used in the fiscal sector. In 1997, barter and 
barter-like operations made up 25 percent of both revenues and 
expenditures of the consolidated budget.  This figure has been 
declining during the subsequent years to approach zero percent in 
2000 (UAH 300 million, or less than one percent of the consolidated 
budget).  There is some evidence, however, suggesting that the 
actual volume of non-monetary payments in the budget sphere is 
much higher than the official figures indicate.5  By some estimates, 
non-monetary payments in budget sector were about UAH 8 billion 
(rather than the official UAH 0.3 billion). 
 
Figure 2  
Barter in manufacturing industries, percent of total annual sales, 
2000  
Source: Monitoring (February 2001) 
Agriculture has its own barter arrangements.  The inputs delivered 
by the state to farms or purchased with government supported bank 
loans are paid back, partially or entirely, with agricultural products.  
Most of them are deposited in the State Material Reserve.  A large 
part of these input supplies and bank loans are never paid back, in 
any form.  Therefore the agricultural debt has been growing.  Barter 
as share of total sales in agriculture has been around 23-27 percent 
over the period 1997-1999 and dropped to around 19 percent in 
2000. The highest share of barter is observed in vegetable-oil crops 
and grain – barter accounts for more than half of their total volume 
(Van Atta, Neubert, and Plakhotnik, 1998). 
                                                          
5 See “Cyclical Dynamics of the Demonetized Sector” in this volume. 
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Figure 3  
Barter and quasi-barter operations in various sectors of the 
economy, percent of the total amount, 1997-2000   
Source: Statistics Yearbooks (1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000) 
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The share of barter in foreign trade, in both exports and imports, fell 
from 10 percent in 1997 to 1.5 percent (exports) and 1.4 percent 
(imports) by the end of 2000.  Geographically, the share of barter is 
generally larger in trade with the FSU countries (4 percent, in the first 
quarter of 2000).   
 
Finally, in-kind payments of wages, pensions, and social benefits are 
still another category of barter.  In 1997, wages in kind constituted  
5-6 percent of all wages due (paid and unpaid).  The proportion more 
than doubled in 1998 and remained stable throughout 1999.  
During the first half of 2000 the share fell to around 8 percent.6  
Figure 4  
Shares of mutual settlements in total incomes, by each category 
of annual consolidated budget, percent, 1999  
Notes:  EPT – enterprise profit tax  
VAT – value added tax  
PIT – personal income tax 
Sources: State Tax Administration and Fiscal Analysis Office calculations 
(www.fao.kiev.ua and Harvard/CASE database) 
 
In next few paragraphs we consider in greater detail non-monetary 
payments in public finance. Statistics covering the budget and diverse 
extra-budgetary operations provide data on so-called mutual 
settlements and the operations with promissory notes.  In 1999 the 
share of non-monetary revenues in the consolidated budget was 
around 30 percent.7  Data from the State Tax Administration provide 
information on mutual settlements by categories of fiscal revenue 
(Figure 4).  The largest share of mutual settlements is found in the 
                                                          
6 Source: Harvard/CASE database, Trends, and authors’ estimates. 
7 Source: HIIDarvard/CASE database and authors’ estimates. 
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revenues of rental payments,8 reaching more than 80 percent, and the 
lowest (around 6 percent) is in the category of personal income tax 
revenues.9 The largest portion of total mutual settlements belongs to 
enterprise profit tax and value added tax – 47 percent and 25 percent, 
respectively (Figure 5).   
Figure 5  
Shares of each category of annual consolidated budget in total 
mutual settlements, percent, 1999  
Sources: State Tax Administration and Fiscal Analysis Office calculations 
(www. fao.kiev.ua and Harvard/CASE database) 
Another category of mutual settlements are those with extra-budgetary 
funds.  In 1999, in accordance with Articles 43 and 45 of the 1999 
State Budget Law, the off-budget mutual settlements related to energy 
supply came to UAH 4.6 billion.  Mutual settlements with the State 
Material Reserve Committee accounted for UAH 1.6 billion, or 35 
percent of total off-budget settlements (FAO, 2000).  
Unfortunately, information about barter in the Ukrainian economy 
is collected and presented in such a way that it is difficult to 
reconstruct a complete picture.  We are not aware of any published 
document that would provide this information in a synthetic and 
internally consistent form.  No documentation on definitions, 
accounting methods, etc. is publicly available. Many questions 
remained unanswered. For example, it is not clear how in-kind 
repaying of arrears is reflected in the data on industrial sales.  Is it 
                                                          
8 Rental payments are the payments made by enterprises for water, use of 
infrastructure, etc. They constitute a small fraction of enterprise obligatory payments. 
9 The more detailed analysis of the mutual settlements based on the State Tax 
Administration data can be found on the website of the Fiscal Analysis Office: 
http://www.fao.kiev.ua. 
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included in this data as “barter,” or as “cash,” or as “other”? It 
seems that in budget accounts the success in reducing mutual 
settlements was accompanied by an increase in tax arrears and in 
barter operations in debt payments.  In other words, a swap of 
barter-for-debt in current accounts was “compensated” with debt-
for-barter transactions in capital accounts.  Similar tendencies have 
been observed in foreign trade.   
Another problem is the definition of barter.  There is a whole gamut 
of various semi-barter operations, involving various kinds of 
promissory notes, trade credit arrangements, give-and-take 
operations, debt-for-equity swaps, etc.  They contribute to the 
fuzziness of the barter picture. 
Barter is a nontransparent way of doing business.  The lack of 
transparency in the official Ukrainian statistics on barter seems to 
be consistent with the murky nature of the barter itself. 
 
 
2. Causes of barter in a post-Soviet economy: literature 
overview 
 
Barter is barely noticed by the mainstream economics theory.  
Standard textbooks treat barter with an “honorable mention” or ignore 
it all together.  One economics dictionary defines barter as “a method 
of exchanging goods and services directly for other goods and services 
without using a separate unit of account or medium of exchange… 
[that] requires double coincidence of wants” (Pearce, 1992).  This is 
why barter is expensive.  Ubiquitous occurrence of barter and other 
non-monetary payments in CIS countries, and their sharp increase in 
the mid-1990s, gave rise to a debate among economists about the 
underlying causes of this phenomenon (Van Atta, Neubert, and 
Plakhotnik, 1998; Guriev and Ickes, 1999a, 1999b; Shchur and 
Zhylayev, 1999; Besedina, 2000; and Thirsk, 2000).  Despite 
significant efforts seeking to understand barter in a post-Soviet 
economy, it still remains an obscure issue, not well understood and 
highly controversial.  At least one thing has been recognized by all 
authors: the main problems with barter in transition economies go far 
beyond the double-coincidence-of-wants issue.   
Contradictory concepts and findings obtained from a variety of 
studies reflect the complex and ambiguous nature of barter.  Barter 
finds its roots in the Soviet past of CIS countries.  The Soviet planned 
economy was in essence a large centrally coordinated barter scheme.  
The direct raison-d’être for the occurrence of barter is an overall 
weakness of institutions and policies in a post-Soviet fledgling market 
economy.  Barter appears as both effect and cause of this weakness. 
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The literature recognizes a large number of causes for barter.  These 
may be grouped into four broad categories: weak policy, weak banking 
(weak financial institutions), weak market (weak competition), and 
weak corporate governance (principal-agent-type problems).  We will 
consider each of these weaknesses in turn.  There is still another 
important fundamental cause of barter that has not been given much 
attention in the literature.  We refer here to all those factors that North 
(1994) defines as informal institutions: people’s perceptions, beliefs, 
convictions, values, knowledge, skills, etc., that are likely to have 
strong effect on the way people and firms behave.  These informal 
institutions, one way or another, remain behind the four listed above 
weaknesses (Szyrmer, 2000a, 2000b; and Dubrovskiy, 2000b). 
 
 
WEAK POLICY 
In the FSU economies, a Soviet-like soft budget constraint principle 
(Kornai, 1992) remains the cornerstone of state policy.  The 
government uses high tax rates and other fiscal confiscation 
measures to extract money from profitable enterprises in order to 
support loss-making enterprises.  Since, for political reasons, the 
government tends to avoid explicit subsidies in monetary form, it 
uses various indirect ways to support the losers.  Different 
nontransparent payment arrangements enable this policy.  Barter is 
such an arrangement.  Therefore it enjoys an explicit or tacit support 
from the authorities. 
High tax rates and shortcomings of the tax system 
Central and local governments maintain their controls over the 
economy by taxing and spending.  Taxes and other payments are 
the main measure that enables a large-scale redistribution of 
incomes.  This is done partly by the rules, specifying unrealistically 
high tax rates, and partly by discretionary decisions of the 
authorities, arranging shadowy “mutual settlements” deals 
(Szyrmer, 2000a), imposing different kinds of penalties for some 
taxpayers, and granting tax debt write-offs for others, etc.  This 
scheme enables the continuation of bureaucratic controls over an 
economy, despite the fact that this economy is officially liberated 
from the Soviet central planning dictatorship.10  The idiosyncrasy of 
the tax system and excessively high tax rates and tax payments are 
                                                          
10 CASE STUDY: In the case of the Barter Factory, the local authorities are heavily 
involved in monitoring the firm and its decisions related to payments, procurement, 
etc.  According to a deputy head of the rayon administration, the firm “‘violates so 
many rules”’ that administration can always exercise some degree of control over 
the firm’s managers.  Tax inspectors and tax police are constantly present in the 
firm.  Negotiations about in-kind payments of taxes also require good contacts with 
local authorities. 
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singled out in diverse surveys as important factors determining the 
choice of type of transactions by enterprises.  Some 17 percent of a 
sample of surveyed managers gave large tax payments as a reason 
for using barter (Auktsionek, 1997).  An out-of-balance tax policy is 
also singled out as an important cause of barter in several other 
studies (Berezovskaya, 1998). 
Ineffective bankruptcy procedure and avoidance of restructuring 
Enterprises use barter to maintain “the cycle of indebtedness to 
prevent them from restructuring” (Van Atta, Neubert, and 
Plakhotnik, 1998).  This resistance to restructuring gets support 
from the state (Commander and Mumssen, 1998). “By allowing 
enterprises to pay taxes in kind, tax offsets provide an incentive to 
avoid restructuring” (Gaddy and Ickes, 1998b).  Typically, an official 
reason to avoid bankruptcy, as preached by the government, 
especially by the local administration, is to protect employment and 
in such a way keep old inefficient enterprises operational.  While 
this policy “…has protected jobs and reduced social unrest, it has 
done so at the cost of retarding the momentum for privatization and 
restructuring and encouraging barter” (Thirsk, 2000).  It is argued 
that, since many enterprises are potentially insolvent, the 
bankruptcy of some of them could cause a whole chain of 
bankruptcies.  In fact, the entire legal system provides effective anti-
bankruptcy protections.  Creditors have not much chance to benefit 
financially from initiating bankruptcy actions (Hendley, Ickes, and 
Ryterman, 1998).  For example, currently in Ukraine, non-
collaterized claims are paid after four kinds of obligations of higher 
priority are repaid: (1) collaterized claims, (2) bankruptcy procedure 
costs, (3) wages and other obligations toward employees, and (4) 
taxes and other fiscal obligations.11  Since, under a weak real estate 
market and under the conditions in which most market institutions 
are not well established, a solid credit collateralization remains 
difficult to attain; creditors are not likely to satisfy their claims.  The 
only institutional claimant in relatively good shape is the state.  
This again puts control back in the hands of the bureaucracy, 
which, at its discretion, may or may not initiate bankruptcy.  Of 
course, factors of a predominantly non-economic nature once again 
dominate these decisions.  Therefore, in the case of an insolvent 
enterprise, some barter arrangements may work quite well for both 
the creditor and the debtor.  The government provides an effective 
protection for these enterprises and thus enables them to “swap 
products they could never hope to sell” (Gallagher, 1996).  
                                                          
11 Law of Ukraine on Amendments to the Law of Ukraine on Restoring the Solvency of 
the Debtor or Declaring It Bankrupt VR 784-14, dated June 26, 1999, became 
effective on January 1, 2000.   
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The soft budget constraint 
Obviously, the soft treatment of some enterprises requires a harsher 
treatment of some other enterprises in order to enable the 
government to collect the necessary tax revenue and to continue its 
micro-management of the economy.  If all the enterprises were to be 
treated equally, the current importance of authorities would decline 
and direct control capacities would vanish.  The soft budget 
constraint policy, through which the authorities chose whom to 
support and, hence, whom to discriminate against, is the key to 
these bureaucratic controls.  Due to its nontransparency, barter 
facilitates this policy (Hendley, Ickes, and Ryterman, 1998; Guriev 
and Kvasov, 1999; Dubrovskiy, 2000a; and Szyrmer, 2000a).12  
Thirsk (2000), when analyzing barter in the Power Industry, argues 
that barter transactions enable “a complex tax subsidy scheme.”13   
 
 
WEAK BANKING 
Weak financial intermediaries and high cost and low accessibility to 
cash result in the spread of barter transactions.  The lack of cash 
and bureaucratic constraints imposed on the cash flow of enterprises 
force them to seek alternative payment schemes.  These often involve 
a lot of creative thinking and sophistication.  
Liquidity shortage  
Financial difficulties are the most often stated reason for reliance on 
barter.  Thus, in the survey noted above, 47 percent of respondents 
stated that lack of working capital forced them to use barter schemes 
(Aukstionek, 1997).  The results of another survey covering 165 barter 
deals in 1997 revealed that in 88 percent of cases firms experienced 
shortage or absence of cash (Marin, Kaufman, and Gorochowskij, 
2000). Findings of research based on an EBRD transition survey 
confirm the strong relationship between difficulties with financial 
liquidity and barter’s share in total firm output.14  On the other hand, 
recent research for Ukraine by Besedina (2000) failed to establish any 
important relationship between liquidity and barter.  
                                                          
12 CASE STUDY: Given its substantial tax arrears, the Barter Factory was constantly 
engaged in some negotiations with tax authorities.  Because the firm remains the 
second largest employer in the oblast, the authorities can hardly make a threat of 
bankruptcy credible. 
13 “It is ‘‘as if’ taxes were paid in full and from the proceeds subsidies were doled 
out to energy consumers who also paid in full.  Instead, consumers do not pay in 
full, or pay in barter, and electricity companies as a result run up tax arrears that 
provide fertile ground for further barter transactions.  Non-payment (subsidization) 
in this case leads to in-kind payment.” (Thirsk, 2000).  
14 EBRD conducted a survey of firms in a number of transition economies, including 
Ukraine (250 firms) and Russia (more than 500 firms). For detailed description of the 
survey results we refer tosee Carlin et al. (1999).   
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High cost of bank credits and insufficient access to credits 
Rapidly increasing inflation in the early 1990s led to very high 
nominal interest rates and unstable relationships between creditors 
and loan-taking enterprises.  Nevertheless, the rapid disinflation in 
the mid-1990s, resulting from tightened monetary policy, also led to 
high nominal rates and very high real interest rates.  During the 
entire period of the post-Soviet transition, banks in FSU countries 
had to operate under very difficult circumstances. Bank credits have 
been expensive and not easily accessible to enterprises.  Hence, 
barter “…established itself as an economic institution to deal with the 
banking failure” (Marin, Kaufman, and Gorochowskij, 2000). 
Difficulties in accessing cash in enterprise bank accounts foster 
barter that does not require the use of these accounts (Shchur and 
Zhylayev, 1999).15  
Kartoteka #2 
The existence of Kartoteka #2, a phenomenon not readily understood 
outside the FSU, distorts economic activity and choices of agents.16 It 
encourages enterprises to avoid any contact with cash (Antczak and 
Ivashchenko, 1997; Van Atta, Neubert, and Plakhotnik, 1998; 
Dubrovskiy, 1999).17  “Barter allows the enterprises to avoid the first 
line of tax collection” (Guriev and Ickes, 1999b). Barter became the 
way to survive under conditions of huge debts and no cash on 
accounts (Maskalevich, 1998).18 
 
 
WEAK MARKET 
General weakness of the market enables enterprises to use different 
kinds of price discrimination, product differentiation, and other 
monopolistic practices in order to increase profits.  The low level of 
liquidity, low degree of openness, and high segmentation lay the 
foundation for generation of additional rents.  Also, given weak 
contract enforcement in post-Soviet economies, low price stability, and 
high level of trading risks, sellers use barter to protect themselves 
against possible losses.  While in the cases of “weak banking” barter 
was often practiced as a business survival “necessity,” here it becomes 
                                                          
15 David Snelbecker refers to it as “good barter” – see “The Fundamental Macroeconomic 
Cause of Barter and Arreas in Post-Soviet Economies” in this volume. 
16 Kartoteka #2 is a system within which any funds entering a bank account of an 
enterprise that is a tax debtor are automatically allocated for tax payments and 
possibly to other creditors according to a priority defined by the law or designated 
by the tax authorities.  
17 See also “Institutional Development of the Banking System” in this volume. 
18 CASE STUDY: As concerns the Barter Factory, the company had significant 
overdue taxes payments and its bank directly managed the company’s cash flow 
within the Kartoteka #2 system. Any cash that appeared on the firm’s account was 
almost entirely confiscated by the tax authorities and thus little was deposited.  
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more a means for profit maximization.  Firms begin using barter not 
because they have to, but rather because they choose to, since they 
view it as a good business strategy. 
Market power 
Heavy engagement of some natural monopolies in barter schemes 
gave rise to a suspicion that monopolists “…can use barter to price 
discriminate among customers, collecting cash from rich ones and 
payments in kind from poor ones” (Guriev and Ickes, 1999b). 
Investigation of barter transactions in Russia demonstrates that in 
some cases involvement in barter is closely related to the degree of 
market power (ibid.).  Though Ukrainian survey data apparently 
failed to provide convincing support for this hypothesis (Carlin et 
al., 1999) it should not be readily discarded since the occurrence of 
multiple prices in barter deals signals market discrimination 
practices.19 
Obviously, by its very nature, barter provides good opportunity for 
price discrimination, since each of its transactions is basically a 
stand-alone operation.  Under the barter scheme transactions follow 
a Coasian-type arrangements (Coase, 1996), in which two (or more) 
sides negotiate for as long as necessary to come up with an efficient 
solution, one which reflects the relative market power of the 
negotiators.  Since in each case this power, which is affected by 
many factors, is likely to be different, the final outcome of such 
negotiations may also differ.  In other words, each exchange may 
see the same good sold/purchased at a different price and under 
different contractual conditions, while both the price and the 
conditions remain unknown to outsiders.  Thus, a barter contract 
may be Pareto efficient for the negotiators, yet price discrimination 
practices are, in a way, built into its procedures.  As demonstrated 
by Korenyok (2000) and others, the opportunity for price and cost 
manipulations is an important factor stimulating the use of barter 
in commercial transactions. 
Disorganization and contract risks 
Barter is used to maintain production when trading relations are 
damaged as a result of post-Soviet disorganization (Marin and 
Schnitzer, 1999).  As former Soviet input-output links among the 
enterprises, and, more importantly, among people who work in 
these enterprises, are ruptured, or at least weakened, the existing 
legal framework for official contractual obligations is not strong 
enough to enforce these obligations.  Enterprises suffer from 
financial strain.  Under these circumstances, barter is chosen to 
                                                          
19 CASE STUDY: The Barter Factory sold a small fraction of its output for cash at 
prices much lower than those used in barter transactions, below the so-called 
accounting cost. 
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help lower transaction risks.  Since barter involves tangible goods 
over which enterprises have more control than over money, barter 
contracts are considered to be safer than cash contracts.  Promise 
to pay in cash may remain only a promise and an enterprise may 
end up with nothing while goods received in exchange of its 
products are tangible and can be sold.  Barter serves as “a risk-free 
trade credit” (Commander and Mumssen, 1998).  Enterprises create 
“a deal-specific collateral” in the form of goods (Marin, Kaufman, 
and Gorochowskij, 2000).  Since such trade credit is secured with 
goods, barter is employed by enterprises as a strategy to minimize 
risk should a business partner renege on a contract.  
Inflation related risks 
Shifting to non-monetary payments is viewed as “a rational response by 
economic actors to a breakdown in the cash economy” (Van Atta, 
Neubert, and Plakhotnik, 1998). Similarly to the previous case (the 
“disorganization”), barter is used as a sort of hedging operation to 
protect transacting parties against the possible (often highly 
unpredictable) losses due to high inflation and general price instability.  
By trading good for good, such risks are significantly reduced.   
Non-cash environment 
To rephrase North’s famous statement - business environment 
matters.  If most people around speak French then in order to be 
able to successfully communicate with others one has to use this 
language.  The same argument applies to barter trade.  If almost 
everybody barters and you want to stay in business, you have to 
barter (Snelbecker, Besedina, and Sluchinski, 1998).  Otherwise, 
higher transaction costs are incurred, not to mention difficulties in 
finding business partners.  A survey of Russian enterprises in 34 
regions showed that “own or partner’s lack of liquidity has been 
unambiguously the dominant reason” for using non-monetary 
payments, including barter (Commander and Mumssen, 1998). 
 
 
WEAK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
A standard problem in corporate management is the issue of 
information available to different actors (owners, managers, workers, 
government, and business partners).  Typically significant information 
asymmetries occur that are used to give advantage to those to whom 
the particular information is available.  These asymmetries weaken 
corporate governance and control, while the weak governance and 
control tend to enforce large information asymmetries.  Barter appears 
as a convenient instrument for hiding or distorting information at the 
level of an enterprise.  Therefore, weak governance and barter tend to 
coincide and mutually reinforce each other. 
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Tax evasion 
Information asymmetries help enterprises diminish tax payments.  
Barter is a convenient means for these asymmetries by enabling 
various cost and price manipulations.  A typical manipulation 
consists of assigning increasing costs to bartered inputs, which 
justifies the reduced payments of corporate profit and value added 
taxes (Commander and Mumssen, 1998).  Another opportunity is 
wage and tax payments in kind.  These payments also enable 
different price manipulations at the expense of workers (who 
cooperate because they do not want to lose their jobs) and tax 
authorities (who may agree under certain conditions].  Tax offsets 
enable enterprises that pay overdue tax payments with goods and 
services to budget sector organizations in exchange for writing off or 
reducing tax arrears (World Bank, 1998; Szyrmer, 2000a; Zhylayev 
and Orlova, 2000; and Thirsk, 2000). Enterprises can manipulate 
prices in this way or simply dispose of illiquid goods and avoid cash 
payments.   
Virtual economy 
The term “virtual economy” has gained currency to define an 
economy that is “based on illusion, or pretense, about almost every 
parameter of the economy: prices, sales, wages, taxes and budgets” 
(Gaddy and Ickes, 1998a). In such an economy barter and arrears 
are used to support this pretense (Szyrmer, 2000a).  The more 
barter is used the less transparent the transactions become and the 
further the virtual economy expands.    
Principal-agent problem and rent seeking 
The principal-agent hypothesis can be considered as an important 
approach for barter explanation, closely related to the concept of 
rent seeking.  Barter helps enterprise management to generate side 
payments (Maskalevich, 1998) and “hide the profit-diverting 
activities” (Korenyok, 2000).  The expansion of barter and arrears is 
explained by “inept and immoral enterprise management” (Gaddy 
and Ickes, 1998a).20 Barter is used to hide illegal “tunneling” 
practices21 (Fonkich, 2000a and 2000b).22  
                                                          
20 For a commentary on this approach, see “Cyclical Dynamics of the Demonetized 
Sector” in this volume.  
21 Tunneling practices are “value transfers from productive to non-productive 
industries” (FonkychFonkich, 2000a).  
22 CASE STUDY: For the Barter Factory, – significant informational problems have 
been noticed.  Each barter deal was made behind closed doors.  Official prices of goods 
were negotiated.  Given the clandestine format of transactions, side payments and 
other transfers could not be ruled out.  The owners of the firm were excluded from the 
negotiations.  
Transactions in Transition: to Barter or Not to Barter? 
 
121
LITERATURE REVIEW: CONCLUSIONS 
Examination of the literature demonstrates that no hypothesis can 
provide a fully convincing explanation for the occurrence of 
barter in post-Soviet countries.  At the same time, none of these 
hypotheses can be easily rejected based on available evidence.   
The above-presented causes of barter are summarized in Appendix, 
Table A1.  Each row of this table corresponds to one literature 
source.  The references are sorted by the year of data used in 
research and by the year of publication.  Each column represents 
one specific cause of barter.  It is interesting to observe a peculiar 
diagonal pattern of this table.  Research and data in different years 
tend to focus on different aspects of barter and its causes, and they 
seek to support different hypotheses. Thirsk’s research (2000) 
appears as an outlier.  Thirsk argues that little enterprise 
restructuring, high debt of many enterprises due to high production 
cost, and over-production related to over-employment are the main 
reasons for barter.  We maintain along with many other authors 
(Gaddy and Ickes, 1998a, 1998b; Korenyok, 2000; Dubrovskiy, 
2000a; and Fonkich, 2000a and 2000b) that, in fact, it is 
nontransparency that is the main attraction of barter, making 
it a convenient tool in the hands of rent seekers. 
As concerns historical causality, path dependence in the broad 
sense seems to be the right answer.  Weak policies, weak market 
institutions, weak corporate governance, and last but not least 
weak and confused market perceptions among policymakers and 
other economic actors are all an inheritance from the Soviet past.  
Since it is not possible, in a short period of time, to change human 
minds and skills (informal institutions), production and distribution 
arrangements (formal institutions), and public decision-making 
(policies), barter emerges as a logical response to all these market-
related “weaknesses.”  In other words, it would be a conceptual and 
methodological mistake to try to trace barter to some specific 
policies or specific institutions.  Barter is a rational business 
strategy, at times even a business survival necessity under 
conditions of uncertainty, used by producers and traders in a given 
systemic context.  It is consistent with their skills and behavioral 
patterns learned in the previous system as well as with their 
progress in learning new institutional arrangements and new 
business strategies.  In the Soviet system money served more as a 
passive accounting unit rather than an active means of market 
exchange.  Barter is a continuation of old Soviet production 
networks through which products were distributed.  In a way, it is a 
decentralized variant of the then-used central-planning operation.  
Today, in place of central coordination of goods and service 
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exchange there is a more chaotic, less regulated, and less 
transparent physical allocation of production inputs and outputs, in 
part by way of barter.23 
 
 
3. Ukraine: a historic perspective  
Over the last decade, post-socialist economies have undergone rapid, 
fundamental transformations.  The whole process is built around a 
core interaction between institutions and behavior of economic actors.  
The actors (policymakers, investors, producers, and consumers) keep 
learning and adjusting to the evolving institutional arrangements, 
while actively influencing the changes in these arrangements.  
Institutions, in turn, keep stimulating the learning of the actors, 
while gradually changing themselves as a result of their own 
“learning” and of the activities of the actors.  This dynamic and highly 
interactive process leads toward a new system – a transition 
economy.  It remains unclear whether this new system is just a 
short-term ephemeral phenomenon, or perhaps a new type, a longer-
lasting aberration of a market economy.  The pervasiveness of barter 
and other non-monetary operations in this economy makes these 
transactions an important attribute, perhaps even a fundamental 
feature of this system.  In fact, it would be hard to imagine an 
alternative arrangement.  Barter is logical for this kind of economy.   
Since there is no more central planning, a market-type mechanism 
is needed for resource allocation.  With no well-developed financial 
intermediaries and no skills to operate within a competitive 
demand-driven market, new exchange arrangements must emerge, 
ones that (1) avoid banking services and money, and (2) do not 
require much market experience. 
The actors in the transition economy know how to produce goods, 
how to acquire physical inputs necessary for their activities, and how 
to deliver outputs to their clients.  Yet, they are still not ready to 
operate in a monetized open competitive market economy with its 
plethora of financial institutions, complex accounting systems, 
deregulated prices, tough quality requirements, complex investment 
strategies (ones not determined and financed by the government), etc.  
Money is produced by the central bank, its future value is unknown, 
and it remains beyond the control of enterprises.  Goods are 
produced by the enterprises, they preserve certain tangible value over 
time, and remain under direct control of suppliers and purchasers.  
Actors know how to handle tangible goods at a microeconomic level, 
but feel lost and confused by the unknown and uncontrollable open 
                                                          
23 See also “The Fundamental Macroeconomic Cause of Barter and Arrears in Post-
Soviet Economies” in this volume. 
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market operations shaped by some abstract monetary policies at the 
macroeconomic level.  Under such circumstances, barter becomes a 
safer and more comfortable choice. 
Because of the high speed of learning by the actors and incessant 
institutional transformations, barter transactions at one moment in 
time, say in 1995, were significantly different from those later, say 
in 2000.  During these five years, a lot of changes and a lot of 
learning took place.  Also, intense research efforts during the last 
few years improved our (still poor) understanding of barter and its 
dynamics, and its causes and effects.  Today, we have access to 
data and empirical research that did not exist five years ago. 
Paying attention to this time dimension of barter activities adds to 
our understanding of the causes of barter.  Learning of and 
adjusting to new institutional arrangements constitute an 
investment by people and firms.  Today, there exist many 
companies that specialize exclusively in barter operations.  
Managers use complex exchange networks painstakingly designed 
and perfected over time.  Many people make their living off barter.  
Many companies are profitable because of barter.  Many companies 
continue their existence thanks to barter.  There have emerged 
powerful interests attached to barter supporting institutions.  A new 
business experience and specific skills necessary to run barter 
operations have accumulated.  
On one hand, progressing market reforms help efforts to monetize 
the economy.  On the other hand, given all these structural and 
institutional adjustments, an economy-wide abolishment of barter 
becomes an increasingly difficult task (although it is not impossible 
under adequate and consistent policies). 
An analysis of the literature suggests that, in Ukraine, while general 
causal relationships between the economy and barter have 
remained roughly stable throughout the transition, the relative 
importance of particular causes and arrangements have been 
changing over time.   
Weak policies 
In the early 1990s barter was a continuation of Soviet-era 
activities.  Enterprises continued as much as possible to use their 
old supply networks.  The government continued its management of 
the economy through high-but-soft tax rates and soft-but-harmful 
budget constraints.  Over time explicit budget subsidies to 
commercial enterprises became politically inconvenient.  In Ukraine, 
these subsidies shrunk from 9-18 percent in 1992-94 to around 4 
percent in 1995-2000 (Figure 6). This was a result of efforts, under 
the watchful eye of the IMF and other international donors, to curb 
hyperinflation by cutting the budget deficit. 
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Figure 6  
Budget expenditure on the national economy, percent of GDP, 
Ukraine, 1992–2000 
Source: Harvard/CASE database 
Barter became an obvious choice of enterprises under the following 
conditions caused by governmental policies: 
• high inflation due to high fiscal deficit 
• low official budget subsidies 
• very high cost of bank credit, related to policies, which were 
detrimental to the development of the banking sector 
• high tax debt tolerated by the authorities 
• frequent debt write-offs approved by the authorities 
• very low unemployment rate and official avoidance of 
bankruptcies of loss-making enterprises 
• slow and nontransparent privatization, which has been 
dominated by insiders  
• significant administrative impediments to the creation and 
development of new profitable market-oriented firms 
• unstable exchange rate, and   
• gradually increasing impediments to foreign trade 
As a result, enterprises had to use barter or chose to use barter 
whenever possible.     
There is no systematic data on barter in Ukraine for years before 
1997.  Since there are similar patterns in the use of barter in 
Ukraine and Russia, it seems that data on Russian barter can be 
used as a crude approximation for barter activities in Ukraine 
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(Figure 7).  In the early 1990s industrial barter remained at a 
relatively low level.  In the years 1995-97 it soared from about 20 to 
40 percent of total sales of industrial output. In 1998 this share 
reached its peak in Russia (around 50 percent) and remained stable 
at about 40 percent in Ukraine.  Since then, it has been shrinking 
in both countries. In 2000, it was 17 percent in Ukraine (at the end 
of the year), and 30 percent in Russia (at the end of August).  
 
Figure 7  
Share of barter in the industrial sales, percent, Russia,  
1992-2000; and Ukraine, 1997–2000 
 
 
Note: The year 2000 figure for Russia is as of the end of August. 
Sources: Harvard/CASE database, Monitoring (February 2001), and Russian 
Barometer 
 
One can argue, however, that barter was widely used from the very 
beginning of transition, even if it was not classified as such.  In the 
early stages of transition, barter was practiced in a more hidden or 
implicit form.  Enterprises simply kept exchanging products at price 
covering costs, while the state sought to subsidize these prices by as 
much as possible.  The main problems were: (1) a many-times 
increase of costs of energy inputs; and (2) output markets’ shrinkage 
due to new state borders and shifts in demand.  This Soviet-type 
multilateral “implicit” barter among enterprises, over a longer period 
of time, was a recipe for disaster.  Most enterprises remained state 
owned or at least state controlled.  An almost full employment was 
preserved (at least officially). As not difficult to predict, GDP declined, 
and inflation reached very high level (for a short period, its annual 
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rate even exceeded 10,000 percent).  Under such conditions barter 
was a convenient way of doing business, although all transactions 
were formally expressed in monetary units and in most cases were 
not officially recognized as barter transactions.   
In the mid-1990s, in the wake of the imposition of fiscal discipline, 
barter turned into a main policy instrument used by state and local 
authorities to support insolvent enterprises. Between 1994 and 1995, 
a dramatic decline of open state subsidies to enterprises,  from 17 to 
4 percent, was followed by a spectacular increase in both the volume 
of barter transactions and the number of loss making  enterprises.  
Between 1995 and 1997, the values of both indicators – share of 
barter transactions in total industrial sales and share of loss-making 
enterprises in total number of enterprises – doubled from 22 percent 
to about 44 percent each (Figures 7 and 8).  In the years 1998-2000, 
the subsidies slightly rebounded, loss-makers mildly declined and 
barter shrunk from 42 to 17 percent. 
 
Figure 8  
Loss-making enterprises, percent of total enterprises, end of 
year, 1992–2000; bank credits to enterprises, percent of GDP, 
end of year, 1992–2000; and overdue payables of enterprises, 
percent of GDP, end of year, 1996-2000 
 
 
Sources: NBU and Harvard/CASE database 
The official support for high employment resulted in the effective 
support (or at least tolerance) for loss-making.  The consequence 
has been economic decline and large hidden unemployment.  Figure 
9 shows the relationship between growth and unemployment in 
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Ukraine and Poland during the last decade.  In Poland, as in several 
other former Soviet bloc countries, the imposition of financial 
discipline (hardening of the budget constraint for enterprises) and 
enterprise restructuring resulted in high unemployment, greater 
enterprise profitability, and economic growth.  Ukraine, on the 
contrary, keeping unemployment low, experienced pronounced 
economic decline.  At the end of the decade, Ukraine was among the 
group of countries within Central Europe with the lowest GDP per 
capita, lowest wages, lowest unemployment, and highest barter.  
When loss-makers are allowed (or are encouraged) to survive by the 
government, they have to find ways for balancing their accounts.  
Under such circumstances, a system of creative “virtual” accounting 
becomes the way to do business and barter is an obvious choice for 
transactions. 
 
Figure 9   
Real GDP growth, annual change, percent, and unemployment 
rate, percent, Ukraine and Poland, annually, 1990–2000 
Source: Harvard/CASE database 
This protection of jobs and slow restructuring of enterprises is an 
important reason for the spread of barter.  A large number of 
Ukrainian enterprises still operate in the “old economy.”  This economy 
is dominated by (but not limited to) the state-owned enterprises, which 
are “…characterized by chronic nonpayments from customers and to 
suppliers, soft budget constraints, extensive use of barter to settle 
debts and persistent wage and tax arrears.  These enterprises are 
typically awash in a sea of red ink but somehow find ways to continue 
their operations, both through barter transactions, which severely 
weaken market disciplines, and explicit and implicit government 
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subsidies.  In Ukraine, representative members of the old economy 
include the coal and agriculture sectors” (Thirsk, 2000). 
Improvements in Ukrainian economic policies resulted in 2000 in a 
gradual hardening of budget constraint, less barter, less arrears,24 
less loss-makers, more bank credits (see below), and, for the first 
time in a decade, a positive economic growth.    
Weak banking 
In the mid-1990s, fiscal and monetary disciplines imposed on the 
enterprises cut off easy access to cash.  The complex restrictions 
concerning enterprise access to their accounts, including an extreme 
form of these restrictions – the Kartoteka #2 system – left many with 
virtually no cash.  Tight monetary policy in the mid-1990s resulted 
in the decline of the amount of bank credits to enterprises (Figure 8) 
and very high nominal and real interest rates.  While in years 1992-
95 real interest rates were highly negative, in 1996-99 they became 
highly positive, with a significant drop in 2000 (Table 1). Given the 
high tax rates and low profitability, few enterprises could afford 
these rates.   
 
Table 1  
Real interest rates on bank credits in national currency, annual 
average, 1992–2000 
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Rate -34.0 -9938.9 -198.3 -72.9 37.3 39.0 34.5 34.2 14.5 
 
Note: The real interest rates, r, are calculated according to: r = i - π, where i is annual 
nominal interest rate and π – annual inflation.  Nominal interest rate is a weighted 
average across credit portfolios of commercial banks.  
Source: Harvard/CASE database 
 
Banking, from a sector that assists enterprises in their inverstment,  
production, and trade activities turned into an industry whose main 
function became to control enterprises and to collect taxes.  Debts of 
enterprises within the Kartoteka #2 system (introduced in 1996) grew 
rapidly and in 2000 reached an amount equivalent to more than a 
half the annual GDP (Figure 10).  
                                                          
24 See “Cyclical Dynamics of the Demonetized Sector”  and “Industrial Production 
and Finance”  in this volume. 
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Figure 10  
Debt of enterprises on Kartoteka #2, percent of GDP, end of 
year, 1996-2000 
Sources: NBU, Harvard/CASE database, and authors’ calculations 
 
Banking, instead of multiplying savings of the population, ended up 
stripping people of their meager deposits, through inflation, exchange 
rate changes, different kinds of interest rate manipulations, and 
various restrictions on using money placed on bank accounts 
(Szyrmer et al., 2000). Negative real interest rates in the early 1990s, 
the sudden collapse of national currency in 1998, and again negative 
real interest rates in 200025 have systematically undermined 
depositors’ confidence into the national banking system.26  Avoiding 
domestic currency and domestic banks as well as escaping to foreign 
currency and barter became a logical survival strategy, especially for 
those enterprises that were not able to pay wages and service their 
other liabilities.  The “barter-or-not-to-barter?” question became 
rhetorical for many agents.  If you want to stay in business you have 
to barter!  
                                                          
25 Nominal interest rate for bank deposits (weighted average) for 2000 was 13.5 
percent; applying the formula used above (Note to Table 1) we get negative real interest 
rate of around negative sixteen (-16) percent (the year-to-year annual inflation in 2000 
was about 25 percent).  
26 In order to avoid the mistakes of the previous decade, medium-term and long-
term effects of the monetary policy must be thoroughly accounted for.  A peculiar 
monetary cycle seems to have emerged: (1) undervalued hryvnia and current 
account surplus; (2) fast real appreciation of the hryvnia; (3) overvalued hryvnia 
and current account deficit; (4) collapse of the exchange rate and decline of foreign 
trade; (5) undervalued hryvnia and current account surplus; etc. The official 
macroeconomic forecast for the next year 2001 assumes further real appreciation 
of the hryvnia.  At one point this appreciation will reach a level, at which it will 
become harmful for the economy.  It seems that currently (spring 2001) the hryvnia 
is not far from this point, but where this point is exactly located remains debatable. 
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All the above led to a shrinking of funds in bank accounts (Figure 11).  
In 1998, the average ratio of enterprises’ cash balances on bank 
accounts to total annual sales was very low – it amounted to only 0.45 
percent.  Three quarters of enterprises kept their cash accounts at a 
balance lower than 0.5 percent of their total annual sales turnover.27  
Under such circumstances, enterprises experienced significant cash 
flow problems.  They did not have enough cash to service their 
transactions and most of them could not afford bank trade credits.  
They had to barter.  
 
Figure 11  
Cash on accounts, percent of total industrial annual sales, 1998 
 
Source: Harvard/CASE database (see section 5 in this chapter) 
 
 
Weak market 
In the late 1990s, the transition in most FSU economies reached a 
stage where some market institutions began operating.  People learned 
how to behave under these new arrangements and barter was 
transformed into a sort of trading insurance in a high-risk 
environment.  Under unsafe property rights and weak contract 
enforcement, barter helped reduce the risks.  Empirical research of 
165 barter deals conducted in 1997 showed that firms using barter in 
the range between 20 and 60 percent of total sales performed overall 
better than other enterprises (Marin, Kaufman, and Gorochowskij, 
                                                          
27 We used data from the balance sheets of industrial enterprises for 1998 (HIID 
Harvard/CASE database). 
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2000).  Thus, if an enterprise barters in some instances and does not 
barter in others – practicing some peculiar kind of price 
discrimination – it ends up being better off than that choosing either 
zero or 100 percent barter option.  The price discriminating 
enterprises seem to be using barter for the sake of some market 
strategies to maximize profits. 
Barter provides a good opportunity to generate monopolistic rents 
by manipulating quantities, qualities, and prices, i.e., by practicing 
product differentiation and price discrimination.  Frequently an 
enterprise can charge many different prices for the same 
(“homogeneous”) product: 
• The price would be zero in the case of nonpayment and some 
special deals (debt write-offs, etc).  
• It will be low (or very low) when some promissory notes or other 
forms of obligations are used, or when arrears (late cash or in-
kind payments) arise. 
• The price would be much higher if the purchaser pays in cash 
on time.  
• Finally, the official price may be very high in the case of barter 
(2-3 times higher than the cash price), though a true price, due 
to diverse open and hidden price manipulations, may be actually 
much lower than the cash price.28  
 
 
Weak corporate governance 
As new transition-related institutions and policies solidified, the 
process of “learning-by-doing” has continued.  New opportunities for 
profitable activities and transactions have been discovered and 
mastered by economic actors.  Low transparency is an intrinsic feature 
of barter and, hence, it made it an attractive way to conduct business.  
It enables the actors to hide information (and exacerbate information 
asymmetries among different actors).  In particular, to increase profits 
and seek rents, information is being withdrawn from tax authorities 
(tax evasion), from firm owners (very low dividends in state owned and 
outsider owned enterprises), business partners (whose deliveries are 
not paid on time or not paid at all), and from workers (very low wages, 
wage arrears, and payments of wages in kind).   
The annual revenue from the enterprise profit tax (to the consolidated 
budget) expressed as a percentage of GDP shrank from 13.2 percent 
in 1994 to 4.4 percent in 2000, or threefold in real terms (Figure 12).  
                                                          
28 See “Cyclical Dynamics of the Demonetized Sector” in this volume. 
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At the same time, the corporate profit tax rate remained unchanged - 
at 30 percent.  There are several reasons for this drop, such as 
declining profitability of enterprises, increased tax arrears, and the 
introduction of tax privileges for some enterprises.  The most 
important, perhaps, is the learning process of the enterprises that over 
time have “improved” their accounting skills in order to keep their 
listed profits at a low level or remain officially in the red.  Lack of 
financial transparency helps and barter becomes a useful tool in this 
strategy. 
 
Figure 12 
Real budget revenues from enterprise profit tax, billions of 
constant 1990 rubles, and percent of GDP, 1992–2000 
 
 
Note: We define here “Real Revenue” as budget revenue expressed in constant 1990 
rubles and computed using estimates of real GDP expressed in 1990 rubles 
presented in Trends (March 2001). 
Source: Harvard/CASE database 
 
The slow progress in enterprise privatization is another important 
factor.  Many large enterprises are still owned by the state.  The 
state also maintains control shares in many semi-privatized 
enterprises and is involved, one way or another, in managing even 
those formally private.  The finances of a half of all Ukrainian 
enterprises are managed by state tax authorities under the 
Kartoteka #2 regime.  Almost all privatized enterprises are insider 
owned and enjoy the safety of closed-stock status.   
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Different models of corporate control have been used in different 
countries at different times,29 such as: 
• Soviet Communist Party’s oversight of enterprises 
• U.S.-type stock exchange monitoring of the performance of 
firms and equity market pressures (real or potential threat of 
takeovers) 
• Japanese zaibatsu and kieretsu industrial conglomerates 
• German-type “corporate democracy” (workers “co-determination”) 
combined with a close supervision by creditor-banks 
• Yugoslav and Polish workers management models 
 
Still other forms of corporate control are practiced. 
None of these mechanisms, however, operates in Ukraine.  Property 
rights are weak.  The central and local bureaucracy is strong and 
closely interwoven, and cooperating, with enterprise managers.     
A good illustration of the problem is the amount the Ukrainian state 
receives as the dividend.  During the first half of 2000 it was UAH 
116 million, or 0.2 percent of total consolidated budget income.  
Given the size of the state sector, this is a tiny amount.  Since 
official enterprise profits are small (and shrinking) and capital 
investment into the economy remains very low,30 the high living 
standards of most enterprise managers suggest that something 
must be going on, something not documented in the official 
transactions.31  
What we observe is a kind of managerial take-over of the economy.  
This Ukrainian-style managerial revolution leads to a corporate 
governance model, in which the managers (predominantly former 
Soviet nomenklatura members) possess almost unchallenged control 
over the enterprise, no matter whether or not they are its formal 
owners (or co-owners).  As long as local authorities and tax 
inspectors cooperate, managers are free to extract large rents 
through “tunneling” (Korenyok, 2000; and Fonkich, 2000a and 
2000b).  Barter is used as an important vehicle for this tunneling.   
Since, in many cases, the activities are hidden, it is difficult to 
provide convincing macroeconomic evidence for the occurrence of 
the tunneling.  Nevertheless, aggregate amortization/taxes/profits 
figures are suggestive of some kind of manipulations.  There is also 
some analytic work that documents tunneling activities at the 
microeconomic level (Korenyok, 2000; and Fonkich, 2000a). 
                                                          
29 Discussion of different corporate control system can be found in numerous 
studies of comparative economics; see for example Gregory and Stuart (1995). 
30 Gross capital formation is about 10 percent of GDP, probably below the effective 
capital depreciation level. 
31 Barter Factory from our CASE STUDY is a good example. 
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4. An example of a barter deal 
Korenyok (2000) has studied and documented instances of barter 
deals conducted in the late 1990s.  Four out of five of Korenyok’s 
cases involved a local government in an explicit or implicit way.  In 
three cases a budgetary organization participated in the deal. In one 
case a coal mine was involved, which can be treated as a semi-
budgetary unit since the coal industry is heavily subsidized.  We have 
selected the last case (involving the coal mine) in order to illustrate 
tunneling enabled by some (quite sophisticated) barter operations. 
Seven participants are involved:  
1. Coal Mine  
2. Coal-Processing Factory  
3. Metallurgical Factory  
4. Metal Seller, associated with the Metallurgical Factory  
5. Machinery Factory  
6. Fictitious Firm32  
7. Financial Company33 
It is a multilateral barter scheme, in which goods and veksels34 
circulate among the participants. Money appears only at the end of 
this scheme, when side payments to management of the participants 
are made. 
During Stage One of the deal coal deliveries are made:  
Coal => Coal Processing =>  Metallurgical  
Mine     Factory  Factory 
At Stage Two, an output from the Metallurgical Factory - some 
metal - is delivered:  
Metallurgical =>  Metal =>  Fictitious =>  Machinery 
Factory  Seller  Firm            Factory 
At Stage Three, the Machinery Factory sells some machinery to the 
Coal Mine: 
Machinery =>   Coal  
Factory  Mine  
                                                          
32 Firm created by Financial Company for a specific period.  
33 The Financial Company did not participate directly in the purchase/sale 
transactions.  
34 The main difference between veksels and their foreign relatives – promisssory 
notes – is that payments on theses debt instruments in Ukraine and other CIS 
countries are made in kind, i.e., veksels areis it is redeemed with goods rather than 
with cash.     
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At Stage Four, payments for all these deliveries are processed.35  But, 
instead of money, all participants of the Deal used a veksel, which is 
issued by the Coal Mine as payment for the machinery it acquired: 
Coal => Machinery => Fictitious => Metal => Metallurgical => Coal => Coal  
Mine     Factory           Firm             Seller      Factory          -Process.  Mine 
                     Factory       
 
There is also a Stage Five in this Deal.  In the whole procedure a 
crucial role belongs to the Fictitious Firm.  This firm delivers to the 
Machinery Factory only a portion of metal it purchases from the 
Metal Seller.  It charges for it a price that is three times higher than 
the one charged by the Metal Seller.  During the entire deal, the 
nominal invoices in each sale/purchase transaction remain the 
same, say for UAH 100.  The Fictitious Firm delivers only one third 
of the amount of metal involved in this deal and is reimbursed only 
for the effective delivery, since it is “paid” by the Machinery Factory 
with the Coal Mine’s veksel, to which an appropriate discount rate 
is applied (67 percent in this case).  Thus, while the official “face 
value” in all these transactions remains the same, there occurs a 
leak.  This leak is channeled through the Fictitious Firm.  Two 
thirds of the amount of metal delivered by the Metallurgical factory 
is sold at the “cash” market and the cash is pocketed by all the 
managers and officials involved in the Deal.   
Five comments are needed.  First, this description of the Deal is a 
slightly simplified version of the Korenyok’s (2000) “Deal #4,” who 
claims that for his analysis he used the information about real-
world cases, which had been made accessible to him.  In our 
description of this particular deal we use of course purely 
hypothetical numbers.   
Second, by presenting description of this Deal, we do not imply that  
all barter transactions be corrupted.  Such an assertion lacks 
evidence and would be unfair.  The occurrence of corruption is 
neither necessary nor sufficient condition for occurrence of a barter 
transaction.  There is, however, overwhelming evidence that the 
corrupted operations do happen.  Corruption is stimulated/enabled 
by the nontransparent nature of non-monetary operations.  In 
particular, the possibility of making payments with the veksels at 
significantly discounted values contributes to the obscurity of barter 
transactions.  At one moment or another, the track of the 
differences between the face price and the market price of the 
veksels is lost and some value channeling can happen. 
                                                          
35 It should be noted that at the first three stages there are no financial settlements 
among parties of the Deal, simply the goods are delivered without being actually 
paid for. Therefore, Stage Four could be viewed as a chain of settlements between 
parties.    
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Third, the additional income extracted from this kind of deals goes 
to the managers of the enterprises involved in these deals and often 
to some bureaucrats who “secure” the entire operation by providing 
a so-called krysha, i.e., the roof, to protect the participants of the 
deals.  The workers, the budget, and outside owners (especially the 
state in the case of state owned enterprises) do not get any share 
from the income channeled away in the barter operation. In the 
above deal, according to Korenyok, managers of the Coal Mine got 
the largest chunk of this extra income. 
Fourth, typically, a fictitious firm is used to hide the money earned 
as a result of these transactions. On the one hand, this firm is 
virtual and exists only on paper; on the other hand, the money it 
generates is real.  These kinds of firms are an important component 
of an emerging virtual economy, Gaddy and Ickes (1998a, 1998b, 
and 2001) write about. 
Fifth, in the above deal and three others, studied by Korenyok, an 
additional barter intermediary (the Financial Company) always 
participates.  The role of this intermediary is to find partners in the 
deals and, thus, to facilitate the non-monetary transactions.  The 
need for this intermediary indicates that the whole operation is much 
more complex than conventional barter as defined by a 
straightforward direct exchange of goods and services between two 
participants of a transaction.  In the Deal described above, the entire 
process is multilateral, not bilateral.  It is highly nontransparent.  
Yet, its transaction costs are not as high as economics textbooks 
anticipate.  The costs are kept at a low level because of the 
participation of a highly specialized transaction facilitator (the 
Financial Company) and the opportunity for significant scale 
economies; the larger the sale contract the lower the average 
transaction cost of the barter deal (Guriev and Kvasov, 1999).36 
 
 
5. Statistical analysis of a large data set 
In our analysis, we have used two 1998 data sets.37  The first includes 
data on barter and consists of 2060 observations. The data have 
regional and industrial division: 27 regions (25 oblasts, the city of Kyiv, 
and the city of Sevastopol). The number of manufacturing industries 
for each region varies from 44 (for Sevastopol) to 91 (for the Kharkiv 
oblast). Geographically, the largest share of barter was in the Rivne 
oblast (64 percent of total sales) and the lowest share of barter was in 
Kyiv (10 percent of total sales). For the entire Ukraine, the most 
                                                          
36 It was demonstrated that the size of the firm (which is supposed to reflect the 
volume of sales) be positively correlated with the share of barter (Maurel and Brana, 
1999). 
37 Source: Harvard/CASE database.  
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heavily bartering industry is Sugar Industry, with barter transactions 
constituting 78 percent of total sales. The Shipbuilding is the least 
involved in barter trade (only 3 percent of its total sales). 
The second data set covers data aggregated from mandatory 
reports submitted by enterprises to the regional branches of the 
State Statistics Committee.  The reporting forms include balance 
sheets, financial statements and assets statements.  The total 
number of variables exceeds 200.  While this data set has the 
same subdivision by regions and industries, the number of 
observations is smaller since it includes only basic manufacturing 
industries.  
Merging the two data sets generated a new one of 465 observations, 
with the same structure but smaller number of industries in each 
region. Summary statistics for the barter variable are shown in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Barter, the 1998 data set, percent of total annual sales, 1998 
 
Initially, we constructed a large square correlation matrix for all 
variables included in the data set (all those included in the reporting 
forms).  The results showed that barter belonged to a small number 
of variables that do not significantly correlate with other variables.  
Its average correlation coefficient was one of the lowest in the entire 
data set.  This possibly confirms an “intangible” nature of barter, 
which is not easily explained by (is not strongly interrelated with) 
other economic variables, since it is driven by predominantly non-
economic, quite idiosyncratic factors.  These factors may be different 
kinds of individual contacts, deals, arrangements, etc., which are not 
reflected by the variables included in our data set.38  
Next, we investigated relationships between barter and selected 
economic variables of potential importance to barter (Table 3).  
 
                                                          
38 Obviously one can argue that the above happens due to a poor quality of data.  
Data quality is clearly a well-known problem, especially in the countries in 
transition.  However, the fact is that this particular data set did show the expected 
relationships for many variables.  This strengthens our confidence in the data. 
Mean
38 .2Barter, n=465
Minimum
0.00
Maximum
98.22
Std.Dev.
26.05
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Table 3  
Correlation coefficients of barter and selected economic variables 
Indicator Correlation 
coefficient 
Cash on accounts  -0.31 
Profits of the reporting period -0.23 
Short-term bank credits and other loans -0.12 
Long-term bank credits, and other long-term liabilities +0.12 
Labor costs +0.15 
Overdue receivables for goods and services +0.15 
Overdue payables for goods and services +0.21 
Losses in previous years +0.22 
Inventories  +0.23 
Wage arrears +0.25 
Losses of the reporting period +0.30 
Number of loss-making enterprises +0.37 
Overdue payables to the budget +0.47 
The enterprises involved in barter follow the expected pattern: 
• They experience problems with cash flow: negative correlation 
with Cash on accounts, Short-term credits, and Profits; 
positive correlation with Losses, Number of loss-makers, 
Inventories, Overdue payables, and Overdue receivables. 
• They are labor “protectors”: positive correlation with both 
Labor costs and Wage arrears. 
• They remain nevertheless in good shape – they invest: positive 
correlation with Long-term credits. 
Of course, the above findings are far from being conclusive.  The 
evidence is “soft.”  Most correlation coefficients are low (although all 
of them are significant).  Only the coefficients for “Cash on 
accounts,” “Number of loss-making enterprises,” and “Overdue 
payables to the budget” exceed 0.4.       
In all our correlation calculations, barter was consistently and 
strongly correlated with an industrial sector division.  Basically the 
industries that produce raw materials and intermediate goods use 
barter more than those oriented toward final consumers: such 
industries as Cement, Glass, Construction Materials, etc., are 
involved in barter much more than, for example, Food and Metals, 
since the latter industries deliver most of its output to final 
consumers - households and exports, respectively (Table 4). 
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Table 4 
Industries with the lowest (left column) and highest  
(right column) shares of barter in total sales  
Industry % Industry % 
Shipbuilding 2.8 Sugar 78.1 
Bakery 4.4 Cement 76.0 
Alcohol 9.3 China  67.7 
Brewery 10.3 Mining Machinery 67.5 
Printing 10.5 Tractors 63.8 
Tobacco 11.7 Wall Materials 63.4 
Meat 12.4 Glass 61.3 
Liqueur and Vodka 12.4 Construction Materials 61.1 
Non-ferrous Metals 17.1 Cotton and paper 58.6 
Microbiology 17.9 Wood 58.1 
We also used a consumer good index (CGI), first employed by Guriev 
and Kvasov (1999), as an indicator of industry closeness to the final 
consumer.  CGI equals 1, when the industry predominantly produces 
consumer goods; and 0, otherwise (i.e., when it mainly produces 
intermediate goods).  Correlation coefficients between barter and CGI 
were consistently negative, for Ukraine as a whole (-0.56) and for 
each of its regions.  There seem to be several reasons for this 
phenomenon, such as: 
• Heavy industry and agriculture are less privatized and less 
restructured than consumer-oriented industries of the economy. 
• Barter deals involve large fixed transaction costs; economies of 
scale support large contracts, which are less frequent in the 
case of producer goods. 
• Large standard mass products, such as electricity,39 gas, oil, 
grain, cement, etc., are more liquid than highly diversified 
consumer goods; therefore, can be conveniently used as money 
substitute. 
                                                          
39 The relatively low barter activity of the Power Industry in 2000 reflects recent 
reforms undertaken in this sector by the Yushchenko government. On June 22, 
2000 the Parliament adopted the law initiated by the government on Amendments 
to the Law of Ukraine on Electricity. This law stipulates for (1) only cash payments 
for power, (2) creation of special accounts of retail power suppliers into which 
consumers make payments. Money from these accounts cannot be used for other 
purposes than payments to power generating companies and other wholesale 
power suppliers. The significant decline of barter in this industry during the year 
2000 (from 47.9 percent in 1998 to 18.6 percent in 2000) seems to provide support 
for the importance of policy in reducing barter transactions.  A consistent change 
in policy brings about radical changes in the barter pattern.  Any more definite 
conclusions should not be drawn, however, until a thorough analysis of data 
indicating how this radical shift is made. 
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• Individual consumers and buyers of Ukrainian exports, as a 
rule, do not gain much from the nontransparent nature of 
barter, thus, in these transactions cash is more often used; in 
the sale of mass producer goods, both sellers and buyers may 
be interested in a deal behind the closed door (after all, “you 
need two to tango”). 
 
 
6. Barter and perfect competition 
The neoclassical model of perfect competition involves several 
powerful assumptions, including those of an absence of time and 
space (economic activities and equilibrium adjustments occur 
instantaneously; no transportation costs are incurred), a large 
number of firms, no entry and exit barriers for market participants, 
perfect information, homogeneous product, zero profits (absence of 
monopolistic rents), and zero transaction costs.  In this model no 
problems with financial liquidity and access to trade credit occur.  
Actors have full access to funds and payments are made 
instantaneously.  Contract enforcement is perfect.  No arrears occur. 
The twenty first century’s world is equipped with great data 
processing and storage capacities, Internet and other powerful 
communication devices. It, thus, comes closer than ever before to 
satisfy many of the perfect competition model’s requirements.  The 
new communication and information processing capacities help 
supply and demand meet and bring prices to a unique market-
clearing equilibrium level; in many cases these capacities help 
reduce business start-up costs and abate other entry barriers.  
Business contacts, price information and price adjustments occur 
almost instantaneously thanks to easy communication among a very 
large number of market participants.  Technological progress reduces 
transportation costs.  The development of the world financial system, 
the use of international accounting and banking standards, currency 
convertibility, fast access to international banking networks, etc. help 
the whole world evolve toward the arrangements specified in the 
perfect competition model.40 
Access to information plays a crucial role in this emerging global 
economic system.  A condition for its smooth and efficient operation 
is easy access to reliable data on economic performance of 
countries, regions, and companies, including transparent standard 
financial and accounting statistics, and international credit and 
investment ratings.   
                                                          
40 Interestingly, even the creators of this model, decades ago, viewed it as a purely 
theoretical concept that is impossible to implement in real world. 
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It seems an unfortunate paradox that during the last decade many 
FSU countries appear to be moving in the opposite direction.  
Barter greatly contributed to this differentiation.  There has been a 
gradual increase in the “distance” between the FSU and the rest of 
the world – in GDP, people’s income, level of technological 
development, etc. (Sachs, 2000).  Currently the dollar GDP level of 
Ukraine and many other FSU countries remains in the vicinity of 
an average level of Africa; is lower than that for China and many 
Southern Asian countries; and is even several times lower than the 
average level for Latin America. The prevalence of barter impedes 
market formation, as noted above, and is a factor in this 
differentiation.  In particular, barter: 
• obscures information 
• enables producers to affect prices 
• opens the door to price discrimination (differential pricing for 
the same product)  
• inhibits newcomers (it is very difficult to enter a market fully 
controlled by barter dealers) 
• obstructs easy exit by enabling/supporting the existence of 
loss-making enterprises 
• increases market segmentation and cartelization 
• reduces product homogeneity, i.e., tends to artificially diversify 
products (each barter deal concerns a specific product being 
exchanged and does not cover any other products) 
• enables high profit (rents) 
• often increases transaction costs 
• barter as a rule lengthens the time necessary for closing deals 
and slows down the circulation of goods in an economy 
• and so on 
Economists claim that the high growth, low inflation, low 
unemployment, and high incomes of the US economy during the last 
decade are, to some degree, the effect of the emergence of this. 
Internet-based open “new economy” (Economist, 2000).  We argue that 
the low growth (or steep decline), high inflation, high real 
unemployment, low incomes, and rapid pauperization and 
decapitalization of the Ukrainian economy is to a significant extent the 
result of barter and barter-type transactions that confuse incentives 
(motivation of economic actors) in business and obscure information.  
The Ukrainian economy has failed to open up both internally and 
externally and remains highly segmented and nontransparent.  A lot of 
responsibility for this situation falls on country’s weak market 
institutions and weak economic policies. Barter economy is not 
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compatible with an efficient competitive market.  While barter hampers 
the development of the competitive market, promoting market 
competition hampers barter (Guriev and Kvasov, 1999). 
 
 
7. Barter and liquidity 
The lack of interest in barter in mainstream economics creates a 
situation where there is little theory to back up this form of 
exchange.  Economists argue that barter is inefficient because of its 
use of goods rather than money for making payments.  Money is 
supposed to be the most liquid asset, which involves the lowest 
transaction costs – it is easier to exchange money for other goods 
than any other (less liquid) asset.  In transition economies, however, 
money is not always the most liquid, meaning, the monetary 
payments may involve higher effective transaction costs, and more 
time and effort, than payments with other (financial and non-
financial) assets.  Given all the constraints and impediments the 
enterprises struggle with, barter may be a cheaper way of doing 
business than cash payments.  Paradoxically cash deposited in 
official bank accounts may be much less liquid than some goods 
used in barter deals, especially those goods that are relatively easy 
to sell.41  Thus, in some situations, barter may lower transaction 
costs, making the economy more liquid, and, most important, 
allowing business transactions to take place. 
Forbidding barter by administrative means will not help.  Only 
broad institutional reforms and improvements in policies can make 
money truly liquid and bring about a withering away of barter.  
Similarly, the shadow economy cannot be eradicated by measures 
aimed at its reduction without the necessary reforms of the whole 
economy and changes in current policies.  It is not barter that is the 
main problem in economies such as Ukraine’s, but rather the 
policies that effectively support barter, nonpayments, shadow, etc. 
 
 
 Concluding remarks 
Why barter?  A series of related causes suggest themselves:   
1. In the early 1990s barter in Ukraine was simply a continuation of 
the operation of enterprises under the Soviet central planning.  It 
was often an “implicit” barter in the sense that it was considered a 
                                                          
41 Managers often face significant difficulties in using their cash balances.  Access 
to money may be difficult and expensive, if possible at all.  It may involve many 
bureaucratic formalities, documents, permits, restrictions, and often even bribe 
payments.  Under such circumstances payments with goods, may provide the 
producer with more flexibility and liquidity than payments with cash deposited 
onin a bank account.    
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standard exchange operation in which prices were calculated based 
on costs and the state provided subsidies when it decided it was 
appropriate. 
2. By the mid-1990s barter became “explicit.”  Various monetary 
and banking restrictions constrained the access of enterprises to 
cash and explicit non-monetary transactions became necessary 
in order to sell and buy.  
3. The emergence of an incomplete-market environment enabled 
many enterprises to use barter in order to protect their revenues 
from monetary losses and to manipulate prices to their 
advantage.  From an inefficient operation characterized by a 
“double-coincidence of wants,” barter turned into a Pareto-
efficient transaction in which the buyer and seller agree on a 
most profitable deal.  Yet this microeconomic efficiency, most of 
the time, did not coincide with macroeconomic efficiency for the 
whole national economy.  Large dead-weight losses occurred and 
hampered economic growth of the Ukrainian economy.  
4. At its most sophisticated level, barter began to be used by 
individuals as a means for hiding and distorting information for 
personal gain.  In most cases enterprise managers and corrupt 
bureaucrats were winners while everybody else (state, outside 
owners of companies, workers, business partners, etc.) were 
losers. 
The time factor plays a very important role here.  The standard 
argument about the high transaction cost of barter because of need 
for double-coincidence of wants became increasingly obsolete.  On 
the one hand, various new institutions and companies have been 
set up and developed that specialize in complex barter operations 
and were able to bring the transactions cost to a relatively low level.  
Economies of scale were helpful.  On the other hand, the main cost 
to the economy is virtuality, which barter uses and promotes.  
Barter emerges as an information “spoiler,” as a black-hole-type 
institution that absorbs a lot of information but delivers very little.  
Those who continue looking at barter predominantly in terms of its 
high transaction costs and its cash-shortage context miss very 
important aspects of barter.  Information distortion seems to be the 
key cause and also the troubling effect of barter today. 
While we tend to agree with Thirsk (2000) that barter is used as an 
instrument to cover large debt, we would argue that there is plenty of 
evidence, including case studies (Korenyok, 2000), survey data, and 
even data on growing income inequality in Ukraine (which may be 
used as circumstantial evidence in this case) that barter goes far 
beyond a simple debt/arrears problem.  Thirsk rejects the 
“conspiratorial pretense” of Gaddy and Ickes’ (1998) virtual economy.  
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“…[Wage] and tax arrears, barter and mutua` l settlements are all 
symptoms of the same underlying cause: weak supply adjustments 
to conditions of non-profitability or the inability of weak market 
structures to impose hard budget constraints on producers who are 
unable to pay for their inputs out of cash sales.”  It seems that 
originally barter was often resorted to as a necessity – a means to 
struggle with the lack of cash and to handle debt.  At a later stage, 
managers learned the opportunity provided by barter, related to its 
nontransparency and turned nontransparency to their advantage.  
Viewing barter as just a response to a problem of “supply 
adjustments” seems to neglect many other important aspects of this 
trade arrangement. 
The focus of reforming decision-makers should not be barter itself 
(or other non-monetary transactions) but rather the fundamental 
institutional roots of this phenomenon and policies supporting its 
occurrence.  Barter operation on such a large scale could not be 
possible in a strong market economy, in which the “rules of the 
game” support profit maximization instead of rent seeking 
(Snelbecker and Novoseletsky, 2000).  Barter is an operation that 
enables collecting returns to the “investment in weak institutions.”  
The investors are transition “winners,” who often claim to be true 
reformers, while, in fact, they manipulate the only-partially 
restructured environment to take advantage of the opportunities 
provided by unfinished reforms, weak institutions and inconsistent 
policies (Hellmen, 1998).   
Solution to the barter problem does not lie in the provision of more 
liquidity in the form of money emission or cheap credits or 
imposition of administrative ban on this type of transactions but 
rather in the implementation of reforms to strengthen the market.  
And, at the end, to avoid any confusion often sparked by the word 
“market,” we must emphasize that obviously no strong market is 
possible without a strong, competent and effective government.   
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Introduction 
Barter and arrears in post-Soviet economies result fundamentally 
from non-market prices that are set above what would be market 
levels, enabled by soft budget constraints on enterprises and 
government.  A combination of soft budget constraints, tight 
monetary policy, and stickiness in pricing causes many nominal 
prices in the economy to be maintained at an artificially high level.  
Barter and arrears are ways to manipulate prices and dispose of the 
resulting surplus goods. 
In this paper, I expand on this theoretical explanation for the 
extensive growth of barter, other non-cash payment mechanisms, 
and arrears in post-Soviet economies.  It should be underscored 
that this analysis is preliminary. It provides a conceptual framework 
for future empirical research.  
Throughout, I use the term “barter” broadly to encompass not only 
in-kind trade of goods but also promissory notes (veksels), mutual 
offsets, and other forms of non-monetary payments.1 
 
 
1. Overview of barter, other non-cash payments, and arrears 
in Ukraine 
Over the last ten years, the economy of Ukraine has evolved through 
three distinct phases: 
 The Soviet period was characterized by chronic shortages of 
goods. 
                                                     
1 See “Cyclical Dynamics of the Demonetized Sector” in this volume. 
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 The early years after independence were characterized by 
hyperinflation. 
 The last several years have seen a considerable growth of 
arrears, barter, and other non-monetary forms of payment. 
In this third phase, rather than paying for goods and services in 
money, enterprises and Government increasingly either have not 
paid at all (in which case arrears accrue) or have paid in kind.  
Sometimes such in-kind transactions take the form of simple 
exchange of goods; but they can be surprisingly complicated, 
involving long chains of participants who engage in mutual 
cancellations of debts, discounted trading of promissory notes, and 
other instruments. 
 
2. “Good” barter vs. “bad” barter 
For the purpose of conceptual clarity, I differentiate between several 
types of barter, which I will divide into “good” barter and “bad” 
barter.  By good barter, I mostly mean that barter which involves 
enterprises in some type of borrowing from suppliers and creditors, 
rather than from banks, due to the low level of development of the 
banking system.  For instance, instead of seeking trade credits from 
banks, enterprises may issue veksels, which are traded at a 
discount, in lieu of payment for goods. In many economies with 
poorly developed financial sectors (and consequently high interest 
rates), barter operations, arrears, and various forms of promissory 
notes are quite common.  By increasing liquidity, the prevalence of 
such sophisticated extra-bank credit methods makes the economy 
more efficient than it would otherwise be.  To the extent that barter 
occurs in Ukraine in response to inadequacies in the banking 
sector, it should be considered a positive phenomenon rather than a 
problem about which policymakers should worry.  Because such 
transactions increase efficiency in the economy, I would tend to 
classify in-kind transactions that merely provide market liquidity to 
enterprises as good barter. 
On the other hand, the extreme level of barter, arrears, and other 
non-monetary payment in Ukraine’s economy suggests that far 
more is happening than just extra-bank liquidity.  Many of the 
effects of these transactions are clearly negative.  Often, barter and 
other non-monetary transactions encourage the survival of “value-
subtracting” enterprises that produce goods no one wants to buy for 
money.  This leads to inefficient allocation of resources and 
distortions in market price signaling. Such barter creates conditions 
for tax evasion and corruption, and leads to a general 
demonetization and lack of transparency in the economy.  The wide 
prevalence of barter and arrears in Ukraine is a principal reason 
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why the economy has contracted to a very low level.  The types of 
transactions that are fundamental causes of Ukraine’s economic 
malaise I will classify as bad barter. 
This categorization of economic activity into good and bad barter is 
rather crude; and it would be difficult, using available data, to 
classify barter transactions into these two categories.  Nevertheless, 
this categorization helps clarify our thinking. Although it is true 
that one cause of barter in Ukraine’s economy is the lack of 
availability of credits from the formal financial sector, this type of 
barter is good in a way; this aspect of barter is not the most 
significant problem for the economy.  I have, therefore, chosen to 
focus our analysis largely on bad barter, in an effort to identify its 
causes and propose further empirical research. 
 
 
3. The search for causes: three working hypotheses 
To orient our search for the causes of barter, arrears, and other 
non-monetary types of payments, I start with a few intuitive 
hypotheses about the nature of these economic phenomena: 
First intuitive hypothesis:  The fundamental causes of barter are 
macro, not micro.  Many have looked for the causes of barter at the 
micro level — that is, at the level of the enterprise.  Lack of 
privatization, ineffective corporate governance, corruption, and 
weakness in contract enforcement are all examples of hypotheses 
commonly put forward that could be called “micro.”  For several 
reasons, however, I suggest that the causes of barter are probably 
“macro.”  Note that the level of barter and other such transactions 
across the economy has gone up and down quite dramatically over 
the last several years, while many micro characteristics of the 
economy, such as corporate governance structure and contract 
enforcement regimes, have changed little.  Furthermore, note that, if 
one were to compare two similar enterprises in, say, Ukraine and a 
neighboring Central European country, in similar industries, with 
similar corporate governance structures, one would probably find 
that the enterprise in Ukraine engages in barter far more often than 
its counterpart in Central Europe.2  This suggests that the reasons 
for barter most likely can be found in some general characteristics 
of the economy, rather than in factors at the enterprise level.  Such 
macro characteristics might include tax policy, financial sector 
regulations, price and monetary policy, level of competition, etc. 
Second intuitive hypothesis:  Of all the possible hypotheses to explain 
barter, only one or two are truly important.  Particularly, if barter is 
caused by specific macro factors, it seems likely that only one or two 
                                                     
2 See “Transactions in Transition: To Barter or Not to Barter?” in this volume. 
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factors are of prime importance, while all the others are ancillary.  Our 
task, therefore, is to determine which of the many hypotheses that 
have been put forward to explain barter are the most significant. 
Third intuitive hypothesis:  The causes of barter can be found in 
characteristics of the economy that date back to Soviet times, and 
which have somehow evolved since then.  Barter, arrears, and other 
non-monetary payments are probably due to some failure of the 
economy to transform itself successfully into a market system. It is 
important to identify the key factors that characterized the Soviet 
system and to try to determine the extent to which these factors still 
shape economic behavior, albeit in some new form.  Specifically, the 
Soviet-period characteristics of soft budget constraints and non-
market prices merit attention. 
I have not assumed the truth of these hypotheses in our quantitative 
analyses. Rather, I simply use them to give direction to our research. 
 
 
4. A theoretical model of barter 
Let us restate the theory I propose to explain what I have defined 
above as bad barter: 
Barter and arrears in post-Soviet economies result fundamentally 
from non-market prices that are set above what would be market 
levels, enabled by soft budget constraints on enterprises and 
government.  A combination of soft budget constraints, tight monetary 
policy, and stickiness in pricing causes many nominal prices in the 
economy to be maintained at an artificially high level.  Barter and 
arrears are ways to manipulate prices and dispose of the resulting 
surplus goods. 
Types of economies  
Looking more closely at the three phases of recent Ukrainian history 
(which parallel closely the Russian experience), which are depicted in 
Figure 1, which shows the quantities supplied and demanded at 
various prices, one can see that the shortage economy of the Soviet 
period was characterized by non-market prices set below market 
level.  The economy in Soviet period was characterized by the 
controlled prices (PS), which were set below the market price (PH).  
Shortage results, equal to AB.  Economic activity in the shortage 
economy is enabled by subsidies and soft budget constraints, which 
allow enterprises to continue producing even when they have 
difficulty finding inputs to purchase at controlled prices and when 
the controlled prices at which they are required to sell their output 
are below the costs of production. In such an economy, the shortages 
constitute an implicit tax on households.  Although prices are 
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nominally stable, one could estimate the level of prices that would 
result if prices were freed, thereby determining a true inflation rate, 
which would be higher than the nominal “repressed” level.  
Figure 1 
Shortage, hyperinflation and barter/arrears economies 
 
The hyperinflationary economy looks like a stable economy (in 
terms of static analysis, at one moment in time).  Nonetheless, the 
hyperinflationary economy has important similarities to the 
shortage economy.  Subsidies are directly provided to enterprises as 
transfers from the government, funded by the printing presses. 
Moreover, credits lent at nominal interest rates – often below the 
inflation rate – constitute hidden subsidies.  Therefore, as in the 
shortage economy, the hyperinflationary economy is characterized 
by soft budget constraints and subsidies.  Also, printing money 
represents an implicit tax on consumers, similar to the shortages of 
the Soviet period.  The constant rapid changes in the overall price 
level (PH). introduces considerable noise in relative prices.  In a 
sense, the whole economy suffers from “sliding” prices.  An 
enterprise, household, or government can arbitrarily adjust the real 
price it pays for a good or service simply by delaying payment.  The 
longer a payment is delayed, the lower the real price becomes. 
The barter/arrears economy is similar to the shortage economy, 
except that the non-market prices are above rather than below 
market level.  Because the nominal price is set above the market 
price, enterprises produce quantity CB′ of goods, but demand for 
these goods is only CA′, so a surplus of A′B′ occurs.  Since no one is 
willing to pay price PB for this surplus, the enterprise either engages 
in some form of barter or effectively gives the goods away, accruing 
B A PS 
PH 
S 
D 
Q 
P 
C A′ B′ 
PB 
The Fundamental Macroeconomic Cause of Barter and Arrears 155
arrears.  Barter and other non-monetary forms of payment allow the 
enterprise to “sell” its goods for nominally high prices even if the 
market value of goods it receives is far below the nominal value.  Two 
enterprises might both have over-priced goods, which they trade 
between themselves (claiming sales at nominally high prices) and 
which they then turn into cash at lower values.  Or a good might be 
sold at a nominal price, for which an enterprise receives veksels, and 
these are later sold for cash at some discounted rate.  Barter and 
other non-monetary forms of payment therefore are principal means 
through which enterprises ratchet down the artificially high nominal 
prices of their goods.  Arrears also can be a means of accomplishing 
the same end if, for instance, part of an order of goods is paid for in 
money and the rest is simply not paid – i.e., with arrears accruing 
that are never paid off.  Some portion of the surplus goods might be 
demanded at a somewhat lower price, which could be obtained 
through various barter operations, whereas another portion of the 
surplus might have a price close to or simply equal zero if this 
portion is given away through accrual of arrears.  
The barter/arrears economy, with its non-market prices and soft-
budget constraints, is similar in many characteristics to the 
shortage and hyperinflationary economies.  Soft budget constraints 
in the barter/arrears economy allow enterprises to continue 
producing goods even when artificially high prices lead to surpluses 
that no one wants to buy for money.  In the Soviet economy, prices 
were controlled officially and shortages represented an implicit tax 
on consumers.  In the barter/arrears economy, prices again are 
non-market prices.  An enterprise might agree to a price for a good 
and then either not pay it (arrears) or pay in kind with another good 
(barter). In both cases, the prices are not market prices, since they 
do not represent the price, which customers are actually willing to 
pay in money.  Barter and arrears also represent a hidden tax on 
the population, since enterprise employees are promised one wage 
but, because they are either not paid or paid in kind with goods 
whose market price is lower than the nominal price, they receive a 
wage lower than promised.  Although many prices in the economy, 
particularly at the consumer level, are legitimate market prices, 
actually paid in money, the presence of so much non-market pricing 
in Ukraine’s economy today causes substantial distortions and lack 
of transparency in the allocation of society’s resources. 
All three periods involved either high inflation or repressed inflation. 
In the Soviet period, repressed inflation could be defined 
conceptually as the inflation level that would have resulted if prices 
were freed.  In the current barter/arrears period, repressed inflation 
could be defined as the inflation level that would result if enough 
money were printed to cover the difference between market and 
nominal prices of bartered goods and services plus the nominal 
prices of outstanding overdue arrears. 
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Repressed inflation and deflation 
By thinking about barter and arrears in this way, I see that these 
phenomena, at the macro level, could be considered repressed 
inflation.  At the micro level, however, by seeing barter and arrears 
as resulting from stickiness in prices, in which prices do not fall to 
their market levels, I could characterize these non-monetary forms 
of transactions as repressed deflation. 
The hyperinflationary and barter/arrears economy only differ in 
how the implicit tax is collected.  In the first case, people are taxed 
indirectly: the value of money that they hold is eroded because 
money is printed to cover excess consumption. In the barter/arrears 
economy, households are paying an implicit tax because of delays in 
wage payments and wages paid in kind.  This economy suffers from 
excess consumption as in the hyperinflationary economy, only it is 
financed through a different mechanism.  Because of this, the 
current so-called stabilization of the economy of Ukraine constitutes 
no significant progress from the hyperinflation and shortage 
economies it replaced.  
Why are nominal prices in the barter/arrears economy higher than 
market prices? There are three root problems. 
• The economy of Ukraine still consists of many old socialist 
enterprises that are producing goods that cost more to make 
than they are worth on the market — i.e., value-subtracting 
production enabled by soft budget constraints. If the enterprises 
were subject to hard budget constraints, they would be forced to 
reduce their prices to market levels. Since market levels would 
be below costs of production, they would eventually cease 
production of such value-subtracting goods and/or undergo 
restructuring. Soft budget constraints make it possible for them 
to postpone restructuring. 
• The inflation rate is low due to tight monetary policy. This is a 
fundamental change from the hyperinflationary period. In that 
earlier period, high inflation allowed real prices to adjust 
downward, since one could simply delay payment in order to 
reduce real prices.  Enterprises could maintain the fiction of 
profitability by selling goods at nominal prices higher than 
nominal input costs while at the same time delaying the moment 
of payment of their output until the real price of output was 
below real input costs. The elimination of high inflation made it 
impossible to reduce real prices by delaying payment. 
• Nominal prices exhibit stickiness, particularly when needed 
price reductions would make output prices lower than the costs 
of production. There are several reasons for this stickiness: 
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− Tax and accounting rules in some cases might require that 
output prices be set above costs of production (because of 
policies aimed at reducing corruption and tax evasion). 
− Because they lack experience with marketing in a competitive 
environment, enterprise managers have a natural tendency 
toward cost-plus pricing of output even if resulting prices do 
not find buyers on the market. 
− Setting output prices above costs might be an important 
way of signaling to the state that the enterprise is 
profitable. An enterprise that sells its output below costs 
sends a clear signal that it is not profitable, while an 
enterprise that sells at artificially high prices and then 
engages in barter might be able to claim that it is a 
profitable enterprise unfortunately forced to work in a 
difficult economic environment. 
− An absence of hard budget constraints removes the main 
factor that would force enterprises to reduce prices to market 
levels even if such levels are below the costs of production. 
 
 
Summing up 
In Table 1, I compare the shortage economy, the hyperinflationary 
economy, and the barter/arrears economy: 
Table 1 
Comparison of the Shortage, Hyperinflationary, and 
Barter/Arrears Economies 
Category Shortage 
economy 
Hyperinflationary 
economy 
Barter/arrears 
economy 
Soft 
budget 
constraint 
Direct subsidies; 
price controls 
Direct subsidies; 
credits at negative 
or low real rates 
Acceptance of tax 
and utility 
arrears and in-
kind payment 
Non-
market 
prices 
Below market 
levels 
“Sliding” in real 
terms, depending 
on delay of 
payment 
Above market 
levels 
Distortions Value-subtracting 
production; 
excessive state 
consumption 
Value-subtracting 
production; 
excessive state 
consumption 
Value-subtracting 
production; 
excessive state 
consumption 
Implicit 
tax on 
population 
Shortages and 
lines 
Erosion of real 
value of money 
Nonpayment 
(arrears) and 
partial payment 
(barter) 
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Conclusions 
The hypothesis I have put forward in this work is that barter is 
caused by macro factors related to subsidies, soft budget 
constraints, inflation levels, and stickiness in prices, rather than 
being caused by micro factors such as corporate governance. 
Considerable research and analysis should still be done to 
understand these problems better, to develop proposals for policy 
reforms that would address these problems, and to assess the 
overall impact of such reforms on the economy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ukraine has experienced growth in industrial production since the 
beginning of 1999.  Industrial output grew 4 percent in 1999, and 12 
percent during the first nine months of 2000, compared to the same 
period in the previous year.  The most significant growth in 2000 was 
achieved in the Light Industry, Wood, Food, Metals, and Machinery.  
At the same time, however, some industries experienced a decline in 
output, namely, Power, Fuels, and Construction Materials.  Although 
industrial output also grew in 1999, the growth in 2000 was much 
more significant. 
While performance varied from industry to industry, there were some 
common factors, which influenced industrial production in 2000: 
1. Low base for comparison  
2. Substantially reformed property relations (privatization) 
3. Increased fixed capital investments in 1998 and 1999 
4. Devaluation of the hryvnia 
5. Increased world oil prices and stabilized domestic oil prices 
6. Increase in household real incomes 
7. Increased demand for Ukrainian exports  
8. Changes in the industrial output structure 
                                                          
1 An early version of this chapter was presented at a Harvard/CASE seminar in 
October 2000.  The chapter covers the first three quarters of 2000.  For an analysis 
of the Ukrainian economy for the entire year, see “The Economic Situation in 
Ukraine: 2000” in this volume.  Janusz Szyrmer and Vladimir Dubrovskiy made 
substantial contributions to this chapter. 
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The first half of this chapter examines each of these factors in 
greater detail and analyzes their effect on Ukraine’s industrial 
performance.  The second part is devoted to particular aspects of  
industrial financial performance, namely, profitability and payment 
discipline.  The latter involves the accumulation of mutual arrears 
between enterprises and their role in providing interest-free credits. 
 
 
INDUSTRIAL GROWTH FACTORS 
1. Low base for comparison 
The first half of 1999 provided a favorable base for comparing 
output, since output at that time declined in all major industries, 
with the exception of Wood and Food.  Not surprisingly, the rate of 
industrial output growth in 2000 was quite high, especially at the 
beginning of the year.  A slowdown began to show in September, 
which could possibly have been attributed to a higher base in the 
corresponding period of 1999.  
 
Figure 1 
Industrial output, cumulative, annual growth, percent, monthly, 
January 1999 – September 2000 
Note: Each data point represents a change in industrial output from a specified 
period in a given year to the same period in the previous year.  For example, the 
change for June 2000 was 111 percent.  Thus, in real terms, gross industrial 
output produced in January–June 2000 exceeded output in January–June 1999 by 
11 percent. 
Source: Monitoring (September 2000) 
 
 
2. Substantially reformed property relations (privatization) 
The fastest growth seems to have occurred in industries that 
experienced the greatest advances in institutional and structural 
reforms.  Reforms, and privatization in particular, in Light Industry, 
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Wood, and Food began earlier than in the rest of the economy and, 
thus, advanced further than in other industries.  In 2000, growth 
rates in these industries were 2.5-3 times higher than the industrial 
average.  Most of the time, these industries operated without 
government support.  Moreover, government intervention in pricing, 
sales, etc. were also minimal.  While the tangible effects of changes 
in ownership were not previously noticed, it became evident in 2000 
that privatization was finally beginning to pay off.  As was expected, 
market competition encouraged the utilization of advanced 
technology and an increase in exports.   
In industries remaining under substantial state control – such as Oil, 
Coal, and Power – such encouraging results were absent and output 
continued to decline.  Thus, a significant difference in performance 
was observed between the most reformed industries and those less 
reformed.  Although the thorough quantitative assessment of the 
effects of ownership transformations requires further research, it 
becomes obvious – even from a cursory analysis – that economic 
performance is a positive function of the extent of privatization: the 
earlier and more privatized industries perform better.2 
 
 
3. Increased fixed capital investments in 1998 and 1999 
The increase in industrial output in 2000 was partly a result of the 
growth in fixed capital investments in 1998 and 1999 – by 6.1 
percent and 2.9 percent respectively.  The lion’s share of industrial 
capital investment was in the Metals, Chemicals, Wood, Food and 
Power industries, most of which grew during the first half of 2000. 
Given the weakness of credit and equity markets, self-financing was 
a dominant form of investment by enterprises.  Thus, the slowdown 
in output decline in 1999 and subsequent growth in the first half of 
2000 led to a deceleration in the decline of fixed capital investments 
in some industries, and to an increase in others.  Since investments 
continued to grow in the first half of 2000, one can expect to see 
their positive effects in subsequent years.  
 
 
4. Devaluation of the hryvnia 
Increased demand for Ukrainian industrial output was stimulated 
by the significant 52 percent devaluation of the hryvnia in 1999, 
and the slow but steady 4 percent devaluation over the first nine 
                                                          
2 For an analysis of these issues see two papers by Janusz Szyrmer, Vladimir 
Dubrovskiy, and Tamara Shygayeva: “Is the Private Sector More Efficient?” (in 
English and Ukrainian), January 1999, ICPS Policy Studies; and “Productivity and 
Profitability of the Ukrainian Enterprises of Different Ownership” (in Ukrainian), 
1999/5, Bankivska Sprava. 
Tamara Shygayeva  162
months of 2000.3  Devaluation made Ukrainian goods cheaper and, 
thus, more attractive to both domestic and foreign consumers.  As a 
result, a significant import substitution effect was observed.  In 
particular, several commodities experienced a steep decline in 
imports: Wood, by 13 percent; Footwear, by 8 percent; and Food, by 
3.3 percent, including a 14 percent drop in imports of butter and 
fats. However, the rate of hryvnia devaluation abated while price 
inflation rate remained significant, and this could accelerate the 
growth of imports in the near future. 
 
 
5. Increased world oil prices and stabilized domestic oil prices 
Rising world prices of oil and oil products significantly affected the 
Oil-refining and Chemicals industries which experienced declines in 
production of 38 percent and 14 percent respectively.  Domestic 
production of gasoline, diesel fuel, etc. also fell. 
The rise in world oil and oil product prices, accompanied by 
controls on the price of oil on the domestic market, presented 
significant risks.  Considerable price increases became unavoidable, 
thus resulting in higher inflation.  The causal chain – “change in oil 
prices, change in other prices” – has been particularly pronounced 
in agriculture.  The intensification of agricultural activities in spring 
tends to push up the price of oil and other agricultural inputs, 
which, in turn, results in higher agricultural product prices in the 
fall.  This pattern has been observed in Ukraine for many years, and 
provides a good explanation for the tendency towards sharp 
increases of prices between August and  October, that is, during the 
main harvest-gathering and processing period. 
 
 
6. Increase in household real incomes 
Growth in industrial production was stimulated by the increase in 
consumer demand resulting from higher household real incomes, 
which rose by 9.4 percent during the first eight months of 2000, 
compared to the same period in 1999.  The most rapid increase 
occurred during the first two months of the year.  According to data 
for the first quarter of 2000 (from household survey results 
presented by the State Statistics Committee), the greatest increase 
was observed in the purchase of consumer durables, like furniture, 
carpets, home appliances, and culture-related goods. 
Interestingly, the increase in real incomes during this period was 
accompanied by a 6.4 percent decline in real wages.  The demand for 
labor increased, and the number of job vacancies grew by 50 percent.   
                                                          
3 Yet, unlike in 1999, during 2000, due to significant price inflation in Ukraine, the 
hryvnia revalued in real terms. 
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7. Increased demand for Ukrainian exports  
Active participation of Ukrainian enterprises in international trade was 
a significant factor contributing to industrial growth 2000.  For the 
first seven months of the year exports rose by 22 percent, while 
imports grew by 25 percent.  Exports to CIS and Baltic states grew 
faster than those to all of Ukraine’s other trade partners, while imports 
from these countries increased at a rate slightly lower than average. 
Exports were the key growth factor in Metals.  Over the first seven 
months of 2000, Metals exports grew by 37 percent.  Given that a 
major part (three quarters) of the industry's output is exported, this 
precipitated an overall 20 percent growth in the industry’s 
production.  As Metals account for nearly half of Ukraine’s total 
exports and 30 percent of all industrial production, this upsurge 
was an important factor in boosting total industrial production. 
The growth in Machinery exports during the first seven months of 
2000 finally led the industry out of its slump. In fact, Machinery 
showed signs of stable growth, running at 11 percent for the period. 
More than 30 percent of output was exported, and this comprised 8 
percent of all exports.  At the same time, however, all vehicle 
exports, including air and watercraft, declined by 10 percent. 
The Wood Industry also enjoyed substantial growth.  During the first 
seven months of 2000, exports grew by 33 percent, and production – 
half of which was exported – by 36 percent.  
Exports of Chemicals rose nearly 50 percent during the first seven 
months of 2000. Although two thirds of the output was exported, 
production growth was relatively modest, at a mere 4 percent. 
Exports of Processed Food grew by 29 percent, although they 
constituted less than 10 percent of the industry’s output.  The 
Processed Food share in total Ukrainian exports also remained low, 
at 2.4 percent.  
If the demand for Ukrainian exports continues in the future, one 
can expect a continued growth in export-oriented industries. 
 
 
8. Changes in the industrial output structure 
A noticeable shift toward products with higher value added took place 
during the first seven months of 2000.  Thus, the greatest growth in 
Ferrous Metals was in pipe production, which grew by 31 percent 
compared to the previous year. In Machinery, auto production grew by 
72 percent; shipbuilding, by 54 percent; electronics, by 41 percent; 
and aircraft production, by 39 percent.  The highest growth in Foods 
was in tobacco production, which grew by 52 percent; confectionery 
products, by 42 percent; and brewery products, by 35 percent.  The 
production of cardboard and paper increased by 52 percent. 
Tamara Shygayeva  164
These positive changes reflect an ability within certain sectors to 
adapt to changing market conditions.  The effect of such changes 
should become evident in the long run.  
 
 
ENTERPRISE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE  
1. Enterprise mutual obligations and arrears4 
The growth in production in most industries was accompanied by the 
considerable accumulation of mutual obligations.  As of August 1, 
2000, receivables came to UAH 197 billion, which was almost 50 
percent greater than the nominal GDP in 1999.  Payables as of that date 
were at UAH 272 billion – more than twice the nominal GDP in 1999.  
An increase in overall obligations, when economic activities are reviving, 
is not necessarily a negative phenomenon.  However, the accumulation 
of overdue obligations (i.e. arrears) should be a matter of concern. 
Arrears result when poor payment discipline exists together with 
impunity for nonpayment.  This reflects the presence of soft budget 
constraints, a phenomenon quite typical of the Ukrainian economy.  
While mutual obligations between enterprises support development 
of the national economy by facilitating mutual interest-free credits, 
overdue obligations do not.  Arrears do not support, but rather, 
jeopardize development.  Currently, they account for almost half of 
both total receivables and total payables.  
Overdue receivables, being largely illiquid assets, significantly slow 
down the production process.  As of June 30, 2000, overdue 
receivables for goods and services supplied stood at UAH 80 billion, 
which exceeded by almost 50 percent the value of Ukrainian 
enterprise inventories.  Overdue receivables totaled approximately 
one third of all working capital, while the share of total receivables in 
working capital reached 71 percent.5  Currently, inventory holdings 
account for approximately 20 percent of working capital, while cash 
and money in banks comprise less than 2.5 percent of working 
capital.  Given that the rate of capital turnover is an important 
determinant of enterprise profitability, particularly during an 
economic crisis, enterprises suffer tremendous losses as a result of 
the massive volume of overdue receivables. 
                                                          
4 In the accounting system for enterprises, a distinction is drawn between obligations 
and arrears.  Obligations are trade credits provided by enterprises to each other.  
Two types of such obligations exist: payables – that which the enterprise owes, and 
receivables – that which is owed to the enterprise.  If obligations are not fulfilled 
within a specified period (usually three months), they become overdue and are 
referred to as arrears. There can be arrears in both payables and receivables, called, 
respectively, overdue payables and overdue receivables. 
5 In 1995 the share of receivables in working capital was 28 percent; in 1998 it was 
62 percent. 
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Overdue payables inflict no less damage.  Their presence precipitates 
not only unreliable partnership relations among enterprises but also 
delinquent payments to the budget, employees, and extra-budgetary 
funds.  Three quarters of overdue payables are for deliveries. 
The situation with arrears deteriorated significantly during the first 
half of 2000, compared to same period in 1999 (Table 1).  This was 
particularly true of the increase in overdue receivables.  It was also 
observed that the situation with overdue receivables for deliveries 
did not improve over the first seven months of the year 2000, 
compared to the same period last year, which was marked by a 
significant decline in output. 
Table 1 
Change in arrears, billions of UAH, and as percent of GDP, 
January–December 1999, January–July 2000, and January-
August 2000 
Indicators Units 1999 Jan–Jul 
2000 
Jan–Aug 
2000 
UAH 
billion 
18.4 21.2 12.8 Increase in overdue 
accounts receivable 
% of GDP 14.5 24.2 12.2 
UAH 
billion 
23.9 16.3 11.1 Increase in overdue 
accounts payable 
% of GDP 18.8 18.7 10.7 
UAH 
billion 
16.3 21.3 13.2 Increase in overdue 
accounts receivable for 
goods and services % of GDP 12.9 24.4 12.7 
UAH 
billion 
17.5 11.6 9.5 Increase in overdue 
accounts payable for 
goods and services % of GDP 13.8 13.3 9.1 
UAH 
billion 
4.5 3.5 1.0 Increase in overdue 
debt to the budget 
% of GDP 3.5 4.0 1.0 
GDP UAH 
billion 
127.1 87.4 104.0 
Sources: Monitoring (September 2000), Main Indicators (January, August 
and September 2000), and author’s calculations 
The poor payment discipline of Ukrainian enterprises forced the 
Government to adopt a much stricter policy toward payments for 
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consumed electricity, gas and coal, which are produced mainly by 
state-owned enterprises.  Starting early in the summer 2000, the 
Government exercised strict, almost daily control over these 
payments.  The electricity supply at a number of large debtor-
enterprises was disconnected, and such measures began to elicit 
the desired response.  Mutual obligations and arrears among 
enterprises began to decrease, and by the end of August had 
declined – not only when compared to the previous seven months of 
2000 – but also to the corresponding period in 1999.  The ratio of 
arrears to GDP has also decreased. Growth of most categories of 
arrears has slowed down (Table 2).  
Table 2 
Change in overdue receivables and payables, by category,  
UAH million, January–July 2000 
 Overdue receivables Overdue payables 
Total, including: 21,216 16,333 
- goods, works, services 21,310 11,594 
- bills of exchange -367 -217 
- wage payments N/A -31 
- budget 115 3,499 
- extra-budgetary 
payments N/A 403 
- advances -253 -38 
- subsidiary enterprises 1,508 -672 
 
Sources: Main Indicators (January and August 2000) and author’s calculations 
GDP growth and simultaneous slowdown of the rate of arrears 
accumulation led to a decline in the ratio of arrears to GDP (Figure 2). 
The relationship between receivables and payables is crucial for the 
assessment of the situation in the domestic economy.  Taking into 
account that in Ukraine, receivables are calculated on the basis of 
costs, while payables are calculated on the basis of contract prices, 
one can conclude that the relationship between them indirectly 
characterizes the profitability of production. In Ukraine, as a whole, 
inter-industry receivables and payables were almost equal (as of 
August 1, 2000, UAH 145 billion and UAH 146 billion respectively6). 
However, comparing overdue receivables and payables, it can be 
                                                          
6 Almost equal numbers for inter-enterprise receivables and payables reflect the 
situation with Ukrainian enterprises when the average profitability is almost zero. 
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seen that the former exceeded the latter (as of August 1, 2000, UAH 
84 billion and UAH 81 billion, respectively).  It means that 
producers were underpaid for delivered goods. Such extraction of 
liquidity from enterprises may substantially hinder their productive 
activity and may cause losses.  
 
 
Source: Monitoring (September 2000) and author’s calculations 
Power was in the worst shape. In the first seven months of the year 
2000, receivables in this industry grew by nearly 70 percent, 
compared to the same period last year (Table 3).  Out of this 
increase, 87 percent is attributed to the increase in arrears (overdue 
receivables).  This means that this sector implicitly subsidized (by 
providing zero-interest credit) other sectors of the economy. 
 
Such poor payment discipline has several explanations: (1) 
pervasive soft budget constraints; (2) lack of market mechanisms for 
the services related to generation and delivery of electricity; and (3) 
non-market pricing of energy final products as a whole. 
Under the existing system, energy consumers have practically no 
choice in selecting their energy suppliers.  A market mechanism is 
almost absent in the industry. 
Unsatisfactory payments for electricity give rise to a “vicious circle” of 
arrears in the economy: being underpaid for the energy delivered, 
electricity suppliers and generators fail to fulfill their obligations to 
budget and suppliers.  So, over the first seven months of 2000,  
0,5
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Overdue receivables Overdue payables
Figure 2 
Ratios of overdue payables and overdue receivables to GDP, 
December 1999 – August 2000 
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payables of Power grew 2.3 times compared to the same period of the 
previous year (Table 4).  About three quarters of the increase in 
accounts payable are attributed to growth of overdue payables. 
Importantly, payables of Power, both overdue and non-overdue, grew 
faster than overdue and non-overdue receivables. Thus, the direction 
of subsidization began changing to the reverse: other industries and 
budget began subsidizing Power. 
 
Table 3 
Change in receivables, by industry, January–July 2000 
Industries 
 
Change in 
accounts 
receivable 
Change in overdue 
accounts 
receivable 
 UAH 
million 
Index*, 
% 
UAH 
million 
Index*, % 
Change in 
overdue 
accounts 
receivable, 
as % of 
change in 
accounts 
receivable 
Industry 8,217 46 5,138 39 63 
Power 12,655 167 10,963 150 87 
Fuels 933 25 280 12 30 
Ferrous Metals 983 131 553 176 56 
Non-ferrous Metals 59 38 -4   
Chemicals 119 32 -126   
Machinery 190 20 -8   
Wood 149 125 11 218 7 
Construction 
Materials  
-292  -49   
Light Industry 76 136 17  22 
Food 937 198 47  5 
Flour Milling and 
Feeds 
42 85 -19   
Other -7,634  -6,527   
* Index is constructed by dividing the change in (overdue) accounts receivable 
between January and July 2000 by the change in (overdue) accounts receivable 
between January and July 1999.  
Sources: Main Indicators (January and August 2000) and author’s calculations 
 
Fuels suffered the most from arrears incurred by electricity 
generating companies. The latter paid for a mere 34 percent of all 
coal delivered to them.  
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Table 4 
Change in payables, by industry, January–July 2000 
Industries 
 
Change in total 
accounts payable 
Change in overdue 
accounts payable  
 UAH 
million 
Index*, 
% 
UAH 
million 
Index*, % 
Change in 
overdue 
accounts 
payable, as 
% of 
change in 
total 
accounts 
payable 
Industry 17,425 85 10,229 93 59 
Power  19,524 230 14,219 234 73 
Fuels 1,946 67 1,920 458 99 
Ferrous Metals 398 28 -327.5   
Non-ferrous Metals 13.0 6 55.2 23 425 
Chemicals 994 131 166 952 17 
Machinery 1,077 71 508 63 47 
Wood 192 90 -2   
Construction 
Materials  
-121  25 7  
Light Industry 308 223 163 301 53 
Food 963 138 349 188 36 
Flour Milling and 
Feeds 
-32  -61   
Other -7,837  -6,786   
* Index is constructed by dividing change in (overdue) accounts payable in 
January-July 2000 by change in (overdue) accounts payable in January-July 1999. 
Sources: Main Indicators (January and August 2000) and author’s calculations 
Despite the growing overdue receivables, Fuels was in better shape in 
terms of payments collection than Power.  The increase in Fuels 
receivables for the first seven months of the year 2000 constituted 25 
percent, and overdue Fuels receivables increased by nearly 30 percent. 
At the same time, Fuels payments to creditors were much worse.  Of  
payables, 99 percent is attributed to the increase in overdue 
payables.  Over the first seven months of 2000, payables increased 
by 67 percent, while overdue payables grew 4.6 times compared to 
the same period of the previous year.  This industry also has the 
greatest debt to the State Budget.  
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As industries of the economy vary considerably in size, it would be 
useful to compare the ratio of increase in arrears (both receivables 
and payables) to industrial sales during the period analyzed.  The 
increase in overdue receivables is spread quite evenly throughout all 
industries (Figure 3), and this increase is rather insignificant if 
expressed as a ratio to industrial sales.  The only significant 
deviation occurs in Power.  The increase in overdue payables to 
industrial sales is not distributed so evenly.  The greatest increase 
appears in Power, although Fuels and Light Industry also show 
significant increases. 
 
Figure 3 
Ratio of change in overdue receivables and overdue payables to 
industrial sales, percent, January–July 2000 
 
 
Sources: Monitoring (September 2000), Main Indicators (January and 
August 2000), and author’s calculations 
It is not accidental that Power and Fuels perform significantly worse 
than other industries in terms of payments to the State Budget. 
Fuels accounts for nearly a half of overall industrial arrears to the 
budget and increased 3.4 times over the first seven months of 2000. 
The share of arrears of Power to the budget is also large – 37 
percent (Figure 4). 
The ratio of arrears to industrial sales  also indicates that Fuels and 
Power differ significantly from other industries in terms of payments 
to the budget (Figure 5).  
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Figure 4 
Arrears to the budget, by industry, percent, as of September 1, 
2000 
Source: Main Indicators (August 2000) 
Figure 5 
Ratio of arrears to the budget to total industrial sales, percent, 
January–July 2000 
Sources: Main Indicators (January and August 2000) and author’s calculations 
 
 
2. Profitability  
As financial statements show in January-July 2000, 56 percent of all 
industrial enterprises were loss-making (Table 5). 
Among all industries, Oil (both Extraction and Refining) and Metals 
return the largest profits.  These industries, however, do not seem to 
have a bright future, given the modest energy resources in Ukraine.  
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They remain operational, largely due to tax exemptions and 
government support via regulation of input and output prices.  Of 
all officially profitable industries, only Food receives no direct 
support from the state.  Power ended up with substantial losses, 
which is related to the diverse subsidies it both provides and 
receives (see above). 
 
Table 5 
Enterprise profitability, by industry, January–July 2000 
Industries Profits,  
UAH million 
Share of 
profitable 
enterprises, % 
All 4,908 44 
Power -991 44 
Fuels 1,755 35 
Oil Extraction 848 67 
Oil Refining 974 64 
Natural Gas 75 75 
Coal -138 32 
Ferrous Metals 3,251 59 
Non-ferrous Metals 195 62 
Chemicals 214 47 
Machinery -169 39 
Light Industry -16 44 
Food 530 46 
Sources: Main Indicators (January and August 2000) 
 
Arrears to the budget are likely to correlate negatively with the 
profitability of industries.  The higher the profitability, the better the 
performance of a particular industry in terms of servicing its 
obligations toward the budget (taxes and other payments), hence, 
the lower its arrears to the budget.  In fact, until recently this 
relationship was not as strong as one would expect.  Results for the 
first seven months of 2000 suggest that this correlation began 
occurring.  It remains negative for Fuels.  In this industry, gas and 
oil exploration expenses are not included in industry expenses.  
Therefore, the profitability indicators for this industry are 
unjustifiably high, since most exploration activities are funded out 
of profits. 
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CONCLUSION 
In Ukraine, for a number of years until the second half of 1999, we 
witnessed a systematic worsening of almost every major economic 
indicator.  The most recent data, however, seem to suggest that an 
economic growth has begun and is likely to continue for some 
time. As presented in this chapter, the expansion of industrial 
output and improvements in many financial indicators can be 
explained by a number of factors.  Some of them – such as low 
comparison base, hryvnia devaluation, and stable domestic oil 
prices – are not likely to provide continued support for growth in the 
long run.  Several other factors – such as privatization, fixed capital 
formation, access to international markets, and structural 
transformations in  Ukrainian industry – should produce long-run 
positive effects.  While the first-mentioned factors do not ensure 
sustainable growth, the last-mentioned should continue to 
stimulate further expansion of the economy. 
Exports have finally turned into a powerful driving force for the 
entire economy, and for industry in particular.  Low financial 
discipline remains a serious stumbling bloc, but even in this area 
some improvements have been noticed.  For most industries the 
situation has stabilized, with the exception of Power and 
Fuels, where arrears continued to grow.  However, even within 
Power and Fuels, the active efforts of the Ukrainian Government 
should begin to show positive results in the near future. 
Despite improvements in overall trends, the most fundamental 
economic problems remain.  The chronic indebtedness and low or 
negative profitability of many enterprises are a result of the low level 
of market transformations, inconsistent policies, pervasive price 
distortions, continued government interference in pricing, and weak 
financial discipline.  The speed and long-run sustainability of 
growth will depend on the Government’s success in its struggle 
against these transition economy “attributes,” still solidly 
entrenched in Ukraine. 
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Overview 
 
The year 2000 was significant in many respects.  For the first time 
since independence Ukraine registered an annual growth in GDP, 
which was to a significant extent the result of the reversal of some 
of the bad policies of the past.  The depreciation of the hryvnia 
increased the demand for domestic goods.  Removing some of the 
administrative restrictions on the purchase of foreign currency also 
helped. 
The changes in the policy were noticeable and predominantly 
positive.  The liberalization of the monetary and exchange rate 
policies was an important step in the right direction.  The 
government began privatizing agricultural land, but this time the 
intentions were serious.  An ambitious plan was developed for 
privatization of the national telecommunications company, 
Ukrtelecom, and the metallurgical giants.  The government also 
managed to restructure most of its external debt due in 2000–2001 
by issuing long-term bonds.  Admittedly, while this prevented what 
could have been a financial collapse, it merely postponed 
redemption of the bonds to a future date.  
 
                                                          
1 Unless otherwise specified, the sources of the information and data provided in 
this chapter were: Financial Week (2000); Monitoring (February 2001); and Trends 
(December 2000 and February 2001). 
1. Output and growth 
The GDP increase in 2000 of 5.8 percent over the previous year 
should be attributed to the rapid growth of 13 percent in industrial 
output.  Given the very low GDP in the first half of 1999 (Figure 1), 
one might have questioned the significant growth in the first half of 
2000.  However, the continued pattern of output growth in the 
second half of 2000 seemed to signal the long-awaited start of an 
economic revival after a decade of decline.2  At the same time, 
certain factors must be addressed if the growth of the Ukrainian 
economy is to become sustainable: 
Figure 1 
GDP growth, cumulative, year-to-year, percent, quarterly, 
1998–2000 
Note: Data for each quarter includes the entire period from the beginning of the 
year.  For example, data for the third quarter covers the period from January 
through September. 
Source: Bulletin (November 2000 and April 2001) 
 
1) To some extent, the growth of GDP could be attributed to 
political factors: Victor Yushchenko’s appointment as prime 
minister and the formation of a “reform-minded” cabinet 
increased business expectations for further liberalization and 
                                                          
2 See also “Industrial Production and Finance” in this volume. 
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reforms, which apparently stimulated some economic activity. 
However, significant progress in structural reforms is necessary 
if this growth is to become sustainable. 
2) The increase in real GDP in 2000 year could also be attributed to 
the favorable situation in external markets.  An increase in 
world metal prices stimulated an increase in Ukrainian exports.  
The share of Metals in total exports increased by 33 percent in 
2000, compared to the previous year, and amounted to about 45 
percent of total Ukrainian exports.  At the same time, the 
increase in world oil prices had little impact on domestic prices 
due to the pricing policy that insulates the domestic market, at 
least in the short run, from large price hikes.  The anticipated 
worsening of the situation in external markets in 2001 – the 
slowdown of growth in the US, stagnation in Japan, and the 
decline in world metal prices – may negatively affect future 
growth in Ukraine. 
Figure 2 
Industry structure, percent of total output, end of year,  
1999-2000 
Source: Financial Week (2000/3 and 2001/3) and authors’ calculations 
 
3) Analysis of the structure of production in Ukraine shows some 
positive trends: the share of Food, Machinery, and Light 
Industry increased in 2000, compared to the corresponding 
period of 1999 (Figure 2).  At the same time, however, the share 
of heavy industries, like Metals (both Ferrous and Non-ferrous) 
and Chemicals, also increased while output in Power and Fuels 
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declined.  The good news was that the Ukrainian economy 
became less energy-intensive.  The bad news was that its 
structure remained heavily distorted.  Ten years ago the share of 
heavy industry was very high and further increased during the 
last decade, while the shares of Machinery and Consumer 
Goods declined (Figure 3).  In the mean time, the high value-
added industries remained underdeveloped.  In many cases, 
enterprises within heavy industry (Steel, Coal, Chemicals and 
others) remain subsidized by the Government.  This support 
creates a false impression of profitability and results in the 
diverting of investments away from more efficient, non-
subsidized industries.  Finally, because relative world prices for 
the products of heavy industry have been declining gradually, 
the sector does not hold much promise in terms of growth. 
Figure 3 
Sector share in industrial output, percent of total production 
measured in international prices, 1990 and 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Trends (December 2000) 
 
 
2. Enterprise arrears 
Enterprise receivables increased from UAH 158.9 billion during 
January-November of 2000 to UAH 189 billion. In the same period, 
enterprise payables increased from UAH 189.2 billion to UAH 
234.1 billion. Roughly one-half of payables and receivables were 
overdue. 
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Despite the high level of growth in industrial output in 2000, the 
situation with enterprise arrears3 improved only slightly: overdue 
payables declined from UAH 107 billion at the beginning of 2000 to 
UAH 103 billion at the end of the year, while overdue receivables 
increased from UAH 76 billion to UAH 80 billion.4  The situation in 
the energy sector was particularly severe.  Total arrears, or overdue 
receivables, for the sale of energy to consumers amounted to UAH 
19 billion as of December 1, 2000, or 55 percent of total industrial 
overdue receivables (Main Indicators, December 2000).  Even 
though there were declines in the share of overdue accounts 
payable in total enterprise payables, from 54 percent at the 
beginning of 2000 to 46.3 percent as of January 1, 2001, and in the 
share of overdue receivables in total receivables, from 46.1 percent 
to 45 percent respectively, the vital structural problems in the 
economy still remained to be resolved. 
 
 
3. Inflation 
Ukraine experienced increasing inflation: in 2000, between January 
1 and December 31 consumer prices increased by 25.8 percent.  
Prices grew so quickly during the year that the official inflation 
forecast was raised twice: from 17.6 percent to 19 percent in early 
February, and to 25-26 percent in early July 2000.5  The year-on-
year inflation peaked in the third quarter at 31.1 percent,6 which 
was its highest rate since the end of 1996 (Figure 4).  In 1999 
inflation remained relatively moderate, partly owing to price controls 
(open and hidden), mainly on food, at the regional level.  
 
Throughout 2000 (January through December), food items 
experienced the largest price increases: meat and poultry increased 
by 69 percent; bread and bakery products, by 60 percent; and fruits 
and vegetables, by 58 percent.  These increases, while painful to 
consumers,7 had an overall positive effect on agriculture and food 
processing, contributing to the growth in these sectors in 2000.  
The prices of non-food items increased moderately, by 8.9 percent.  
The share of imports in this group was significant, at about 50 
percent.  The relatively stable exchange rate was a key reason for 
                                                          
3 For definitions of enterprise obligations and arrears see “Cyclical Dynamics of the 
Demonetized Sector” in this volume.  
4 Overdue receivables and overdue payables in 1999 increased by 32.2 percent and 
29.3 percent respectively, and year-on-year inflation amounted to 22.7 percent. In 
2000, overdue receivables increased by only 6.3 percent while overdue payables 
actually declined by 2.3 percent, and average inflation was 28.2 percent. Thus, the 
state of enterprise arrears improved considerably in real terms. 
5 Financial Week (2000/14 and 2000/28). 
6 Calculations were based on Monitoring (February 2001). 
7 Nominal incomes of the population in 2000 increased by 40 percent, and nominal 
pensions, by 23 percent (see below). 
slow price growth.  Wholesale prices rose by 20.6 percent 
throughout 2000, compared to 15.7 percent in 1999. The largest 
price increases in 2000 were in Flour and Cereals, which increased 
by 57.2 percent; Fuels, 35.5 percent; Processed Food, 30.3 percent; 
Chemicals, 25.3 percent; and Light Industry products, 22.6 percent. 
Figure 4 
CPI, year-on-year changes in average consumer price levels, 
quarterly, 1997-2000 
Source: Monitoring (February 2001) and authors’ calculations 
These increases could be explained by: 
• the growth in monetary aggregates in 2000: the monetary 
base increased by almost 40 percent 
• the increase in housing and utilities rates – the latter, by 31 
percent – pursuant to IMF requirements 
• the continued liberalization of agricultural prices, and 
• increased world raw-metal prices: nickel more than doubled, 
aluminum and copper increased by 30-40 percent, etc. 
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4. Trade8 
The official foreign trade balance in 2000, for both goods and 
services, amounted to USD 2.7 billion, compared to USD 2.2 
billion in 1999.  Year-on-year, exports increased by 18.8 percent, 
whereas in 1999 they had declined by 7.9 percent. Imports 
increased by 18.2 percent, and in 1999 had declined by 19.5 
percent.  Visible exports – i.e., the exports of goods – increased by 
25 percent, and visible imports, by 18 percent.  The visible trade 
surplus was USD 0.6 billion, compared to a deficit of USD 0.2 
billion in 1999.  The major increase in exports occurred in Metals – 
by 33 percent (Figure 5).  This increase, however, was not 
particularly welcome.  First, Metals exports do not help remove the 
severe structural distortions in Ukrainian industry: Metals is a low 
value-added energy-intensive industry, which pollutes the 
environment and supports an obsolete industrial base.  Second, 
Metals is virtually subsidized with cheap energy and soft taxes.  
Third, unlike Consumer Goods and Machinery, Metals does not 
stimulate much market-learning, in terms of modern marketing, 
institution building, etc.  Fourth, the growth in Metals exports in 
2000 was due to favorable world market conditions and could be 
short-lived.  Fifth, the significant increase of metal exports rather 
than other commodities, such as Machines and Consumer Goods, 
reflects the numerous trade restrictions that affect the country’s 
export potential; for example, significant restrictions remain on the 
trading activities of small businesses.9 
The low responsiveness of exports to changes in the exchange rate 
could be explained by the fact that many large enterprises, most of 
which were state owned, had not been restructured.  While most 
other CEE countries had accomplished a major shift in the 
structures of their exports and imports toward more value-added 
goods, Ukrainian trade experienced a slower rate of change (Figures 
5 and 6).10 
                                                          
8 Data provided in this section is from Outlook (2001) and Monitoring (February 2001). 
9 See Szyrmer et al. 2000. “Trade Growth in Ukraine: Impediments and Solutions.” 
Unpublished manuscript. Kyiv: Harvard/CASE Ukraine Project 
(www.case.org.ua/orm). 
10 Between 1992/93 and 1998, the export share of raw materials and fuels in 
countries like Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia declined significantly: by 56 
percent in Poland, 45 percent in the Czech Republic, and 27 percent in Slovakia.  
The respective figures for imports were: 55 percent, 36 percent, and 43 percent.  At 
the same time, both exports and imports of machinery in these countries increased 
substantially.  In 1998, the import and export shares of fuels and raw materials 
remained below 15 percent, while machinery reached about 40 percent – with the 
exception of Poland’s machinery exports, which were 28 percent (Rocznik, 2000).  
In Ukraine, the trade structure remained unfavorable, with a high share of fuels 
and raw materials, above 60 percent, and low share of machinery, below 20 
percent. 
Figure 5 
Structure of Ukrainian exports of goods, percent, 2000 
(corresponding 1999 figures in parentheses)  
 
 
Source: Outlook (2001). 
 
Figure 6 
Structure of Ukrainian imports of goods, percent, 2000 
(corresponding 1999 figures in parentheses)  
Source: Outlook (2001). 
 
 
5. Monetary policy  
Monetary policy underwent a significant change in the first quarter 
of 2000. The National Bank of Ukraine abandoned the exchange 
rate corridor and allowed the exchange rate to float.  Ironically, 
under the corridor regime, which was supposed to keep the rate 
stable, it actually remained painfully volatile.  Since January 2000, 
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when the efforts to contain the rate within an officially established 
corridor were abandoned, the rate remained respectfully stable: 
depreciation in 2000 was only 4 percent, compared to 52 percent in 
1999.  On the other hand, if one took into account the NBU’s 
continued heavy interventions in the Ukrainian inter-bank market, 
the exchange rate regime was still far from a “free float” and, 
properly speaking, should have been classified as a managed float, 
and a heavily managed one at that.  
Ukraine’s external debt in 2000 was serviced in a timely manner, 
and almost without any new loans from international financial 
organizations. 
The official hryvnia exchange rate in 2000 changed from 5.22 
UAH/USD at the beginning of the year to 5.44 UAH/USD at year-
end. The stability of the exchange rate could be explained by: 
• the NBU policy to maintain a stable exchange rate, i.e., its 
active participation in the currency market, restrictions on 
the simultaneous purchase and sale of hard currency, and 
its use of a variety of measures to prevent speculative 
attacks on the foreign exchange market; 
• the hard currency surplus on the Ukrainian inter-bank 
currency exchange, caused by the positive trade balance, the 
increase in privatization revenues, and foreign direct 
investments; 
• the successful restructuring of part of the external debt; and 
• increased demand for the national currency, caused by the 
growth in GDP and an increase in monetization of the economy, 
i.e., the reduction of barter operations and elimination of non-
cash settlements, especially in the energy sector. 
In 2000, the NBU acquired over USD 1.4 billion on the currency 
market, which was used to service the external debt and strengthen 
official foreign currency reserves.  By the end of 2000 these reserves 
reached USD 1.6 billion, the highest level in three years.  
Unfortunately, this was still an alarmingly low level of reserves and 
affected the macroeconomic stability of the economy.  Slovenia, 
Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia had higher foreign 
reserves – about USD 3 billion each – despite the fact that these 
countries are several times smaller than Ukraine.  The central 
European nations – Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary – had 
foreign reserves of USD 700-1,300 per capita, while in Ukraine the 
ratio was USD 30-40 (Business Central Europe, April 2001). 
In the second half of 2000, the NBU became concerned about the 
rapid growth of monetary aggregates.  Heavy interventions in the 
inter-bank currency exchange and the relaxation of monetary policy 
aimed at stimulating bank lending, resulted in 2000 in a growth in 
the money supply of UAH 10 billion, or 45 percent.  The banking 
sector experienced a liquidity surplus, which led to reduced interest 
rates on credit resources.  However, bank services remained 
expensive and the interest rate spread, i.e., the difference between 
deposit and credit rates, was consistently high, which suggested 
that the banking efficiency was not improving.11 
The relaxation of monetary policy resulted in lower interest rates 
and lower bank-reserve requirements.  In April 2000, the NBU 
decreased the annual discount rate to 29 percent and the Lombard 
rate to 34 percent, and in August – to 27 percent and 30 percent, 
respectively. Reserve requirements for the banks were reduced 
gradually from 17 to 15 percent.  Inparallel, in order to rein in 
effective money supply, the NBU decided to broaden the definition of 
assets subject to reserve requirements. 
 
 
6. The banking sector12 
As the price of credit dropped, commercial banks increased their 
investment activity.  As a result, the total credit portfolio rose by 
UAH 8 billion in 2000, from 21 percent of total bank assets at the 
end of 1999 to 23 percent at the end of 2000 (Figure 7).  At the 
same time, however, the volume of long-term loans decreased from 
17 percent of total portfolio in 1999 to 14 percent in 2000. 
The low level of lending – between 20 and 30 percent of total assets – 
implied that a major portion of assets was being used in non-lending 
operations, thus, undermining one of the primary functions of a 
bank as a financial intermediary. 
The share of problem loans (bad, prolonged, and substandard loans) 
in the credit portfolio of Ukrainian commercial banks as of January 
1, 2000 remained very high at about 18 percent. Sixty percent of 
problem loans of seven large banks were directed loans provided by 
the banks for various government programs.13  The obligation of 
banks to service Kartoteka #2 and to hold government securities, 
imposed additional costs, thus reducing bank efficiency even 
further.  At the end of 2000, Kartoteka #2 amounted to about UAH 
94 billion, which was almost equal to the total value of all assets in 
the entire banking system.  Nonetheless, some positive changes 
were observed.  In December 2000, Ukraine’s parliament, the 
Verkhovna Rada, adopted a law that abolishes Kartoteka #2 in 
2001.  This law can be considered to be one of the major 
                                                          
11 See “Institutional Development of the Banking System” in this volume.  
12 The data provided in this section is from Bulletin (January 2001) and the 
Harvard/CASE database.  
13 Data for June 30, 2000. 
accomplishments in Ukrainian reforms over the past few years.  It 
remains unclear, however, how effective the new mechanisms will 
be, including those set forth in the law of Ukraine on Amendements 
to the law of Ukraine on Restoring the Solvency of the Debtor or 
Declaring It Bankrupt implemented on January 1, 2000. 
Figure 7 
Credit portfolio of Ukrainian banks, percent of total assets, 
Q4’1997-Q4’2000 
 
Source: Harvard/CASE database 
The profitability of the banking system in 2000 declined sharply 
compared to 1999, and the entire sector suffered losses totaling 
about UAH 16 million (Figure 8). Since the end of 1999, the return 
on equity of commercial banks declined and became negative by the 
fourth quarter of 2000 – a loss of 0.3 percent, compared to a gain of 
7.7 percent in Q4’99 and 10.3 percent in Q4’98.  
The poor health of the banking system is related to the low 
confidence people have in banks.  Enforcement of prudential norms, 
reserve requirements, and transparent accounting standards on the 
financial intermediaries (banks, stock markets, etc.) are important 
measures for protecting bank customers and increasing their 
confidence, which is of crucial importance in any financial 
operations. 
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Profitability of Ukrainian banking system, percent,  
Q4’1997–Q4’2000 
 
Note: Profitability is measured by the return on equity ratio (net profits over equity 
capital). 
Source: Harvard/CASE database 
 
 
7. Government income and expenditures14 
On February 17, 2000, the law on Budget 2000 was adopted in 
which the enforcement of a zero budget deficit was accompanied by 
the elimination of non-cash settlements with state and local 
budgets.  The policy in the budget sector could be characterized as 
inconsistent: on the one hand, it abolished all kinds of budget 
subsidies and privileges, and on the other, it continued the policy of 
soft budget constraint with both individual enterprises and whole 
industrial branches.  Traditionally, the most subsidized industries 
are Agriculture, Power, Fuels, and Ferrous Metals.  Since October 
2000, poor payment discipline and expectations that the practice of 
mutual settlements would resume threatened the budget with 
revenue shortfalls.  This led the Government to again permit 
nontransparent debt settlement schemes and various in-kind 
payments.  While about UAH 4.8 billion in budget debts were settled 
in the period January-November 2000, UAH 3.1 billion of debts 
were settled in December alone.  
                                                          
14 This section was based on Outlook (2001/1). 
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The rate of execution of consolidated budget revenues was 114 
percent of the amount approved in the Law on the State Budget of 
2000.  Budget revenues in real terms, i.e., excluding inflation, 
increased by 6 percent compared to the previous year.15  Taking 
into account, however, real GDP growth in 2000, one would have 
expected a more significant real budget revenue increase.  There 
were a number of reasons for the high rate of budget revenue 
execution, in particular: 
• inflation in 2000 was much higher than assumed in the 
Budget Law; 
• local budgets performed much better than they were required 
to by the Law: for January-November 2000, local budget 
revenues were executed 128 percent; 
• the inclusion in the budget of income from a number of former 
extra-budgetary funds also affected fiscal performance 
positively.  
Consolidated budget expenditures in 2000 were executed 112 
percent and totaled UAH 47.3 billion.  Although the share of social 
expenditures slightly increased, this item remained under-financed 
at the local level.  Unfortunately, the largest increase – almost 70 
percent in real terms – occurred in public administration expenses.  
After a long history of poor fiscal management, the consolidated 
budget in 2000 finally showed a surplus of about UAH 1 billion. 
However, if standard IMF methodology for calculating budget 
deficits is applied and receipts from privatization are excluded, then 
Ukraine finished the year with a UAH 1.6 billion deficit, or roughly 
0.9 percent of GDP.  Nevertheless, there was significant progress in 
budget management in 2000. Also, unlike in previous years, the 
2001 Budget Law was adopted in an orderly manner as early as 
December 2000. 
The work on the draft Tax Code was an important step in Ukrainian 
tax reform.  The code contained a number of measures aimed at 
easing the tax burden, the major features of which were: reduction 
of the enterprise profit tax rate, or EPT; reduction in the number of 
excise taxes, local taxes, and tax privileges; elimination of the 
special tax on amortization; and an increase in the non-taxable 
maximum income.  Despite the improvements in the taxation 
system set forth in the draft code, little change was provided for in 
the area of tax administration, which most experts believe is a 
precondition for tax reform to be successful.  
                                                          
15 In comparable terms, budget expenditures rose only by 0.1 percent, as some 
items included in the 2000 budget were financed from the extra-budgetary funds in 
the previons years. 
8. Household incomes and expenses 
The income of Ukrainian households in 2000 totaled UAH 86.8 
billion (Table 1), or USD 0.90 per person per day.16  This income 
increased year-on-year, in real terms, by 6.3 percent, excluding 
taxes and other mandatory charges.  The increase in disposable 
income could be attributed to the increased total wage fund (by 38.6 
percent, about 10 percent above the average inflation rate).  
However, there was a decrease in the share of wages and salaries, 
pensions and other social transfer payments, and foreign currency 
purchases in total household income.   
Expenditures from personal savings increased in 2000 by 15 
percent compared to 1999.  Total expenditures in nominal terms in 
2000 increased by about 41 percent compared to 1999, while real 
household consumption increased by 11.5 percent17 during the 
same period.  The largest portion of the expenditures increase in 
2000 was on taxes and other mandatory payments, and goods and 
services.  The former was caused by considerable increases in 
housing and utilities tariffs, and the latter, by significant increases 
in food prices and the CPI as a whole. 
Official per capita monetary income in 2000 increased somewhat to 
UAH 1,749 (USD 322), compared to 1999 (UAH 1,240 and USD 300 
respectively).18  The payment of arrears in wages, pensions and 
other social payments was an important factor in the per capita 
monthly income increase.  The average wage increase was 35.4 
percent in nominal terms and 3.6 percent in real terms, compared 
to the corresponding period in 1999.  However, average wages in 
dollar terms continued to fall, although at a decreasing rate (Table 
2).  The nominal average wage increase was partially affected in 
2000 by a 60 percent increase in the minimum wage from UAH 74 
to UAH 118.  All of this data, however, should be treated with 
caution because of the existence of the shadow economy and tax 
evasion. Moreover, many enterprises in various regions of Ukraine 
paid wages to their employees in the form of goods, although the 
share of wages paid in this manner decreased in 2000. 
                                                          
16 The World Bank considers an income of one dollar per person per day as a rough 
benchmark of poverty.  In Ukraine, despite respectable progress, most of the 
population still lives in poverty, at least in terms of official income.  
17 UEPLAC estimates.  This includes only official household consumption, which is 
registered. According to UEPLAC methodology, real monetary income in 2000 
increased by 9.4 percent compared to 1999.  See Trends. 
18 The U.S dollar equivalent of income per capita was obtained by dividing nominal 
monetary income per capita in hryvnia by average exchange rate for the year. 
Table 1 
Household incomes and expenditures, by category, selected 
indicators, 1999 and 2000 
 2000 1999 
 UAH 
billion 
% change 
from previous 
year 
% of total income 
(expenditures) 
Total income 86.8 40.4 100 100 
Wages and salaries 42.5 38.6 48.9 49.6 
Sale by private persons 4.5 58.2 5.2 4.6 
Pensions, aid and stipends 18.2 23.4 20.9 23.8 
Foreign currency sales 4.2 14.4 4.8 5.9 
Other income 17.4 75.2 20.2 16.1 
Total expenditures and savings 83.7 40.6 100 100 
Purchase of goods and services 59.9 43.1 71.5 70.3 
Mandatory payments 11.7 74.0 14.1 11.3 
Savings, incl. purchase of 
securities 5.2 15.0 6.3 7.7 
Foreign currency purchases 4.0 -18.3 4.7 8.2 
Other expenditures 2.9 88.9 3.4 2.5 
Income in excess of 
expenditures (+) or expenditures 
in excess of income (-) 
3.1 34.3 3.6 4.2 
Average annual inflation rate, % 28.2 22.7 
Source: Financial Week and Bulletin (April 2001) 
The official unemployment rate in 2000 was impressively stable, 
gradually declining from 4.3 percent at the beginning of the year to 
4.2 percent at year-end.  Despite this slight positive change in the 
labor market, the situation remained difficult.  Administrative and 
agricultural reforms resulted in reduced employment in these 
sectors.  Moreover, official unemployment figures did not reflect 
forced part-time unemployment: compulsorily reduced working 
hours, mandatory unpaid leaves of absence, etc.  The average 
duration of unemployment remained unchanged at about eleven 
months. 
Table 2 
Wage dynamics, 1998-2000 
 1998 1999 2000 
Average wage, UAH 153.50 177.52 230.09 
Wage increase, Dec-to-Dec, percent 5.6 24.3 35.4 
Average wage, USD* 62.7 43.0 42.3 
 
* Average wage in dollar terms was calculated by dividing average wage in hryvnia 
by average exchange rate for the year. 
Source: Trends (February 2001) 
 
 
9. Social payment arrears 
The government kept its word to repay all pension arrears in 2000 – 
about UAH 1.3 billion – and did so by September 8.  Obviously, this 
did not eliminate the need for pension reform. In the mean time, the 
gradual worsening of the age structure in Ukraine continued.  The 
population numbered 51.7 million at the end of 1995, 49.7 million – 
1999, and 49.3 million – 2000.  Death rates in 2000 were almost twice 
as high as birth rates.  Thus, as the population and number of people 
active in the work force decreases, the number of pensioners and 
average age of the population is rising.  The current, so-called pay-as-
you-go pension system is losing its capacity to support the growing 
army of pensioners.  Three working persons currently support two 
pensioners.  In fact, this ratio will continue getting worse: the “baby-
boomers” have already begun entering retirement age. 
The wage and salary debt to budget organization employees declined 
impressively in 2000 – by one-half in nominal terms, and by two-
thirds in real terms – reaching UAH 262 billion by year-end.  The 
largest amount of wage arrears was in Education, which comprised 
42 percent of total budget-sphere wage arrears, and in Healthcare, 
which comprised 30 percent.  Budget-sphere wage arrears 
constituted 5.3 percent of total wage arrears, which declined by 40 
percent in real terms in 2000 – already the second year of decline. 
Declining wage and pension arrears were accompanied, however, by 
growing government liabilities in other spheres – VAT refunds, T-bill 
debt, etc. The repayment of arrears in one sector therefore resulted 
in the accumulation of arrears in others.  
There appears to be a significant negative relationship between 
arrears and inflation.  While monetary expansion is still one method 
of financing state debt, the procedure is less straightforward than it 
was in the early 1990s when printing presses were used to finance 
large budget deficits.  In time the deficit vanishes, but monetary 
expansion remains strong and the state continues to collect an 
“inflation tax.” 
 
 
10. External debt 
One of the important tasks of the new government in 2000 was the 
restructuring of external debt, the total sum of which amounted to 
USD 2.1 billion.  The debt restructuring saved the country from 
financial collapse and gave the government some leeway to improve 
the performance of the economy so that the debt could be 
redeemed.  
About 99 percent of Ukrainian bonds that were to mature in 2000-
2001 were restructured: 
• Euro-denominated bonds (EUR 500 million) 
• Merrill Lynch bonds (USD 258 million) 
• Chase Manhattan bonds (USD 74 million) 
• German-mark-denominated eurobonds (DEM 1,538 million) 
These bonds were converted into new, euro-denominafed or dollar-
denominated eurobonds maturing March 2007: EUR 1,133 million 
and USD 1,129 million.  The principal payments on the new 
eurobonds will start in March 2001 and will run through March 
2007. Beginning in June 2000, Ukraine was to pay interest 
payments - quarterly coupon income of 11 percent annually on 
dollar-denominated bonds, and 10 percent annually on euro-
denominated bonds.  
Despite the large-scale restructuring, the interest and principal 
payments that remained to be paid in 2000 were still very large.  As 
a whole, in 2000 Ukraine’s external debt declined by USD 2.1 
billion, or 17 percent.  At the end of the year this debt was USD 
10.3 billion. It was the first year after independence that external 
debt decreased in Ukraine.  In 2000 Ukraine received almost no new 
loans from the IMF or other international organizations.  The IMF 
EFF program was suspended in September 1999, and some new 
credits came only in December 2000.  
Ukraine had yet to solve the problem of its debt to Paris Club 
member countries and to Turkmenistan, both of which Ukraine 
stopped servicing at the beginning of 2000. These debts amount to 
USD 500 million and USD 280 million, respectively.  
11. T-bills19 
Domestic debt increased in 2000 by 38 percent to UAH 20.7 billion. 
In the second half of the year most of this debt was restructuved. 
The Government began efforts to revive the T-bill market that 
collapsed in 1998. 
The volume of government securities traded on the primary market in 
2000 declined from about UAH 3 billion to UAH 2 billion.  The 
decrease in trading volume was caused by many factoris, including the 
slow pace of privatization, the unstable relationship with the IMF 
throughout the year, the precarious political situation at the end of the 
year, and by the decline in T-bills profitability.  With respect to the 
last-mentioned factor, average weighted profitability in 2000 was 20.5 
percent, compared to 27.5 percent in the previous year. 
At the beginning of the year, the NBU’s portfolio of government 
securities was UAH 9.6 billion.  While the Ministry of Finance 
stopped servicing its debt to the NBU in October 1999, it did 
manage to restructure its debt in September 2000.  Nonetheless, 
these government securities failed to attract large interest of the 
private sector.  The volume of government securities traded on the 
Ukrainian Inter-Bank Currency Exchange (secondary market) 
slightly declined from UAH 2.9 billion to UAH 2.8 billion. 
 
 
12. Investment and globalization 
Fixed capital investment in 2000 totaled UAH 19.5 billion.  The 
institutional breakdown was: 
• private property – UAH 1.3 billion, or 6.7 percent of total 
• collective property – UAH 8.0 billion, or 41.2 percent 
• state property – UAH 10.0 billion, or 51.2 percent 
• property of international entities – UAH 0.2 billion, or 0.8 percent 
Thus, most investments were undertaken by the so-called collective 
sector, which includes worker-owned enterprises and diverse 
enterprises of mixed-ownership forms.  The investment activities of 
private enterprises remained at a very low level.  Also, most 
investment continued to be in the old economy – i.e., in heavy 
industry – and in the major industrial regions. Investment as a share 
of GDP fell from 13.5 percent in 1999 to 11.3 percent in 2000. Such 
a low level of investment was discouraging.  Moreover, if asset 
depreciation is taken into account, net investment was actually 
negative.  Weak market institutions, ineffective contract enforcement 
and an inadequate legal framework discouraged private firms from 
undertaking new fixed capital formation projects. 
                                                          
19 Data is from Bulletin (January 2001). 
Since 1992 Ukraine received only USD 3.9 billion in foreign direct 
investments (FDI).  In the mean time, between 1992 and 2000, 
foreigners invested USD 41 billion in Poland, USD 20 billion in 
Russia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, USD 5 billion in each of 
Romania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Latvia.  In 2000, USD 
584 million was invested in Ukraine, which was 23.9 percent more 
than in 1999.  Interestingly, more than half of all FDI was invested 
in industrial enterprises. 
The largest investors in the Ukrainian economy since 1992 have 
been the United States, with USD 636 million; Cyprus, with USD 
373 million; and the Netherlands, with USD 362 million.  
The major investments in 2000 were in the form of: 
• cash – 58 percent 
• movable and immovable assets – 30 percent 
• securities – 6 percent, and 
• other – 6 percent 
The last two decades have witnessed an unprecedented worldwide 
integration of national economies into one global market for goods, 
services, capital, technology, and information.  Trade and financing 
relations have intensified.  The transitional economy countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, which adopted fast-track reforms, 
have achieved a significant degree of openness and are reaping the 
benefits of faster economic growth, and enjoying a growing share in 
international capital and access to new technology.  
Ukraine needs more fundamental reforms to start taking tull 
advantage from the growth opportunities provided by the financial, 
economic, and technological globalization.  
 
 
13. Privatization 
According to Budget 2000, the State Property Fund was supposed 
to generate from privatization at least UAH 2.5 billion in budget 
revenues, which was UAH 0.4 billion more than it actually collected.  
In 2000, 5,300 enterprises were privatized, or 5 percent less than in 
the previous year.  
The SPF had planned to sell in 2000 state shares in a large number of 
energy distribution companies and ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy 
enterprises.  However, the privatization of some enterprises was 
surrounded by scandal and court hearings, as in the case of 
Zaporozhsky Aluminum Plant (ZAP), and the privatization of energy 
distributing companies (oblenergos) was postponed until the beginning 
of 2001.  Nontransparent privatization procedures and the low-level 
investment appeal of Ukrainian enterprises were the main reasons for 
the failure to generate budget revenues as planned.  
 
 
Conclusion 
The year 2000 was a good year for Ukrainian economy.  GDP began 
to grow, and after many years of decline, positive changes in output 
and trade finally took place: more Machinery and Consumer Goods; 
and less Power, Fuels, and Construction Materials.  The 
pathologically high level of energy consumption in Ukrainian output 
declined, and labor productivity increased significantly.  Moreover, 
the degree of economic openness increased impressively: in 
particular, the export-to-GDP ratio grew by 18 percent for total 
exports, and by 12 percent for visible exports.  While inflation was 
relatively high at 25-30 percent, it remained under control and the 
prospects for lower inflation in the future are good.  The pressure on 
prices from the growing money base was moderated by a rapidly 
growing demand for money; interest rates declined and the 
availability of bank credits expanded.  Ukraine’s economy 
underwent a process of rapid monetization that manifested itself, 
not only in more bank credits and less bad debts, but also in the 
declining use of barter, in decreased mutual settlements in the 
budget sphere, lower wage and pension arrears, and in shrinking 
dollarization.  In addition, household incomes increased.  There was 
further progress in privatization, the number of private firms grew 
significantly, and economic reforms continued. 
There are several obvious questions concerning these 
accomplishments, including issues like: (1) the reliability of 
statistics, (2) the long-term direction of the reform process, (3) the 
very low level of current economic activities, and (4) the effects of 
the international market on the Ukrainian economy.   
While it appears that the quality of Ukrainian statistics is still not 
particularly high, the official data nonetheless provides a reasonable 
approximation of the actual economic situation.  Economic growth 
and the increases in real income are unquestionable, although their 
exact magnitudes require further refinement.  In many cases, we 
lack detailed data and good documentation in support of the 
published statistics in order to properly evaluate particular 
processes.  According to available information, several time series 
lack internal consistency, due to changes in methodology, and are 
therefore not fully compatible with one another. This observation 
seems to apply particularly to the case of industrial statistics (e.g., 
changes in the treatment of value added tax), barter statistics, etc.   
It also appears that the reforms in the economy continue to 
progress, notwithstanding the various drawbacks.  Difficult 
conditions at the beginning of this process, rather than the speed of 
reforms, are responsible for the current relatively low levels of living 
standards and market development.   
While GDP and most other financial and economic indicators were 
originally at a very low level, this cannot be used to explain the rapid 
improvement of many of these indicators in 2000.  For that matter, 
low starting levels do not automatically enable growth, as 
demonstrated by the further economic decline of Moldova, a country 
which had already been described as having the poorest economy in 
Europe.  In our opinion, growth in Ukraine was enabled by continued 
reform efforts and the improvements in current policies.  Important 
factors in stimulating investment and growth included, in particular, 
the cheaper hryvnia, the hardening of budget constraint for many 
actors in both the public and private sectors, a more transparent 
economy with less barter, progress in the monetization of agriculture, 
lower wage arrears, and improvements in contract enforcement.   As 
long as the policies continue improving, growth should continue as 
well.  Any attempt to return to the infamous policies which supported 
soft budget constraints, tax privileges and weak contract enforcement 
could undermine current policy achievements.  A systematically 
revalued hryvnia could also threaten future economic growth. 
Finally, the sustainability of Ukrainian growth could be affected by the 
changes in international markets.  A combination of factors – 
including ruble depreciation, the high prices of gas and oil, and 
improvements in political stability –  enabled the rapid growth of the 
Russian economy and have had a positive effect on Ukraine.  However, 
Russia’s economic growth and other improvements on external 
markets might turn out to be short-lived.  This is yet another reason to 
continue the often unpleasant, but absolutely necessary, reforms of 
the Ukrainian economy and to further improve economic policies. 
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1 cumulative 
2 to the corresponding period of previous year 
3  "+" is decrease in reserves and "-" is increase 
4 for the period 
5 end of period 
6 annualized weighted average, percent 
7 reserves = (money base) minus cash in circulation) 
8  for pensioners, registered in the social security authorities 
9  social protection and security 
 
* as of November 2000   
** 1000 KBV/100 RUR   
*** as of the 10th day of the following period 
 
 
1999 2000 Indicators 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
               
GDP                             
Nominal GDP, UAH billion1  54.52 81.52 93.37 102.59 130.44 172.95 24.98 54.18 91.81 130.44 32.55 71.82 122.32 172.95
GDP growth. percent2 -12.2 -10.0 -3.0 -1.9 -0.2 5.8 -4.7 -3.0 -1.7 -0.2 5.5 5.0 5.2 5.8
                 
Output, percent1, 2                             
Industry -12.0 -5.1 -0.3 -1.0 4.0 12.9 -2.4 0.2 2.3 4,0 10.3 11.0 11.8 12.9
    Power  -6.9 -2.6 -0.2 6.6 -2.9* 3.3 5.0 6.5 6.6 3.2 1.7 -0.3 -2.9*
Construction -35.2 -34.0 -11.9 1.4 -6.7 1.3* -23.1 -19.4 -12.2 -6.7 8.9 5.2 3.7 1.3*
Agriculture -3.6 -9.5 -1.9 -10.8 -6.9 -7.6 0.5 -1.5 -2,0 -6.9 -4.9 -4.6 1.3 7.6
Transport & Communications -21.4 -17.7 -1.9 -3.6 -4.0 1.5* -8.8 -6.5 -5.7 -4.0 4.9 1.9 1.6 1.5*
Trade  1.8 0.2 7.6 -3.0 5.3* -9,0 -7.9 -7.6 -3.0 8.8 6.2 6.5 5.3*
Services  -10.6 -1.7 -3.6 -1.7 1.4* -3.8 -3.1 -2.7 -1.7 3.4 1.9 1.6 1.4*
                
Foreign trade, USD million                             
Exports (goods and services) 17 090 20 346 20 355 17 621 16 332 19 522 3 587 4 833 4 130 4 508 4 571 4 598 5 052 5 301
    Former Soviet Union (FSU) 9 528 12 349 10 286 7 728 7 276 8 104 1 457 2 300 1 688 1 831 1 897 1 884 2 076 2 247
    Rest of world 7 562 7 997 10 069 9 893 9 782 11 418 2 130 2 533 2 442 2 677 2 674 2 714 2 976 3 054
Imports (goods and services) 18 280 21 468 21 891 18 828 15 237 18 116 3 741 3 287 3 658 4 551 4 604 4 155 4 230 5 127
    FSU 11 630 13 582 12 786 10 166 8 341 9 575 2 369 1 654 1 916 2 402 2 713 2 065 2 069 2 728
    Rest of world 6 650 7 886 9 105 8 662 6 896 8 541 1 372 1 633 1 742 2 149 1 891 2 090 2 161 2 399
Balance -1 190 -1 122 -1 536 -1 207 1 821 1 406 -154 1 546 472 -43 -33 443 822 174
    FSU -2 102 -1 233 -2 500 -2 438 -1 065 -1 471 -912 646 -228 -571 -816 -181 7 -481
    Rest of world 912 111 964 1 231 2 886 2 877 758 900 700 528 783 624 815 655
                 
Balance of payments, USD million                              
Current account -1 152 -1 185 -1 335 -1 296 1 658 1 481 -329 1 569 414 4 -157 449 901 288
     Goods -2 702 -4 296 -4 205 -2 584 244 779 -639 1 110 231 -458 -388 285 724 158
     Nonfactor services 1 512 3 174 2 669 1 377 1 577 627 485 436 241 415 355 158 98 16
     Investment income  -434 -572 -644 -871 -869 -942 -318 -153 -250 -148 -365 -219 -174 -184
     Current transfers  472 509 845 782 706 1 017 143 176 192 195 241 225 253 298
Capital account 1 566 946 2 120 2 106 -704 -1 331 774 -1 156 -288 -34 151 -491 -749 -242
     Direct investments 257 526 581 747 489 594 37 123 186 143 126 207 131 130
     Portfolio investments 4 198 1 603 47 -86 -201 24 7 -138 21 -482 471 -96 -94
 
 
Indicators 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1999 2000 
       Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
     Other investments 1 299 1 090 319 -9 -814 -1 318 641 -1 012 28 -471 477 -1 308 -748 261
         Medium- & long-term loans  3 706 1 140 1 025 130 5 -1 690 39 -61 262 -235 -1 447 -335 -160 252
     Capital transfers 6 5 0 -3 -10 -8 -2 -2 -4 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2
     Errors and omissions 74 239 -785 -810 -954 -150 -445 -413 -126 30 6 42 -152 -46
     Overall balance 488 873 383 -1 324 283 398 -74 272 360 -275 -32 -141 34 537
Financing / reserves3 -488 -873 -383 1 324 -283 -398 74 -272 -360 275 32 141 -34 -537
      Foreign currency & deposits -446 -916 -507 1 432 -395 -214 108 -415 -216 128 49 99 11 -373
      SDR 17 94 -5 -108 112 -184 -34 143 -144 147 -17 42 -45 -164
      Securities -59 -51 129 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
                 
Consolidated budget                             
Revenues,  UAH million 20516 30 141 27 148 28 916 32 876 49 115 6 161 7 727 8 767 9 685 8 956 11 351 12738 16 069
      VAT 4 517 6 293 7 602 7460 8 409 9441 1 636 1 898 2 316 2 280 1886 2199 2605 2747
      EPT 4 833 5 450 5 689 5695 6 352 7698 1 066 1 499 1 575 2 231 1501 1621 2006 2599
      PIT 1 600 2 639 3 293 3571 4 434 6378 840 1 045 1 167 1 382 1 176 1460 1695 2047
      Excise 401 652 1 158 1289 1 788 2240 335 412 503 502 324 552 612 751
      Privatization proceeds 74 199 128 471 822 2291 152 211 174 285 420 713 259 899
      Other revenues 9091 14 908 9 278 10431 11 071 21 067 2 132 2 662 3 032 3 005 3649 4807 5560 6355
Expenditures,  UAH million 24 486 33 759 33 345 31 196 34 821 48 081 6 248 8 088 9 294 10 636 7 969 11668 11 892 16 552
      Debt servicing 2 447 2639 2 951 2 410 3 087 4569 1 207 365 838 680 533 1644 776 1616
            Internal debt 183 558 930 1 663 1 251 1661 315 102 489 345 152 136 227 1147
            External debt 2264 2082 2 022 748 1 836 2907 892 263 319 335 381 1508 549 470
      Defence 1017 1252 1 419 1419 1 558 2295 192 366 482 489 371 498 685 743
      State investments 865 1 069 535 836 1 085  190 370 256 269        
      Housing and utilities 1675 1770 1 559 1404 1 165 1084 174 245 331 440 168 214 335 370
      National economy, total 2608 2960 3 913 4 099 4 827 6 602 881 1 176 1 708 1 062 895 1 509 1 667 2 531
            Agriculture 343 300 48 608 539 886 65 102 138 226 94 187 215 385
            Coal (fuel and energy) 0 133 1 083 1434 1 660 1913 343 497 343 649 380 459 473 603
            State reserves 0  1 386 123 398 912 33 104 147 114 3 6 13 392
      Total social-cultural 6 110 7 717 9 633 12 826 13 117 18947 2 353 473 3 486 6 805 3 417 4560 5039 5931
            Soc. protection9 3 367 4 065 5 504 4 227 4 147 5985 691 3 263 1 211 1 557 1 112 1486 1807 1563
            Education and health 5561 7086 8 871 8196 8 423 11974 1 544 1 032 2 173 3 674 2 145 2813 2982 3942
 
 
 
1999 2000 Indicators 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
               
            Other social and cultural 549 631 762 663 1 985 1097 118 191 102 1 574 160 261 250 427
      Other 9764 16351 12 424 7 634 6 638 13776 1 251 2 303 2 193 891 2 585 3243 3852 4558
               
Consolidated budget  deficit,  UAH million                             
Budget balance (IMF method)1 2429 2 607 5 189 2 766 3 101 1 256 195 953 1 701 3 101 -567 463 -125 1 256
Budget balance (MinFin)1 3970 -3964 -6 201 -2 280 -1945 1 035 -88 -448 -975 -1 945 987 670 1 517 1 035
Deficit / GDP ratio (MinFin)1 7.3 -4.9 -6.6 -2.2 -1.5 0.6 -0.4 -0.8 -1.1 -1.5 3.0 0.9 1.2 0.6
      Domestic financing4   4 956 1 343 2014 1502 -43 776 63 1219 -553 879 -571 1747
      Net external financing4 779  233 852 -81 -584 221 -502 515 -315 -400 -434 -129 379
            Inflows   1 502 3245 1 815 381 589 746 465 464 0 0   
            Redemption (principal)   1 269 2393 1897 965 300 890 373 418 368 834   
               
Prices                             
CPI (Q1-1995 = 100) 177 247 272 326 389 489 338 354 359 389 428 461 473 489
CPI, average annual change, % 377.0 80.3 15.9 10.6 22.7 28.2 21.2 25.4 26.0 18.7 25.1 27.4 31.1 28.9
CPI, point-to-point change, %5 181.7 39.7 10.1 20,0 19.2 25.8 3.5 4.9 1.4 8.3 10.2 7.7 2.5 3.4
      Food 150.1 17.4 14.1 22.1 26.2 28.4 5.9 4.9 -0.3 13.9 11.5 7.1 3.0 4.4
      Non-food 120.0 18.8 2.9 24.1 10.6 8.9 0.7 1.7 4.5 3.3 3.3 1.7 2.0 1.6
      Services 484.4 112.7 7.9 13.0 11.9 31.2 1.1 7,0 2.3 1.1 13.1 12.4 1.6 1.5
WPI, point-to-point change, %5 172.1 17.3 5.0 35.3 15.7 20.8 2.3 3,0 5.7 3.9 7.9 3.5 3.3 4.5
                 
T-bills, Interest Rates                             
Yield, weighted average, %4 86 71 33 55 28 20 32 30 24 22 20 21 23
OVDP sales, UAH million5               
      Primary market 304 3063 8322 8164 3842 1892 1 028 1 154 966 694 1 685 27 180
      Secondary market 1913 6549 5017 2895 2798 496 343 1 207 848 252 1 926 458 162
NBU refin. rate, %5 110.0 40.0 35.0 60.0 45.0 27.0 60.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 32.0 29.0 27.0 27.0
Interbank O/N rate, %  22.1 40.4 45.0 8.7 45.0 26.0 45.8 63.2 11.9 10.9 32.9 8.7
Comm. banks credit rate, %6 107.1 77.0 49.1 54.5 53.4 40.3 61.7 54.5 50.9 52.4 47.9 40.4 38.0 38.1
Comm. banks deposit rate, %6 61.2 34.3 18.2 22.3 20.7 13.5 24.1 20.5 17.9 20.8 16.9 11.9 13.6 12.7
               
Inter-enterprise arrears, UAH billion1                             
Accounts receivable 22.3 48.0 74.1 103.0 163.5 178.2 127.4 150.8 157.9 163.5 177.2 185.6 186.2 178.2
Accounts payable 30.5 73.2 102.5 137.6 196.4 222.4 163.4 183.4 192.1 196.4 219.1 235.7 232.6 222.4
 
 
1999 2000 Indicators 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
               
Public debt1, 5                              
Internal debt, USD million1, 5  1929 5367 3315 2 871 3 824 5 790 6 843 3 906 2 871 2762 4259 3891 3 824
External debt, USD million1, 5 8000 8839 9553 11483 12475 10356 11 350 12 392 12 890 12 475 10978 10569 10073 10356
      Debt payments (P+I) 1420 1112 1393 2434 893 1220 570 213 110 470 149 332 373 366
                 
Official exchange rate5                             
UAH/100 USD 179.40 188.90 189.90 342.70 521.63 543.45 393.56 394.89 446.97 521.63 542.76 543.78 543.97 543.45
UAH/100 DM 125.15 121.49 105.97 204.84 267.93 258.55 215.53 209.25 241.40 267.93 265.16 264.24 243.78 258.55
UAH/10 RUR 3.87** 3.40 3.19 1.66 1.93 1.93 1.63 1.63 1.78 1.93 1.91 1.94 1.96 1.93
                 
Monetary indicators. UAH million5                             
Money supply, M3  6 930 9 364 12 541 15 705 22 070 32 084 15 923 18 579 20 468 22 070 24 211 27 098 28 975 32 084
Currency in circulation, M0 2 623 4 041 6 132 7 158 9 583 12 799 6716 7 915 9 008 9 583 9 465 10 783 11 541 12 799
Net domestic assets 4 336 5589 7622 15 294 21 495 20 506 16679 17 659 19 224 21 495 21 581 21887.3 20717 20 506
    Net claims on Government 4295 5995 7096 14620 19121 19 939 15 610 16057 17250 19121 19601 20500 19932 19 939
Net foreign assets -779 -614 -211 -6655 -9286 -2945 -7 930 -7 038 -7 756 -9286 -8 571 -7465 -5569 -2945
Monetary base 3 540 4 882 7 058 8 625 11 988 16 777 8 562 10 334 11 069 11 988 12 580 14 025 14 888 16 777
    Reserves of comm. banks7 917 841 926 1 467 2 405 3 978 1846 2 419 2 061 2 405 3 115 3 242 3 347 3 978
                 
Foreign exchange reserves, stock, USD million5                           
Foreign Reserves (excl. gold) 1051 1 960 2 341 761 1 046 1 353 673 941 1332 1046 941 812 825 1 353
    SDR 144 67 71 182 66 249 209 64 214 66 82 39 71 249
    Foreign currency 906 1893 2 270 579 981 1 104 464 877 1118 981 859 773 754 1 104
Gold (national estimation) 18 12 18 32 47 124 33 33 45 47 119 127 124 124
               
Privatization                             
Number of enterprises privatized5 28 152 48 118 57 009 62 349 67 998 73 349 63 429 64 509 66 399 67 998 69 051 70 278 71 654 73 349
                
Wages                             
Average wage, UAH/month 73 126 143 154 177 231 156 172 184 199 194 216 245 269
Wage arrears. UAH million1. 5 575 3 739 4 908 6 518 6 462 4928*** 6 814 6 886 6 830 6 462 6 517 6 325 5965 4928***
      of which in budget sphere 192 994 717 960 591 261*** 967 899 735 591 628 545 437 261***
Average pension,8 UAH/month1, 5 39 52 52.2 61 69 84 61 62 69 69 71 72 73 84
Pension arrears, UAH1, 5 72 1 124 1 280 1 974 1 263 0 2 282 1 974 1 611 1 263 1 310 858 0 0
 
 
 
1999 2000 Indicators 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
               
Privatization                             
Number of enterprises privatized5 28 152 48 118 57 009 62 349 67 998 73 349 63 429 64 509 66 399 67 998 69 051 70 278 71 654 73 349
                
Wages                             
Average wage, UAH/month 73 126 143 154 177 231 156 172 184 199 194 216 245 269
Wage arrears. UAH million1. 5 575 3 739 4 908 6 518 6 462 4928*** 6 814 6 886 6 830 6 462 6 517 6 325 5965 4928***
      of which in budget sphere 192 994 717 960 591 261*** 967 899 735 591 628 545 437 261***
Average pension,8 UAH/month1, 5 39 52 52.2 61 69 84 61 62 69 69 71 72 73 84
Pension arrears, UAH1, 5 72 1 124 1 280 1 974 1 263 0 2 282 1 974 1 611 1 263 1 310 858 0 0
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